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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study is to provide a framework for understanding the dynamics and 
motivations behind the mobilisation of diasporas. What shapes diaspora mobilisation? 
And when they do get involved in homeland politics, what determines the success of 
diaspora efforts? How is diaspora mobilisation shaped through human agency? The 
study will look at the Croatian diaspora in North America which, with a long history of 
active involvement in the politics of its homeland, brings forth a compelling case for the 
study of diaspora mobilisation. Are conflict–based arguments sufficient to explain 
diaspora mobilisation? Are there complementary, but potentially more covert, driving 
factors behind it?  
Other studies have identified homeland conflict as important for diaspora mobilisation, 
but have not shown yet in depth how framing processes work in the presence of 
charismatic leadership and their framing strategies. Aiming at filling this gap in the 
literature, this study provides a complementary argument to conflict–based arguments; it 
focuses on the role of collective action frames (CAF) used by goal–seeking elites in 
diaspora mobilisation and brings out the effects of agency. It states that while conflict 
provides important opportunities to mobilise, agents play a crucial role in framing and 
reframing these opportunities to advance their political goals. This thesis is the first one 
to give an in depth discussion of specific framing mechanism and how they interconnect 
with charismatic leadership.  
By employing the frame analysis approach this study intends to link the literature on 
collective action frames and framing processes with the research done in Diaspora 
Studies.  In doing so, it will make use of the framing literature in relation to social 
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movement processes that it tries to illuminate. The study identifies effective framing 
processes, diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational, as crucial for understanding the 
character, the course and the outcome of diaspora mobilisation and its consequent 
political influence.  
The study aims to expand framing theory by contributing to our understanding of how 
leaders motivate and mobilise resources, generate and identify opportunities, frame 
issues, plan and develop strategies, recruit support and create change. Human agency has 
been neglected by the recent emphasis on structures of opportunity and this study is a 
response to the growing demand for the examination of the numerous ways in which 
leaders generate social change and create the conditions for the agency of others.  
However favourable the ‘breeding ground’ presented by the opportunity structure, it 
only provides potential actors with options. It is ultimately always the parties themselves 
who must make the best of them. This study shall therefore focus on the leader in charge 
of the framing processes and his characteristics as one of the key factors explaining his 
success. In doing so, the study will address an existing gap in the framing literature and 
divert attention to the role of Franjo Tuđman, the first President of independent Croatia, 
in constructing diaspora collective action frames. In placing the focus on the leader, the 
study does not intend to minimise the role of other explanatory factors, e.g. effective 
resource mobilisation and political opportunity structures (POS), the right configuration 
of which is essential for the framing processes to be effective. Instead, when addressing 
these elements of diaspora mobilisation, the study does so through the lens of leadership. 
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Figure 1 Ethnic Distribution in the Balkans1 
 
 
                                                 
1 Ethnic Distribution in the Balkans, c. 1990. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. Retrieved from 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Balkans/images-videos/Ethnic-distribution-in-the-Balkans-
1990/712   
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CHAPTER I: Introduction 
 
From the economic and political point of view, emigration presents a loss for the future 
development of Croatian life and should it continue in its present direction and numbers 
it will bring about the suicide of our nation.2  
 
These were the words of warning published by a Croatian newspaper at the turn of the 
19th century. The harsh reality that marked that period in Croatia could not have 
produced any milder choice of words. However, rather than ending with a “suicide of 
the nation”, the 20th century ended on a slightly less destructive note. Although it 
concluded with a decade heavily marred by conflict and violence, it also ended the 
centuries–long struggle for Croatian statehood. The descendants of those who left 
Croatia at the turn of the century, through their financial and political networks of 
influence, heavily contributed to what has been referred to in the Croatian Diaspora3 as 
the “rebirth of the nation”.4 
This is a study of the Croatian Diaspora, which with a long history of active involvement 
in the politics of its homeland, brings forth a compelling case for the study of diaspora 
mobilisation. Croatia has played an important role in all forms of emigration flows in 
almost all periods of the last few centuries.5  It is often stressed that Croatia had the 
                                                 
2 Čizmić, I. (1994). Emigration from Croatia between 1880 and 1980. In M. Sopta and G. Scardatello 
(Eds.), Unknown journey: A history of Croatians in Canada (p. 2).  Downsview: University of 
Toronto Press Inc. 
N.B.I use the APA style consistently for my references. In consultation with the APA editor, I use 
footnotes for all my references. When referring to specific page numbers of a publication, these 
are inserted in brackets as in the example above to avoid in-text referencing. 
3 In this study, ‘Diaspora’ is used to refer to the Croatian Diaspora, while ‘diaspora’ is used to refer to 
diasporas in general. 
4 Interview with a member of the Croatian Diaspora conducted for the purposes of this study. 
5 Čizmić, I. (1996) The Republic of Croatia Mediterranean and Central European States emigration and 
emigrants from Croatia between 1880 and 1980. GeoJournal: An International Journal on 
Human Geography and Environmental Sciences, 38(4), 431–436. 
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greatest emigration rate in the world, after Ireland.6 Together with Ireland, Greece, and 
Israel, Croatia serves as a revealing example of the role that diasporas play in the 
process of struggle for a separate nation–state.7 8 The importance of the Croatian 
Diaspora is also marked by its size, and it was the scale of its potential that enticed 
political leaders into embarking on a diaspora project. According to a number of 
demographic estimates, more than one third of Croatians live abroad – the majority of 
them having settled in North America.  The total population of Croatia is not more than 
4.29 million (90.4 per cent of whom identify themselves as Croatian),9 with estimates of 
more than three million living abroad.10 11  The majority of Croatian emigrants live in the 
United States of America (US).  In 2012, there were 419,647 American citizens of 
Croatian ancestry living in the US as per the revised 2010 United States Census 
(compared to 544,270 in 1990).12  Due to frequent enumeration mistakes, missing 
records, and transcription or indexing errors, the number is likely to be much higher, 
with some demographic analysts estimating a figure of over two million people of 
Croatian descent13 in the US alone.  In Canada, there were approximately 114,880 
                                                 
6 ibid  
7 Seton-Watson, H. (1979). Nations and states. London: Basil Blackwell. 
8Appaduraï, A. (cited in Danforth, L. M., 1995). The Macedonian conflict (pp. 80–81) Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.  
9Croatian Bureau of Statistics (2011). 2011 Census of the Republic of Croatia. Retrieved from 
http://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm  
10Čizmić, I., Sopta, M., & Šakić, V. (2005). Iseljena Hrvatska [Emigration Croatia]. Zagreb: Golden 
Marketing - Tehnička knjiga. 
11Hrvati u svijetu. Interview with Natasha Srdoc-Samy, president of the Adriatic Institute for Public 
Policy, a Croatian think-tank based in Rijeka. Croatian Radio Television archive. Retrieved from 
http://www.hrt.hr/arhiv/hrvati_u_svijetu 
12United States Census Bureau (1990). American Community Survey. Retrieved from 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data.html 
13Croatian Ethnic Institute. Retrieved from http://www.croatian-institute.org/about.html 
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Canadians of Croatian descent as reported in the 2011 National Household Survey.14  
This is not to claim that all people of Croatian descent living outside of Croatia are 
members of the Croatian Diaspora.  As we shall see, one of the concerns arising from 
definitional inconsistencies among scholars, and also governments and diaspora 
organisations, are the irreconcilable statistical differences regarding diaspora 
membership. 
Transnational engagement of these communities has played an important political role in 
the creation of independent Croatia – their engagement significantly helped the electoral 
campaign of Franjo Tuđman, the late founder and first president of the Republic of 
Croatia.15  Both the conception and the formation of the new Croatian state have 
involved Croats operating from within the Croatian Diaspora in North America and, as 
we shall see, they proved instrumental in bringing that idea to life.  For their efforts, they 
were awarded an unparalleled position of privilege, including unique voting rights and 
leading political positions.  
For more than a century there have been ‘two Croatias’ –  one in the Balkans, now a part 
of the European Union (EU), for a long time trapped between the East and the West, 
battling regional tensions and struggling against foreign domination – and one 
developing outside the borders of Croatia.  In spite of the initial animus revertendi of 
these migrants, most of them never returned home.  Without denying the ever–present 
                                                 
14Government of Canada (2011). National Household Survey. Retrieved from 
http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/dt-td/Rp-
eng.cfm?LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=0&GID=0&GK
=0&GRP=1&PID=105396&PRID=0&PTYPE=105277&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Tempo
ral=2013&THEME=95&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF= 
15 Djuric, I. (2001). The Croatian Diaspora in North America: Identity, Ethnic Solidarity and the 
Formation of a 'Transnational National Community. Spaces of Identity, 3, 89—105. 
17 
 
links between the two entities, we can say that the relationship between the Diaspora and 
its homeland has always been complex and a rather eclectic one.  Diasporas in general 
commonly undergo important structural changes and, as emphasised by Sheffer,16 often 
modify their previous assimilationist, integrationist, or acculturationist tendencies.  The 
Croatian Diaspora members today openly and proudly maintain their ethno–national 
identity, belong to a number of diasporic organisations, and do not hesitate to act 
publicly on behalf of their home country.  Most Croatian commentators agree that 
Diaspora identity was shaped by the Croatian historical narrative, focusing on a shared 
history of the Croatian people and occupancy of a common state, but always 
emphasising the tradition of statehood that Croatia ostensibly enjoyed throughout its 
history.17  Nonetheless, there are examples of competing notions of national identity that 
existed both in Croatia proper and in the Diaspora.  We will see in later chapters how the 
notion of Croatian statehood was re–emphasised by Franjo Tuđman in the 1990s, who in 
his well–structured and carefully designed speeches stressed that Croats shared a 
‘centuries–old dream’ of statehood, a claim that resonated throughout the decade.  
Carefully thought–out interpretations of Croatian identity served to stabilise the 
relationships between different members of the Diaspora, but also between the Diaspora 
and its homeland.  These were articulated to a wide audience at home and abroad by 
Tuđman and his political supporters in the 1990s.  What Croats experienced as two 
separate, internally fragmented entities, were merged into one Croatian nation, now 
including Croats in both the Diaspora and in Croatia proper.  This unifying discourse, as 
                                                 
16 Sheffer, G. (2003). Diaspora politics: At home abroad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
17 Bellamy, A. J. (2003). The formation of Croatian national identity: A Centuries-old dream?  
Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.  
18 
 
we shall see, aimed to rise above national cleavages, legitimise political programmes in 
Croatia and serve as a mobilisation tool abroad.  This led to an unprecedented Diaspora 
support for its homeland and a relationship built on networks of political, financial, 
humanitarian and cultural influence. 
The purpose of this introduction is not to provide a comprehensive history of Croatia 
and its Diaspora, nor to explain the intricate political environment in the Balkans and 
offer reasons for the military conflict in former Yugoslavia.  Instead, the following pages 
will first briefly present key debates in the field of Diaspora Studies and address the 
growing definitional and conceptual inconsistencies attached to the term ‘diaspora’.  The 
chapter will then present a focused history of the Croatian Diaspora meant to serve as 
contextual information for arguments presented later in the thesis, and also explain the 
use of the term in the Croatian context. The last section will briefly introduce the 
research problem and outline the structure of the thesis. 
Diaspora: The Conceptual Debate 
 
Debate in the Field of Diaspora Studies 
  
An unruly crowd of descriptive/interpretative terms now jostle and converse in an effort 
to characterise the contact zones of nations, cultures and regions.18  
 
We have witnessed a rapid increase in interest in diasporas since the late 1980s.  
Brubaker19 counts 'diaspora' and its cognates as keywords only once or twice a year in 
dissertations from the 1970s, about 13 times a year in the late 1980s, and nearly 130 
times in 2001 alone.  Brubaker also points out that 'diaspora' explosion is not limited to 
                                                 
18 Clifford, J. (1997). Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century (p.245). Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press.  
19 Brubaker, R. (2005). The ‘diaspora’ diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28, 1–19. 
19 
 
academic writing, evidenced by a million google hits in 2005.  A few years ago this 
number reached 50 million.  Today it is around 130 million. 
One of the battles fought within the field of Diaspora Studies, still a relatively new field, 
is the conceptual debate of the term that finds its roots in Greek and is based on a 
translation of the Hebrew word galut.  Based on speiro (to sow) and the preposition dia 
(over), in Ancient Greek, the term referred to migration and colonisation.  In Hebrew, 
the word originally referred to “the setting of colonies of Jews outside Palestine after the 
Babylonian exile” and has assumed a more general meaning to refer to people settled 
away from their original homelands.20  The difficulty lies in determining diaspora 
membership. Definitions range from broader concepts such as ‘imagined communities’21 
and ‘categories of practice’,22 to narrow checklists.23  Today we talk about ‘cultural 
diasporas’,24 of ‘fear Diasporas’25, and ‘virtual diasporas’26. Francophone and 
Anglophone communities and other linguistic groups: Buddhist, Catholic, Muslim and 
other religious communities are also often labelled as diasporas.  Immigrants, 
                                                 
20 Shuval, J. T. (2003).The dynamics of diaspora: Theoretical implications of ambiguous concepts. In R. 
Münz & R. Ohliger (Eds.), Diasporas and ethnic migrants: Germany, Israel and Russia in 
comparative perspective. London, Frank Cass. 
21 Sokefeld, M. (2006). Mobilizing in transnational space: a social movement approach to the formation of 
diaspora. Global Networks, 6 (3), 265–284. 
22 Brubaker, R. (2005). The ‘diaspora’ diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28, 1–19. 
23 Safran, W. (1991). Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return. Diaspora, 1 (1), 83–
83. 
William Safran uses a strict definition of diasporas, defining them as expatriate minority communities (1) 
that are dispersed from an original ‘centre’ to at least two ‘peripheral’ places; (2) that maintain a memory, 
vision, or myth about their original homeland; (3) that believe they are not-and perhaps cannot be-fully 
accepted by their host country; (4) that see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return, when the time 
is right; (5) that are committed to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland; and (6) of which the 
group's consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by this continuing relation with the 
homeland. 
24 Cohen, R. (1997). Global Diasporas: An Introduction. London, UCL Press. 
25 Appaduraï, A. (1996). Modernity at Large: Cultural dimensions of globalization. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
26 Tishkov, V.A. (2000). Istoricheskiy phenomen diaspory.Etnographicheskoye obozreniye, 3, 43-63. 
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expatriates, émigrés, refugees, overseas communities, ethnic communities, and guest 
workers are all diasporas – or are they? Within academia, the term is now used 
throughout the humanities and social sciences, but the dispersion is even more striking 
outside academia, in media and popular culture where adjectives, verbs and other 
diaspora–derived nouns have been created, further dispersing the term both semantically 
and conceptually.  
The relatively scarce use of the term before the late 1970s, as Shuval points out, was 
because before the 1960s, immigrant groups were generally expected to gradually lose 
their ethnic identity and assimilate to norms of the host country. Immigrant groups that 
were thought incapable of this were not admitted, e.g. non–Whites to Australia”27. With 
assimilation theory and other theories based on the integration model during the 1970s 
revealing their shortcomings, we start seeing an increase in the use of the term ‘diaspora’ 
referring to migrants with a strong sense of ethnic identity.28  With Sheffer,29 
Shepperson,30 Cohen 31 and Armstrong,32 discussions of diasporas moved beyond the 
paradigmatic case, the Jewish Diaspora, to include other cases. In doing so, they 
continued to engage the Jewish experience and that of other 'classical' diasporas, 
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Armenian and Greek33. Although still present in discussions by Safran in 199134 and 
Clifford in 199435, references to the Jewish case have gradually decreased. 
Armstrong’s “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas”36 was a first attempt at theorising 
diaspora, followed by Gabriel Sheffer in 198637 arguing for a separation of the concept 
of diaspora from the Jewish experience, as it defines just as accurately the experience of 
Assyrians, Phenicians and Nabatheans as well as some later European diasporas.38 With 
that in view, Sheffer describes three main criteria vital for any definition of a diaspora: a 
preserved collective identity, a distinct internal structure to that of both the host and 
homeland, and real or symbolic links with the home country.  Less than a decade later, 
Sheffer introduced the political dimension of diasporas and a distinction between 
stateless and state–based diasporas.  Cohen’s39 typology, based on rich empirical 
observations, made a distinction between labour, imperial, trade, and cultural diasporas. 
The 1990s saw the development of a number of diaspora typologies.  Safran suggests 
diaspora could be considered as a ‘metaphoric designation’ that could refer to various 
populations including expatriates or political refugees.  In his essays,40 41 Safran narrowly 
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defines diasporas as ‘expatriate minority communities’ while Alain Medam’s42 typology, 
taking into account the degree of diaspora cohesiveness and dynamism, differentiates 
between ‘crystallised diasporas’ and ‘fluid diasporas.’  Michel Bruneau’s43 typology, on 
the other hand, is based on the degree of organisation, differentiating between the 
entrepreneurial diasporas, the religious diasporas, and the political diasporas.  
With the appearance of the notions of transnational space and transnational 
communities, notably with the work produced by Basch, Glick–Schiller and Szanton 
Blanc,44 diasporas are redefined as ‘nation unbound’ that ‘reinscribe’ space in a new 
way.  The difficulty of distinguishing diaspora and transnational communities was 
confirmed in the works of Robin Cohen,45 Nicholas Van Hear,46 and Paul Kennedy and 
Victor Roudometof,47 who acknowledge that despite the important contributions of the 
last 10 years, the theorisation of the transnational experience, with its links to 
globalisation, remains incomplete. 
In view of the diverse and often conflicting uses of the term ‘diaspora’, the discussion in 
this study will be limited to the definition offered by Sheffer,48  which identifies 
diasporas as 1) ethno–national social and political formations, that 2) emerged out of 
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either voluntary or forced migration and are now permanently settled as minorities in 
one or several host countries.  They 3) maintain links with their homelands and other 
diasporants residing in other host countries and 4) show solidarity with their group and 
their entire nation.  These diasporas 5) organise and are active in the cultural, social, 
economic, and political spheres.  Members of ethno–national diasporas also 6) establish 
trans–state networks that reflect complex relationships among the diasporas, their host 
countries, their homelands, and international actors.  
Diaspora: The Croatian Debate 
 
Diaspora is not simply a theoretical concept or heuristic tool, but rather a meaningful 
category of self–representation and political discourse, not just for diaspora Croats but 
also for those homeland Croats who have inhabited that space and been drawn into 
diaspora spheres of influence – symbolic, political or otherwise. 49 
 
Even when the term ‘diaspora’ is appropriate, the fact that it is used to describe largely 
dissimilar concepts can render it vacuous.  For the purpose of this study, the term 
‘diaspora’ is used to refer to people of Croatian origin living outside the Republic of 
Croatia, including those settled overseas (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
Latin America) and Croatian immigrants in other European countries (Austria, Italy, 
Germany, Hungary, etc.) and their descendants, with the focus being on Croats living in 
North America.  A common denominator shared by these groups of immigrants, apart 
from their Croatian background, is an active engagement in activities between their 
home and host country.  Members of the Croatian Diaspora not only mark their ethnic 
origin as Croatian but have a strong sense of Croatian identity that is visible in areas of 
their everyday life.  It is evident in their preservation of Croatian language and traditions 
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and/or via educational, political or cultural ties with Croatia.  Many of them manage to 
maintain a strong dual identity – being a well–integrated and active member of both the 
host society and the Croatian Diaspora, thus embodying the concepts of multiplicity, 
transformation, and development. 
The difference between dissidents, political, and other emigrants was frequently blurred 
by the communist regime in Yugoslavia50.  Although ‘co–ethnics’, Croatian emigrants 
have traditionally been deeply divided between themselves.  Before the 1990s conflict, 
the Diaspora was heavily fragmented along both generational and political lines.  It 
included third generation Croats who, because of assimilationist and integrationist 
efforts of their ancestors, had weak and irregular links with their homeland.  The second 
generation Croats represented the relatively small number of radical activists involved in 
military operations and extremist activities.  The first generation Croats consisted mainly 
of those that fled Yugoslavia after 1945, some of whom were still politically active.  
Organisations representing Croats overseas mirrored the fragmentation of their political 
views.  The oldest and largest Croatian organisation in North America, in existence since 
1894, the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU), maintained its apolitical position and its good 
relations with Belgrade during Yugoslavia.  A later organisation, the Croatian National 
Council, which included political emigrants from the 1970s, functioned as a 
representative body of Croatian emigrant groups and operated from 1974 to the nation's 
independence in 1991, avoiding violence.  A distinctly anti–Yugoslav and more radical 
Croatian National Resistance (HNO), with its links to the Ustaše movement, sought to 
establish an independent Croatia during its time in Yugoslavia.  The Croatian Academy 
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of America, on the other hand, with its lectures on the subjects of Croatia’s history, 
literature and culture, and its Journal of Croatian Studies, encourages open debate and 
discussion51.  A number of Diaspora organisations operate under the umbrella of the 
National Federation of Croatian Americans (NFCA), with objectives focused on the 
protection of human rights, the inviolability of borders of Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the promotion of cooperation between Croatia and the US.52  In its 
mission statement NFCA also promises to protect Croatia when unfairly attacked, a 
topic explored in more detail in Chapter VI, ‘Diaspora after Tuđman’. 
At home, Diaspora discourse was inconsistent prior to the 1990s, dominated by 
categories of at least four different types of emigrants, all labelled by different synonyms 
of the term ‘diaspora’.  Political emigrants were usually referred to as ‘Croatia in exile’ 
(‘Iseljena Hrvatska’).  During communism, the ‘gastarbeiters’ (German for ‘guest 
workers’, referring to Croatian citizens working in mainly Austria and Germany) were 
also described as ‘our citizens temporarily employed abroad’, although the temporary 
nature of their stay was disputable, to say the least.  Many of them settled abroad 
permanently, significantly reducing the number and the duration of their visits to 
Croatia.  Terms such as ‘our emigrants’ and ‘our people abroad’ were also used but 
equally failed to clearly and thoroughly define the concept.  The Croatian World 
Congress today uses terms such as ‘Croatia outside the homeland’ interchangeably with 
the term ‘diaspora’.  Chapter VI analyses post–Yugoslavian Diaspora–related debates 
and elaborates on the current homeland–Diaspora relationship, addressing unfavourable 
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portrayals of Diaspora Croats at home that refer to them as hard–core nationalists, 
‘political/economic opportunists’ or ‘high–minded idealists’ not able to escape the 
legacy of the past.53 
There is a general consensus in the Diaspora Studies literature that over the span of its 
existence and as a reflection of events taking place in both home and host countries, a 
diaspora goes through a number of transformations, resulting in altered relationships 
with the homeland.  My research on the Croatian Diaspora also confirms that the 
strength of the central force keeping the relationship between the homeland and the 
diaspora alive is constantly susceptible to change and is heavily dependent on both 
internal and external circumstances.  The force that has kept Croatian emigrants close to 
their homeland since they left it behind has varied and shifted through time, with the 
early 1990s witnessing an immense increase in its presence.  A similar argument can be 
applied to the term ‘diaspora’ itself and the inconsistency of its connotations in the 
Croatian political discourse through history.  Its meaning, including the message that it 
was meant to convey, has evolved through and in the words of Franjo Tuđman, a former 
partisan turned Croatian nationalist and ‘unifier of everything Croatian’.  He used it as a 
tool to bury the past and, as we shall see, create a sense of unity among Croats outside 
their homeland.  
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A Brief History of the Croatian Diaspora 
 
What is happening to the Croatian nation today is not just emigration; this is decay, its 
disembowelment.  Almost everyone runs away from here....54  
 
Croatia has, at different times, existed as part of the Ottoman, Austro–Hungarian, 
Napoleonic French, Nazi German, and Yugoslav states; therefore, many of the 
immigrants arriving in other lands have been mistakenly recorded as Italian, Austrian, 
German, Yugoslav, or whatever else the immigration officers presumed them to be.55  
North America was one of the most frequent destinations for Croatian emigrants.  It is 
difficult to determine when the first Croatian emigrant arrived on the North American 
continent, but one of many legends says that Croatian sailors were among those on 
Columbus's historic voyage in 1492.56  The general consensus among historians is that 
the very first Croatians who left their homeland for the New World were from towns 
along the Adriatic Sea, predominantly from the city of Dubrovnik.  In 1494 Dubrovnik 
signed a significant trade agreement with Spain, and as a result started sending ships on 
the new trading routes to American Spanish colonies.  According to the archival records 
in Dubrovnik, the first emigrants left Dubrovnik for North America in 1526.  In May 
1783 a letter was sent from the Dubrovnik Senate to its diplomat in Paris, Francesco 
Favi, in which he was asked to visit the ministers of the American Colonies and 
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“exchange courtesies with them on our behalf, recommend our shipping and our Flag to 
them, and ask if access to their harbours would be open for our ships.”57  In his answer 
two months later, Favi explained that he had paid the visits, and that the Americans had 
replied that Dubrovnik ships were welcome in their ports.  58 
Works on Croatian Diaspora retell the story of Croatian sailors shipwrecked off Cape 
Hatteras in 1498 who, after settling down in the area, gradually assimilated with the 
Native Americans, the Croatan Indians.  In 1593, an English expedition discovered a 
tree carving in what was at the time the Roanoke Colony.  The tree had the inscription 
‘Croatoan,’ which is recognised among American historians as an Algonquin Indian 
name.  These and many other legends, however contested, have “contributed to the 
Croatian people's proclivity to look to the US as a traditional friend, ally and leader to 
this day.”59 
The first notable emigration of Croats occurred in the 15th and 16th centuries, at the 
beginning of the Ottoman occupation in today's Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
forcing people to settle in the neighbouring Hungary, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and small parts of Italy, Germany and Ukraine.  There are still large Croat 
communities in Austria and Hungary today.  The Illyrian Provinces, referring to the 
greater Croatian area at the time, were turned over to the Austro–Hungarian Empire 
from Napoleonic France in 1815.60  Adverse political circumstances forced a great 
number of Croats to migrate overseas, deserting mostly the regions of Dalmatia and 
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Istria because of their close proximity to the Adriatic Sea.61  Harsh living conditions took 
over when in 1870 a bitter depression hit Croatia as a result of a serious crop disease, 
and also as a result of the industrial development calling for considerably fewer 
workers.62  Typically, under–employed young Croatian men were sent abroad to earn 
money in order to repay debts or pay for the family house.  In the beginning, even during 
the period of mass immigration before World War I, only a small number of women 
emigrated with the men.  However, in the post–war years, and during the economic 
crisis of the 1930s, the percentage of women emigrants grew considerably, reaching 
more than 40 per cent.63 
Croatian emigration gained significance in the 1880s when Croats begin joining the 
great migration wave in the first decades of the 19th century, starting from Central and 
Southern Europe64.  By 1880, the source of the migration was for the most part mainland 
Croatia with roughly 10,000 people emigrating between 1870 and 1880, and 
approximately 74,000 in the period between 1880 and 1890.65  Many of them went to 
overseas destinations, including North America, South America (particularly Chile and 
Argentina, with smaller communities in Bolivia and Peru), South Africa, Australia and 
New Zealand. In the 2011 Australian Census, of the total ancestry responses, 126 270 
responses were towards Croatian ancestry66.  Many of them also settled after World War 
                                                 
61 ibid 
62 ibid 
63 ibid 
64 Antić, Lj. (1992). Hrvati i Amerika [Croatians and America]. Zagreb: Hrvatska Sveučilišna Naklada. 
65 Prpić, J. (1971). The Croatian immigrants in America. New York, New York: Philosophical Library, 
Inc. 
66. Australian Government. Department of Immigration and Citizenship. Community Information 
Summary.  Retrieved from 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/02_2014/croatia.pdf 
30 
 
II, with more than 20,000 Croatian refugees moving to Australia after 1950s, after 
previously living in the refugee camps in Europe, mainly Italy, Austria and Germany. 
The period stretching from the 1960s to 1973 marked the largest increase in Croatian 
immigration to Australia. 67 
It is estimated that roughly half a million Croats immigrated to the US alone before 
World War I.  Their reasons were mutually intertwined, caused by both political and 
economic factors as economic underdevelopment of Croatia at the time was directly 
linked to its political situation in the Austro–Hungarian monarchy.68 
Deprivation of political rights in the first Yugoslavian state, the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes, created the first real political emigrants and only the American 
restrictive immigration policy slowed down the massive exodus that started before 
World War I.  A large number of roughly half a million people left the Croatian lands 
prior to World War II.69  According to the documentation of the Emigration Department 
in Zagreb for the period from January 1921 to the end of December 1939, a span of 19 
years, some 195,937 persons emigrated overseas.  If the number of those who moved to 
European countries (88,642) between 1927 and 1934 is added to the above figure, the 
total number of emigrants is about a quarter of a million.70  Some of these people 
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emigrated overseas, but most of them stayed within Europe71.  The majority of Croatian 
emigrants that went to Europe settled in Germany, Belgium and France. With a gradual 
decrease of emigration from the interwar Yugoslavia to overseas destinations, 
emigration to European countries increased.72 From 1946 until 1963/4 a large number of 
illegal emigrants, following the abolition of travel restrictions on labour migrants 
illegally crossed Yugoslav borders, mostly to Italy or Austria. The period after 1964 was 
marked by state-tolerated and even facilitated mass migration of workers known as 
“workers on temporary work abroad” (known also as Gastarbeiters). The most attractive 
destinations were Western European countries, especially the FR Germany.73 Today, 
Croats, roughly 350,00 of them, form the 6th largest ethnic minority in Germany.74 
The journey of the Croatian Diaspora has been rocky from the start, with the period from 
1941 to 1945, when the Croatian Government at the time was openly pro–German and 
pro–Italian, most likely having been the most difficult.  The declaration of war in 1941 
on the US by the government of Ante Pavelić in Zagreb, the head of the Independent 
State of Croatia (NDH), the World War II puppet state of Nazi Germany, further 
aggravated the already delicate political situation of the Diaspora, particularly that of 
Croatian–Americans.  When the US entered World War II, all major Croatian 
organisations in the US firmly supported the American government in its decision to join 
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the war.  The second larger emigration wave of Croats, this time largely for political 
reasons, took place immediately after the end of World War II.  These political 
emigrants were either supporters of the Ustaša regime in NDH or those opposing the 
communist regime in the second Yugoslavia. Those who survived the Bleiburg massacre 
of 194575 occupy the greatest majority of political immigrants in North America.76  
Bleiburg continues to play an important role in Croatia’s collective memory and, as we 
shall see in the chapters that follow, was brought to the foreground again during the 
1990s. 
The second Yugoslavia, first called the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia and proclaimed 
in 1943 by the Yugoslav Partisans’ resistance movement during World War II, was 
renamed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946, when a communist 
government was established.  In 1963, it was renamed again to the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)77.  The emigration policy of the second Yugoslavian 
state persistently drove Croats out of the country, thus “emptying entire 
regions, especially those where the Croatian element was most vital”78. Nonetheless, the 
years after World War II saw a reduced and more dispersed emigration over time.  For 
instance, approximately 45,000 Croats left Croatia for the US after 1945, typically to 
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break away from the Yugoslav regime.  The political migration wave continued and 
significantly accelerated after mass political cleansings during 1971/72.  The 1970s, 
characterised by a political movement in Croatia, the Croatian Spring, which called for 
greater rights for Croatia as well as democratic and economic reforms, brought hard 
times for Croats in the Diaspora where it was politically unpopular to be a Croat when 
Washington ignored the Croatian movement in Yugoslavia and supported the Belgrade 
regime.79  The United States Census of 1990 recorded 141,516 foreign–born 
Yugoslavs.80   
Geographies of Interest 
 
The Croatian Fraternal Union, mentioned earlier, is the oldest, largest and most 
influential Croatian Diaspora organisation, with its membership traditionally strongest 
across the states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, California, and the Canadian province 
of Ontario.  In Croatian Diaspora’s recent history, major hubs have been located in 
Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles and Toronto, Canada.  This section will 
provide more information on diaspora Croats in Toronto, Canada, Cleveland, Ohio and 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the home office of the CFU, where the bulk of this study’s 
empirical data derives from.  
In Ohio there are over 70,000 Croatian–Americans, roughly 10,000 of whom arrived in 
the US between 1945 and 1970.  Cleveland itself has around 25,000 Croats, with around 
500 diaspora organisations, making it one of the most famous Croatian Diaspora 
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communities.81  Around 200,000 Croatians live in Pittsburgh today, the headquarters of 
the CFU and the home of the Fraternalist (Zajedničar), the most influential Diaspora 
publication averaging 20 pages in both Croatian and English.  Pittsburgh is also the 
home of many cultural societies, parishes, clubs and Croatian schools.   
From humble beginnings and a membership of less than 300 in 1894, the CFU has 
grown into a modern organisation and one of the leading fraternal benefit societies.  
Today it has approximately 60,000 members worldwide and its assets in 120 years have 
grown from $43 to approaching $400 million.  In 1994, the CFU celebrated its 100th 
anniversary and the office in Pittsburgh now includes libraries, an extensive museum, a 
classroom, an editorial department, a recording studio and office space for its executive 
boards and employees.  It also publishes the Fraternalist. 
The CFU survived the 1930s Great Depression and the turbulent years of the great wars, 
particularly the entry of the US into the war in 1917, when Croatians were seen as war 
aliens having arrived in the US from Austro–Hungary, an enemy nation at the time.  In 
Canada, for example, Josip Marohnić, the President of the CFU, pled the case for a 
number of imprisoned Croatians, most of whom were subsequently released by the 
Canadian government.82  On July 16, 1941, another difficult year for diaspora Croats, the 
CFU sent a note to President Roosevelt “stressing that Croats are loyal citizens of the 
USA and were convinced that victory of the Allies will be the victory of the old country.  
They fully supported the politics of the USA and its Allies”.83  
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Since its early days, the basic purpose of the CFU has been to provide members with life 
insurance programmes and annuity/individual retirement account (IRA) products.  Other 
notable CFU activities include the CFU Scholarship Foundation, which has awarded 
8,832 scholarship grants, totalling $2,880, 355, to students since its inception in 1958.  
The CFU also has a strong sports promotion programme, with tournaments held at the 
national, regional and local levels in skiing, basketball, golf and bowling.  CFU’s 
cultural activities focus on the promotion of Croatian national folklore, with both juniors 
and adults performing in over 30 ensembles at an annual festival held in a different city 
each time. Radio programmes operated by CFU members “can be heard, particularly on 
Saturdays and Sundays, in many cities in the US and Canada”. 84  The CFU also  takes 
great pride in working with the younger generations.  In 1915 the CFU established the 
Junior Order Department, stating: 
We should always keep in mind that by organizing our young generation 
we will make the Croatian national conscience enter the hearts of all 
young people and remain there, that we will protect our children , educate 
them and make them become the future members of the National Croatian 
Society.  We who are older shall go one after the other, and it is our duty 
to take care of the descendants who will fill our ranks in the future and 
represent honourably our Croatian cause.  85 
 
Currently there are 213 junior Nest lodges across Canada, the US and Croatia.  
The period after World War I was characterised by a noticeable development in the 
social status of diaspora Croats and by an increased Americanisation of Croatian 
communities.  Every Croatian community by now had its doctors, lawyers, teachers and 
business people.  Croatians in the US now lived in nicer homes and better 
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neighbourhoods.  During this period, many of them worked in business, education or 
politics, but thousands of them were still employed in steel mills and coal mines.  The 
45,000 people who arrived in the US after World War II differed significantly from 
those that emigrated earlier.  They were mainly political immigrants.  They were also 
better educated, many of them intellectuals and professionals.  They adjusted relatively 
quickly to life on the new continent and integrated more easily.  Many of them started 
off doing manual labour, but they quickly learned English and were able to move on to 
higher paid positions, continue their education at North American Universities, and work 
in their chosen fields.  George (Jure) Prpić, a celebrated Croatian writer and the author 
of many works on the Croatian Diaspora, is one of many examples.  They were able to, 
in a relatively short time, accumulate enough wealth to start their own businesses, buy 
cars and properties and, unlike their co–ethnics at home, ‘live the life of the west’.  With 
their wealth, observes Prpić, “they enriched the everyday life of America”86.  But, more 
importantly, they were a vital resource in the 1990s, one that significantly contributed to 
the creation of independent Croatia. 
From the end of World War II until 1975 approximately 65,000 Croats settled in 
Canada, with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area having the highest concentration of 
Croatian Canadians.  Roughly 35,000 Croatian Canadians have settled there.  Similar to 
other regions, those who came from socialist Yugoslavia in the years immediately after 
World War II have always had a strong Croatian identity and maintained a community 
through churches and cultural associations.  Before and during World War II, Western 
Herzegovina was the most prominent stronghold of radical Croatian nationalism where a 
                                                 
86Prpić, J. (1997). Hrvati u Americi [Croatians in America] (p. 329). Zagreb: Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika.  
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number of Franciscans also became notorious for being open supporters of the far–right 
regime.  After World War II, they established communities in Chicago and also in 
Norval, a town on the Credit River, approximately 55 km west of Toronto.  These 
functioned as epicentres of the far–right political activity.87  However, the community 
was very much divided between the supporters of Tito and those with links to the World 
War II fascist regime, but as many had relatives at home, their political activity was 
limited due to fears of retribution. 
Many of these post 1945 migrants also settled in Cleveland, Ohio, where they re–joined 
earlier Croatian and Slovenian immigrants.  Given that a lot of them fled from the 
communist regime, they were ardent anti–communists and often much more radical in 
their political views, regularly clashing with the earlier Croatian settlers.  Having 
escaped from communism, they disliked being referred to as ‘immigrants’ and called 
themselves political refugees.  In Cleveland, a similar political divide separated them 
from the supporters of Tito’s partisans, whom they referred to as communists.  These 
newly arrived radicals were vocal in their support of Croatian independence, and were 
labelled as Ustaša or fascists by the earlier Croatian settlers.88  The early 1970s, the days 
of the Croatian Spring, triggered a new wave of political immigrants from Croatia.  
Thousands of people were drawn to North America by letters written by their Croatian 
relatives already settled in the US and Canada, promising jobs and high salaries.  
Cleveland was one of the examples, where an American Society for Croatian Migration 
was formed, tasked with supporting all newly arrived Croatians. 
                                                 
87Perica, V. (2002). Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
88 Raditsa, B. (1958, January). The clash of two immigrant generations. Commentary, 21, pp.8-15; also in 
Prpić, p.329. 
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Throughout the years, the Cleveland community was exceptionally active in 
commemorating Croatia’s past, the Bleiburg tragedy in particular.  On 2 June 1960, for 
example, the Congressional Record reports on the commemoration held at the Statler– 
Hilton Hotel in Cleveland on 30 May 1960, celebrating Croatian victims of 1945.  The 
report was followed by an article entitled “The Bleiburg Maribor Tragedy – Croatian 
Golgotha” written by Stephen W. Skertich89, an American of Croatian origins.  Earlier 
that year Cleveland Croats also celebrated Croatian Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac with 
similar celebrations, many triggered by the Cardinal’s death in 1960, also held in other 
Croatian communities in North America.90  After World War II Stepinac was found 
guilty by the Yugoslav authorities of a charge of high treason for his collaboration with 
the Ustaša regime and sentenced to 16 years in the notorious Lepoglava prison, a 
frequent home for unwanted political prisoners, including Franjo Tuđman.  Five years 
later, he was released to house arrest and was appointed Cardinal in 1952.  He was later 
declared a martyr and beatified by Pope John II in front of an audience of half a million 
Croatians. 91  He was, and still is, frequently used as a symbol of Croatian national pride, 
including by President Tuđman. 
According to Prpić, a prominent member of the Cleveland community, Tuđman was 
relatively unknown in the Diaspora at the time.   This changed in the summer of 1966, 
when he first came to the North American continent, visiting Cleveland and other North 
American communities.  He appeared at the right time, with the dialogue on Croatian 
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reconciliation having begun.92  Six years later, he was imprisoned for participating in the 
Croatian Spring movement, which advocated Croatian independence, and again in 1981 
for spreading national hatred, including by maintaining links with the members of the 
‘fascist’ Croatian Diaspora93.  Following his release, he obtained a passport for the first 
time in 17 years and travelled to North America in 1987.  By 1987 Tuđman was already 
well known in the Diaspora, both as a historian and a fighter for Croatian sovereignty. 
His articles and books were read in the Diaspora, including Nationalism in 
Contemporary Europe, translated into English by Meštrović94. Still, when Tuđman first 
visited Canada in 1987 many were suspicious of his communist views. However, by the 
time he ran for president in 1990, “nationalism had superseded factionalism, and 
Canadian Croats say their money helped elect him”95.  
“But the fledgling Croatian Government got more than money from Canada; it got 
people”.96  Some of the most prominent figures included Defence Minister Šušak from 
Ottawa, Minister of Transport and Communications Ivica Mudrinić of Mississauga, 
Ante Beljo of Sudbury, who became a leader of Tuđman’s party, and Drago Hlad of 
Mississauga, who became an official in the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs.97  It is 
this period between 1987, the beginning of Tuđman’s strong ties with the Diaspora, and 
                                                 
92 Prpić, J. (1997). Hrvati u Americi [Croatians in America]. Zagreb: Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika.  
93 Babić, G. (1992). Bespuća Franje Tuđmana. Zemun: Grafopublik; see also Prpić (1997), p. 362. 
94 Tuđman, F. (1981). Nationalism in Contemporary Europe. New York: Columbia Press. 
95 Swardson, A. (1993, March 8). The Croats of Canada prove their hearts are in the homeland. 
Washington Post. Retrieved from 
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1995, which marked the end of the Croatian Homeland War, that this study is focused 
on.  More specifically, it focuses on how the Croatian Diaspora bridged the political 
divide and united during that period to support the homeland, with special attention paid 
to the drivers behind their mobilisation.  But let us briefly examine some key events of 
the period, before delving deeper into the research problem.   
“What is going to happen when Tito dies…?”  
Mohácsi Dezső, my grandfather 
 
The start of the Balkans conflict in the early 1990s started the disintegration of SFRY 
following the secession of most of the country's constituent entities.  ‘Like Rome,’ as the 
saying goes, ‘it wasn’t built in a day.’  Indeed, the 10–year–long series of bitter ethnic 
conflicts that started in 1991 in the territory of former Yugoslavia have centuries–deep 
roots.  The long–standing ethnic and religious tensions, buttressed by chronic political, 
economic and cultural crises, escalated into the bloodiest conflict on European soil since 
World War II.  It will take generations to repair the damage caused by the fighting 
between mostly Serbs on one side and Croats, Bosnian and Albanians on the other; but 
also between Croats and Bosniaks98 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonians and 
Albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  While some perpetrators 
were prosecuted at the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, reconciliation on 
the ground in many parts of former Yugoslavia is still far from achieved.  Let us briefly 
go through some of the key events of the 199–1995 war in Croatia, as these will be 
referenced in later chapters. 
Key Events from 1990 to 1995: From Socialism to Independence  
 
                                                 
98Bosnian Muslim 
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The year 1990 saw the first free, multi–party elections in Croatia since 1938, and the 
first such elections for the Croatian Parliament since 1913.  The parliamentary elections 
in the then Socialist Republic of Croatia were held in April 1990, with the Croatian 
Democratic Union, known by its Croatian initials HDZ, winning 205 out of 356 seats, 
overthrowing the League of Communists of Croatia–Party of Democratic Reform 
(SKH–SDP) from power and ending more than four decades of communist rule in 
Croatia.  The new Parliament convened for the first time on 30 May 1990, electing 
Franjo Tuđman as President.  On 19 May 1991, Croatia held an independence 
referendum, with 93 per cent of voters opting in favour of independence.  On 25 June 
1991, Croatia declared its independence but was urged to introduce a three–month 
moratorium on the decision.  Two months later, the war broke out with the Croatian 
Parliament severing all remaining ties with Yugoslavia in October 1991.  Members of 
Croatia's Serb minority in Croatia, supported by the Yugoslav National Army and the 
regime of Slobodan Milošević, the Yugoslav President the time, seized large areas of the 
country, with only two thirds of its territory remaining under Croatian control.  Pro–Serb 
forces bombed Croatian cities, including Osijek, Zagreb and Dubrovnik, and destroying 
the town of Vukovar in the East of the country.  By the end of 1991, more than a quarter 
of the country was under Serb occupation, with Croatian and other non–Serbs expelled 
from these areas.  The January 1992 ceasefire left Croatia partitioned until 1995 when 
Croatia's army carried out two military operations: operation ‘Flash’ in spring, and 
operation ‘Storm’ in the summer of 1995, reconquering most Serb–held territory. In 
January 1992, Croatia gained diplomatic recognition from the members of the European 
Economic Community and subsequently the United Nations.  The remaining occupied 
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areas of Croatia were restored in November 1995, with the process concluded in January 
1998.99 
The 1990s and the Diaspora  
 
When Josip Broz Tito died in May 1980, the Croatian Diaspora saw it as the beginning 
of the end of Yugoslavian ‘brotherhood and unity’.  The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 
and the end of the Communist domination of Eastern and Southeast Europe marked the 
start of a new and very important period of the Croatian Diaspora’s history.  Before the 
final dissolution of Yugoslavia and the initiation of the democratic processes in Croatia, 
most Croatian Diaspora organisations approved of separation from Yugoslavia.  The 
deaths of two significant Diaspora leaders also symbolically marked the start of a new 
period of Croatian Diaspora’s history.100  These were Juraj Krnjević, one of the principal 
leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), wholly committed to achieving Croatian 
democracy and freedom, and Andrija Artuković, Croatian ultra–right–wing politician 
and Pavelić's right–hand man during the Nazi puppet state of Croatia.   Artuković was an 
outspoken supporter of Croatian independence, later extradited by the US government to 
Yugoslavia.   In May 1988, the Croatian National Congress, a North American umbrella 
association, openly demanded Croatian independence. 
Following Croatia’s declaration of independence in 1991, organised Diaspora rallies 
urged the recognition of Croatia.  In April 1992, approximately one year after Croatia 
declared independence, the US Government formally recognised the independence of 
Croatia, with President Bush establishing diplomatic relations with the newly formed 
                                                 
99 Murphy, D. E. (1995, August 8). Croats declare victory, end blitz. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from 
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Croatian state.  The establishment of the Croatian state and its recognition by the US 
Government brought about changes in the presence of Croatian immigrants in North 
America.  For the first time in their history, the long–awaited Croatian independence put 
an end to their existence as a nation without a state.  Diaspora members interviewed for 
the purposes of this study observed that Diaspora Croats “no longer felt as orphans”.  
The centuries–long drive for statehood had finally materialised and, as emphasised by 
the Croatian Heritage Foundation101, the Diaspora was finally given the chance to lay 
emphasis on their national identity, Croatian language, history and culture.  
The early 1990s ended Yugoslavian brotherhood and unity but they also marked the 
beginning of a new era for Croatia and its Diaspora.  The Croatian struggle for 
independence was highly internalised by the Diaspora from the start and paved the way 
for an unprecedented political movement, the most widespread and powerful in the 
history of its existence.  It was Tuđman who on many occasions identified his party as a 
national movement, rather than simply a political party.  He owed the success of his 
party to the Diaspora, a debt he repaid.  Following the 1995 parliamentary elections, 12 
diaspora Croats, from Canada, Ohio (two from Cleveland and one from Eastlake), and 
other parts of the world became prominent figures in the new Croatian Parliament. 
                                                 
101The mission of the Croatian Heritage Foundation, based in Zagreb, Croatia, is to preserve and develop 
Croatian cultural identity, the Croatian language and the customs of Croatians living outside their country 
of origin. The Foundation supports cultural and social activities that contribute to affirming the Croatian 
name around the word. 
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Research Problem and Thesis Structure 
 
Research Problem 
 
The Croatian Diaspora is a compelling example of strong diaspora networks and their 
influence on homeland affairs.  The importance of these networks is growing globally.  
However, aside from a few notable exceptions, within the study of Diaspora Politics the 
context in which transnational diaspora mobilisation operates is paid very little attention.  
What drives diaspora mobilisation?  What shapes it?  Diaspora mobilisation is defined as 
bringing the diaspora resources together, organising them and preparing the diaspora for 
action. The focus here is on how the diaspora is galvanised to participate in homeland 
affairs, through their political activity as well as direct and indirect influence, through 
voting, campaigning, financing, and lobbying.  
Many studies identify conflict as a key mobilising force and point to a large number of 
conflict–generated diasporas, with their identities closely linked to military conflict at 
home. These diasporas are often characterised as maintaining important symbolic ties to 
the homeland and harbour traumatic memories, which they either experienced first–hand 
or from afar, strongly empathising and identifying with their fellow co–ethnics at home 
and abroad. Indeed, the conflict of the 1990s was a powerful mobilising factor for the 
Croatian Diaspora across the globe.  But is conflict the sine qua non for galvanising 
diaspora support?  Are there other, complementary explanations?  It is towards 
answering these questions that this study is directed. 
Drawing on the Croatian example, this study will extend the frontiers of our 
understanding of the intricate diaspora–homeland relationship and provide a framework 
for understanding the dynamics behind Diaspora mobilisation.  Drawing on some recent 
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theoretical literature, the following chapter will introduce the research question in full 
and summarise the relevant research done to date.  It will also present the reader with a 
hypothesis guiding this study, suggesting that collective action frames designed by 
homeland leaders play an important role in the successful mobilisation of the Croatian 
Diaspora.  The following chapters will then examine the role of Franjo Tuđman and his 
supporters in galvanising Diaspora support.  Through the lens of leadership, the study 
will employ a frame analysis approach and thus link the literature on collective action 
frames and framing processes with the research done in Diaspora Studies.   
Thesis Structure 
 
CHAPTER II  
Theoretical Framework and Research Design 
 
Drawing on some recent theoretical literature, this chapter will introduce the research 
question in full and summarise the relevant research done to date.  
Overarching research question: What shapes diaspora mobilisation?  
Complementary questions: Are conflict– based arguments sufficient to explain diaspora 
mobilisation?  Are there complementary, yet more covert, driving factors behind it? 
What is the role of human agency? When they do get involved in homeland politics, what 
determines the success of diaspora efforts?  
To answer these questions, the study looks at the Croatian Diaspora in North America 
which, with a long history of active involvement in the politics of its homeland, brings 
forth a captivating case for the study of diaspora mobilisation.  What were the drivers 
behind Croatian Diaspora mobilisation?  What roles are played by political leaders?  
Why/how did Tuđman and his party (HDZ) succeed in galvanising Diaspora support for 
their homeland?  
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This chapter will present the reader with the hypothesis guiding this study, suggesting 
that, in light of earlier studies that have identified homeland conflict as a key force 
behind diaspora network formation, conflict is not the only explanatory force behind a 
focused and sustained diaspora undertaking.  The chapter presents a framework for 
understanding Croatian Diaspora mobilisation, suggesting that conflict has been 
instrumentalised by homeland leadership and that collective action frames (diagnostic, 
prognostic and motivational), framed by political elites, play a key role in successful 
mobilisation of the Diaspora. The political elites, with their leadership skills, succeeded 
in using a particular feature of the conflict for effective CAF in mobilising the Diaspora. 
They made words their main tools in attracting receptive audiences at home and abroad 
and succeeded in implementing their ideas through the creation of diaspora CAF, a 
discourse which elevated a collective diaspora identity, and a promise of an independent 
Croatia, with which many identified.  In linking the literature on collective action frames 
and framing processes with the research done in Diaspora Studies, the framework 
presents a novel way of conceptualising diaspora mobilisation.  It also foregrounds the 
element of human agency, which has been neglected by previous studies.  It highlights 
the central role that leaders play (Franjo Tuđman, the first President of independent 
Croatia) in the processes of framing.   
CHAPTER III  
The Man behind the Frame: Tuđman’s Path to Power – from Prisoner to President  
 
Chapter III discusses characteristics of Franjo Tuđman, the first President of 
independent Croatia, as a leader and a politician.  Given the context of a growing sense 
of crisis around the disintegration of Yugoslavia, his leadership is analysed through a 
Weberian lens of charismatic authority.  The chapter looks at Tuđman’s specific traits 
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and experiences from his past that contributed to his ‘charismatic personality’, including 
his cultural and symbolic capital.  Furthermore, the chapter explains the shifting 
trajectory of Tuđman and examines the conditions that led to his rise to power, including 
the changes in the Croatian political arena in the late 1980s and early 1990s, culminating 
in the creation of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) led by Franjo Tuđman.  
Human agency has been neglected by the recent emphasis on structures of opportunity in 
social movements, hence the focus in this study on the role leaders play in generating 
social change and in creating the conditions for the agency of others.  This chapter sets 
the scene for the analyses of what the literature calls collective action frames, focusing 
on Diaspora meta–frames and Tuđman as the main Diaspora frame–master.  
CHAPTER IV  
The Framing of a Dark Diagnosis: Interpreting Injustices and Naming Enemies  
 
The focus of Chapter IV is to look at the first component of the framing process – the 
diagnosis.  The goal of diagnostic framing is to identify, and appropriately frame a 
burning national issue as well as attribute blame.  This chapter will look at the ‘national 
problem’ of the early 1990s Croatia, as identified by the framers, and show how they 
sought to identify the problem and attribute it to a specific source that was then 
transformed into an object of blame and/or responsibility.  The chapter will analyse how 
the framers reduced a series of disparate social phenomena to a few principal themes.  It 
will present findings obtained through discourse analysis of primary sources that identify 
central themes used by Tuđman in his diagnostic framing.  In doing so, the chapter will 
identify three fundamental elements of the diagnostic framing process: the first being 
‘problem diagnoses’, followed by the formation of ‘injustice frames’ and the closely 
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linked ‘adversarial’ or ‘boundary’ frames.  The chapter examines how the frames 
promoted a particular ‘causal interpretation’ and ‘moral evaluation’, which then enabled 
the framers to suggest a suitable ‘treatment recommendation’102.   The chapter will also 
look at how these were received in the Diaspora. 
CHAPTER V  
From Victim to Victory: Framing Solutions and Attracting Support  
 
Prognostic frames look at the problem and ask, “What can be done?”  The main purpose 
of these frames is to offer solutions to collective problems identified through diagnostic 
frames. As we shall see, diagnostic frames, discussed in the previous Chapter, are very 
closely linked to prognostic frames, framing the ‘national problem’ in such a way that 
limits the number of appropriate, logical, solutions.  Together with motivational frames, 
diagnostic and prognostic frames form collective action frames.  
Chapter V will present the findings obtained through discourse analysis, which 
identified two central themes or preconditions necessary for achieving the proposed 
solution: national reconciliation and a unified Croatian Diaspora.  These actions were 
framed as sine qua non for changing the status quo.  They were also the ones most likely 
to resonate with Tuđman’s key sponsor – the Diaspora.  This was important, as Croats 
abroad were a vital resource for bringing the proposed solution to reality.  Frame 
resonance will also be discussed, including how some of Tuđman’s ideological visions 
were received and dropped, or adjusted, in comparison with other frames and in 
response to the audience (frame modification, i.e. the frames that did not resonate).  The 
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U.S. anti-nuclear movement. Political Communication, 10, 155–173. 
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chapter will also look at mobilising resources and structures, both formal and informal 
(Diaspora week and strong ties), used as tools to collect and transfer information and 
transform individual claims into group demands.  
CHAPTER VI  
Diaspora after Tuđman  
 
Chapter VI will discuss the modern–day Croatian Diaspora with an aim to examine how 
and why active Diaspora organisations continue to internalise and reproduce the ideas 
framed by Tuđman in the 1990s.  In doing so, the chapter will focus on the current status 
of the Diaspora and its disenchantment with the current political settlement.  More 
specifically, the chapter will examine the controversies that accompany Croatian 
Diaspora electoral participation; namely, the unique voting rights that Croatian Diaspora 
enjoyed in the 1990s, the reasons behind that unparalleled position of privilege, and the 
‘disenfranchisement’ that followed.  The chapter will highlight main concerns coming 
from the Diaspora as well as those voiced by the Croatian Government.  I will analyse 
how the modern–day Diaspora’s political activity in Croatia – as well as direct and 
indirect influence, through voting, campaigning, financing and lobbying – is still very 
much guided by the events of the 1990s.  The discussion will be framed around justice 
and accountability in the context of Croatia’s path towards the EU, as some of the most 
notable activities organised by the Diaspora were around those themes.  The final 
section will continue to focus on the recent history of the Croatian Diaspora in North 
America and discuss views of Croatian Diasporic communities after independence, 
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exploring major existential questions, including the question of return.  Some of this 
content was published in Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans103.   
CHAPTER VII  
Conclusions  
 
In the final chapter, I summarise my findings, discuss their significance and identify 
policy implications and areas in need of further research. 
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CHAPTER II: Theoretical Framework 
and Research Design 
 
Diasporas are not the only actors to “think locally and act globally” but a homeland– 
based secessionist elites do so as well.104 
 
Diasporas and their political roles are growing in number, size and influence around the 
world.  However, aside from a few notable exceptions105, the study of Diaspora Politics, 
specifically its mobilisation dimension, remains largely neglected in political science. 
Recently, diaspora mobilisation has gained increasing interest, particularly in studies of 
civil war and terrorism, but conditions, causal mechanisms and modes of diaspora 
mobilisation, particularly vis–à–vis emerging states, remain under–researched.106 Very 
little attention is paid to the strategies behind political mobilisation of diasporas and the 
causes and motivations behind their participation in the political life of their homelands.  
What is the driving force of their political agendas?  What shapes their mobilisation?  
What causes it?  A plethora of studies look at homeland crisis, and conflict in particular, 
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as a key force behind diaspora mobilisation and network formation and argue that some 
of the most highly mobilised diaspora groups are those whose identities are linked to 
homeland conflict.  But are conflict–based arguments sufficient to explain diaspora 
mobilisation?  Are there alternative or complementary explanations?  Is it the conflict 
itself, or is it also the politics at home that strengthen networks abroad?  Empirical 
material used in the study of these questions is drawn from the Croatian Diaspora in 
North America.  The research problem is summarised below. 
Overarching question: What shapes diaspora mobilisation?  
 Are conflict–based arguments sufficient to explain diaspora mobilisation?  Are 
there complementary, yet more covert, driving factors behind it? 
 How is diaspora mobilisation shaped through human agency? 
 When they do get involved in homeland politics, what determines the success of 
diaspora efforts? 
Case study specific question: What were the drivers behind Croatian Diaspora 
mobilisation in the early 1990s and during the Croatian ‘Homeland War’?  
 What roles were played by political leaders? 
 Why/how did Tuđman and his party (HDZ) succeed in cementing and 
augmenting the mobilisation and political influence of the Croatian Diaspora in 
their homeland?  
Hypothesis: While homeland conflict provides important opportunities to mobilise, 
agents play a crucial role in framing and reframing these opportunities to advance their 
political goals. Collective action frames (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational), 
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purposefully developed and communicated by home country leaders, play a crucial role 
in the successful mobilisation of the Croatian Diaspora. 
This study will extend the frontiers of our understanding of diaspora mobilisation and 
cross–border practices in light of the increasing visibility and growing significance of 
the phenomenon.  This research will examine the phenomenon of diaspora mobilisation 
and the political and institutional influence of diasporas in the development of their 
home countries in times of war.  Drawing on some recent theoretical literature, this 
study will provide a framework for understanding the dynamics and motivations behind 
the political activation and mobilisation of diasporas and examine how this process is 
triggered by homeland leaders’ efforts to galvanise diaspora action in order to advance 
their own political interests. Specifically, the aim of the study is to demonstrate how 
Croatian political elites made words their chief tools in spurring vigorous involvement 
of receptive audiences at home and abroad.  The study will show how they achieved 
success in implementing their ideas locally, nationally and internationally by generating 
collective action frames and a discourse of a mystical elevation of a collective Diaspora 
identity, with which many identified.  Success, used in reference to diaspora 
mobilisation, is defined here as effective strategies used by political elites in the home 
country, including their aides abroad, that enabled them to leverage the diaspora for the 
realisation of their own political goals. 
The study of diasporas can greatly benefit from ideas developed in social movement 
theory.  This study will argue that framing processes, alongside resource mobilisation 
and political opportunity structures, are crucial for understanding the nature, the 
underlying forces and the scope of diaspora mobilisation and its consequent political 
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influence.  By employing the frame analysis approach this study intends to link the 
literature on collective action frames and framing processes with the research done in 
Diaspora Studies.  In doing so, it will make use of the framing literature in relation to 
social movement processes that it tries to illuminate107. 
While focusing on diaspora mobilisation, this study also aims to address an existing gap 
in framing theory.  Morris and Staggenborg argue that social movements theory would 
benefit greatly from additional research into how leaders generate social change as well 
as the conditions for the agency of other participants.108  In their analysis of leadership in 
social movements, they argue that human agency has been largely ignored by the recent 
weight put on opportunity structures.  Morris and Staggenborg note that social structures 
alone:  
Cannot deliberate, imagine, strategize or engage in decision–making; 
human actors, navigating a matrix of social structures, initiate these 
activities.  Strategic decisions feature prominently in determining 
movement outcomes, and social movement leaders are the primary 
decision–makers within social movements.  Social movement leaders 
carry out a complex set of activities that are crucial to outcomes because, 
regardless of structural conditions, there exist a variety of choices to be 
made regarding these tasks. 
 
Similarly, Ganz observes that, despite the deep roots of leadership in sociology, social 
movement scholars have, with few exceptions, eschewed the topic. He argues that a 
structural bias present in social movements studies seems to have made it more 
productive for scholars to focus on the constraining conditions that make certain 
outcomes more probably than to identify enabling conditions that make many outcomes 
                                                 
107 Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and 
assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639. 
108 Morris, A. & Staggenborg, S. (2004). Leadership in Social Movements. pp. 171-196 In D.A. Snow, 
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possible. He observes that agency is more about grasping at possibility than conforming 
to probability.109 
A number of other scholars have noted that leadership in social movements has yet to be 
adequately theorised (Aminzade, Goldstone & Perry110; Barker, Johnson & Lavalette111; 
Klandermans112; Melucci113; Morris114; Zurcher & Snow115, to name only a few).  As vital 
as leadership is to understanding social movements, it is woefully undertheorised, De 
Cesare observes. We don’t understand fully how leaders rise, the ways in which they 
interact with one another, and how they influence the emergence, existence, and decline 
of movements.116 Jan Willem Stutje further observes that the study of leadership and its 
relevance to the study of social movements has not moved beyond generalisations. His 
work emphasizes that much of the writing on leadership and charisma focuses on 
specific traits associated with exceptional leaders, a practice that has widened the 
concept of charisma to such an extent that it loses its uniqueness – and therefore its 
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utility. The contributors to Stutje’s volume reintroduce the debate on charismatic 
leadership from a historical perspective and seek to expand our understanding of the 
concept’s relevance to the study of social movements. Very few studies have focused on 
how leaders sustain a powerful symbiotic relationship with their followers, one that 
encourages devotion to the leader and shapes a real group identity.117 
Similarly, the framing perspective, despite its important role in explaining social 
movements, also favours structural and organisational factors.  The framing theory118 
depicts social movement organisation (SMO) as the major actor in the framing process 
while neglecting the importance of leaders.  The aim of the next chapter is to address 
this gap and divert attention to the central role that leaders play in the processes of 
framing.  The focus will be on Franjo Tuđman, the first president of independent 
Croatia. 
But let us first turn to the current debate in the field and address some of the key 
discussions relevant to this study’s field of enquiry.  The next few pages will define in 
more detail how the concept of diaspora is employed in the project and highlight some 
of the more prominent elements of the diaspora debate.  I will then address conflict as a 
potential driver of diaspora mobilisation before expanding this conflict–centred view. 
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Current Debate in the Field 
 
Diaspora: Actors of Change 
 
Who is and who is not part of a diaspora?  The previous chapter provided an overview of 
existing diaspora definitions, ranging from broader concepts to narrow checklists.  To 
remind the reader, the discussion in this study is limited to Sheffer’s definition of 
diasporas as ethno–national social and political formations, with the key focus being on 
their active effort to maintain links with their homelands and other diasporants residing 
in other host countries, in order to show solidarity with their group and their entire 
nation.  
Diaspora Consciousness   
 
Sheffer’s definition will be extended in this study to include the observation that 
diaspora formations are not completely homogeneous entities.  They are also not static; 
they transform and evolve over time.  This will become evident as different stages of the 
Croatian Diaspora framing process are analysed.  
The diaspora debate has been largely based on the assumption that there is a natural and 
uncomplicated organic group of people without division or difference, dedicated to the 
same political interests”.119  This definition assumes a high level of ‘commonness’, with 
common group aims and objectives.  Furthermore, it has been emphasised that the 
notion of a politicised ethnic identity prioritises homeland concerns120 and develops 
when diaspora members “perceive the socio–political landscape from the vantage point 
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of the ethnic group”.121  For a group of people to be categorized as a diaspora, they need 
to be “willing to identify themselves at least partly with a common imagination of 
identity or difference from others”.122  However, mere membership of a diaspora does 
not presuppose the existence of this type of consciousness;123 124 an essentialist 
assumption is entirely unwarranted125.  As we will see in the Croatian case, diaspora 
consciousness is continuously susceptible to change, making diasporas neither 
homogeneous nor static entities.  Over the span of its existence, a diaspora, with both its 
core and periphery members, goes through a number of transformations, resulting in an 
altered relationship with the homeland.  To explore how the common diaspora 
imagination is shaped and disseminated, we need to look more closely at the driving 
force behind this process – the actors that play a key role in both the construction and 
reconstruction of diaspora consciousness, as well as in putting that consciousness into 
action.  This is crucial in order to explore how diaspora mobilisation takes place and 
how it develops into a more vigorous political participation. 
Diasporas and Transnational Engagement  
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Diaspora and transnationalism, often placed within the same theoretical frame, have 
come to occupy a position of increasing significance in national and global life.  Cross–
border linkages between diasporas and their homelands can carry substantial quantities 
of various resources – money, information, knowledge, political and diplomatic 
exchange.  The question of separating the political from the non–political is complex, as 
many of these practices are political in nature and generally it is difficult to distinguish 
between different economic, religious or socio–cultural activities.  
The new transnational connections brought about by globalisation have come to occupy 
a prominent role in the field.  Previous research has revealed that most transnational and 
global communities have a potential to shape nation–states and local economies as well 
as global political, social and economic life.126  Recent empirical studies of diasporas put 
emphasis on NGOs and the civil society, economic associations, religious institutions, 
and political parties.  Ulrich Beck observes that the most interesting questions 
surrounding globalisation involve processes through which “sovereign national states are 
criss–crossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, 
orientations, identities and networks”127.  This refers to the emergence of new actors in 
addition to nation states.  These global institutional structures, such as large international 
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organisations, development organisations and NGOs, may play key roles in facilitating 
transnational political practices.128   
Research on these transnational connections is on the rise129 130 as are, due to new forms 
of communication technology, the opportunities for the “de–localised and de– 
territorialized migrants of the Global Age”131 to be a part of transnational linkages 
between home and host countries.132  Kennedy observes that “locality is no longer the 
only or even the primary vehicle for sustaining a community.  The subversion of 
physical locality and its re–constitution in a de–territorialized fashion is a task carried 
out by the migration of people and cultures across the borders”133.  However, the 
delocalisation of many diasporas does not suggest a loss of importance for territory.  
Diasporas continue to be predominantly defined and organised around ethnic or national 
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affiliations and maintain strong links to their home countries.134   The histories of these 
diaspora groups are strongly grounded in particular territories.135  Locality, although 
frequently experienced symbolically as an “imagined homeland or a place understood 
through nostalgia, memory, history or constructed cultural sites”136 has not lost 
significance in the diasporic sphere.  
In some cases, as Lyons argues,137 transnational politics remains intensely territorial in 
its focus and goals even if deterritorialised in terms of actors.  Many conflict–generated 
diaspora groups such as the Tamils, Irish, Armenians and Eritreans, conceptualise 
politics in territorial terms – the liberation of a symbolically important piece of specific 
land138.  Rather than attempting to create a deterrorialised transnational community, 
some diaspora groups preserve and intensify attachment to their identity’s territorial 
element even if they are physically detached or unlikely to visit or move to that 
territory139.  One of the key tasks of this study is to identify diaspora actors that influence 
or manipulate this process with the aim of stimulating diaspora mobilisation.   
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In line with the more recent literature focusing on the role of ‘sending countries’ in 
constructing diaspora transnational networks of influence, this study puts focus on the 
seminal role homelands play in mobilising diasporas.  Homeland interests are 
manifested through either ‘homeland policies’, the goal of the sending states being to 
encourage diasporants to return, or ‘global nation policies/diaspora policies’,140 where 
they are encouraged to “stay abroad but stay in touch”.141  The literature gives interesting 
examples of how political elites in the homelands tap into financial and political 
resources abroad.  States with particularly high rates of emigration, (e.g., Philippines or 
Vietnam) instead of labelling them ‘traitors’, now honour their citizens abroad as ‘our 
heroes’ whose remittances, investment and various altruistic ventures are seen as vital 
for the economic development of their home countries.142  Others, such as Turkey and 
Mexico have even supported the naturalisation of their citizens abroad.  ‘Alman ol, Turk 
Kal’ (Become German, remain Turkish) was among the slogans used by the Turkish 
government to urge the diaspora to integrate and become law–abiding citizens of their 
host countries,143 while retaining their Turkish identity. 
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The Drivers of Diaspora Mobilisation: Homeland Conflict 
 
“Exile is the nursery of nationality”, Lord Acton observed as early as 1860144.  In some 
cases, these new realities allow for the expression and celebration of nationalist 
sentiments,145 making ‘long–distance nationalism’146 a significant force in today’s world.  
Examples of politically involved diasporas playing an active role in contemporary 
conflict are readily available.  A range of political activities, from international lobbying, 
spreading propaganda, staging demonstrations, fundraising, overseas voting, party 
campaigning and diasporic representations in homeland governments, to recruiting 
fighters, supporting war efforts, and terrorism is evident among numerous diaspora 
groups147.  A number of recent studies focus on the role of diasporas in securing funding 
for homeland insurgencies.  For instance, much of Eritrea’s military efforts in the recent 
war with Ethiopia were financed by an informal 2 per cent ‘tax’ levied through the 
Eritrean refugee diaspora.148  Similarly, it is estimated that at least 80 per cent of money 
spent by political parties in the 1990s Croatian elections came from the Croatian 
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Diaspora.149  Connections between diaspora fundraising and conflict have also been 
noted with regard to the Tamil diaspora (to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elelam), the 
Kurdish Workers Party, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army150.  The significant 
upsurge in strength of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the summer of 1998 
was at least partly the result of the fundraising efforts by the Albanian diaspora.151  Other 
politically active diasporas are the Oromo, Eritreans, Jews, Armenians, Palestinians and 
Chechens,152 Algerians, Philippinos, Mexicans, and Columbians.153  Diasporas also play 
an important role in lobbying host governments for increased support for states engaged 
in conflict, as exemplified by the Croatian and Armenian efforts154.  The Croatian 
Diaspora, for instance, was successful in helping swing the international community 
behind the Croats in the 1990s conflict. 
In an age when diasporas are playing an important role in transnational politics,155 why 
do some ethno–national groups participate in homeland politics more than others?  And 
when they do get involved in homeland politics, what determines the success of their 
efforts?  Despite its relevance, the question has been somewhat neglected by the 
available literature on Diaspora Politics.  Shain and Barth categorize diaspora members 
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as silent, core and passive156,also defined by Shain as “rear guard” or “occasional 
recruits”157 , “indicating the level of homeland salience across communities but not 
attempting to account for it”158.  Gabriel Sheffer, in his attempt to formulate “a more 
comprehensive theory of current diasporism”159 makes an important distinction between 
stateless and state–linked diasporas.  Robin Cohen observes that this categorisation 
immediately implies the possibility that stateless diasporas will become more politically 
active and “establish organisations to collect money and weapons to help armed struggle 
at home and mount campaigns for the recognition of irredentist states”.160  Sheffer 
emphasised that these migrants are highly mobilised into strong diaspora networks in 
part because their identities are linked to stateless and marginalised groups.  These 
stateless diasporas are particularly prone to maintaining links with the homeland and are 
more likely to stay involved with homeland politics.  As long as the fight for 
independence continues, the diasporants:  
Will be particularly torn between memories of their homeland and wishes 
to recapture the past, and the need to comply with the norms of their host 
country.  Tendencies to assimilate and integrate into the host society are 
counterbalanced by their strong sentiments for the homeland.161  
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Previous studies define conflict and trauma associated with the original dispersal as 
generators of “a vision and memory of a lost or an imagined homeland still to be 
established”.162  Lyons emphasises that “homeland conflict is often the touchstone of 
identity and diaspora social organisations often mobilise around providing support for 
actors engaged in the conflict back home”.163  Diasporas that are “born from a forced 
dispersion”, according to Chaliland, often “conscientiously strive to keep the memory of 
the past alive”.164  Lyons further observes that “some of the most highly mobilised 
diaspora groups are groups whose identities are linked to stateless and marginalized 
groups”.165  Pnina Werbner shares this view, noting that these diasporas often “feel free 
to endorse and actively support ethnicist, nationalistic, and exclusionary movements.”166 
Koinova lists the Albanian, Armenian, Bosnian, Chechen, Croat, Palestinian, Serb, 
Somali, and the Tamil diaspora as examples of this behaviour.167 Lyons also identifies 
the Oromo and (pre–1991) Eritreans from Ethiopia, the Kurds from Turkey in their 
continuous efforts to establish a Kurdish state, and the success of the Croatian Diaspora 
in playing a major role in establishing an independent Croatian state.  Other diasporas 
motivated by conflict include the Iranian and Iraqi diaspora, as well as the Irish.168 These 
                                                 
162 Faist, T. (2000). Transnationalization in international migration: Implications for the study of 
citizenship and culture. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23 (2) (see p. 197).   
163 Lyons, T. (2006). Diasporas and homeland conflict. In M. Kahler & B. F. Walter (Eds.), Territoriality 
and conflict in an era of globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
164 Chaliland, G. (Ed.) (1989). Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-States (p. xiv). London: Pluto. 
165 Lyons, T. (2006). Diasporas and homeland conflict. In M. Kahler & B. F. Walter (Eds.), Territoriality 
and conflict in an era of globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
166 Werbner, P. (2002). The place which is diaspora: Citizenship, religion, and gender in the making of 
chordic transnationalism. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28 (1) (see p. 120). 
167 Koinova, M. (2015) Sustained vs episodic mobilization among conflict-generated diasporas. 
International Political Science Review . Retrieved from 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/70873/1/WRAP_Koinova%20Final%20ISPR%20version%20April%2
02015%20for%20WARP%20(00000002)_.pdf 
168 Lyons, T. (2006). Diasporas and homeland conflict. In M. Kahler & B. F. Walter (Eds.), Territoriality 
and conflict in an era of globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
67 
 
diasporas belong to the conflict–generated diaspora group whose identities put emphasis 
on their position as “national groups denied their rightful homeland”169.  Koinova 
stresses that conflict–generated diasporas “formed based on forced rather than voluntary 
migration are particularly prone to participating in domestic conflict due to a pervasive 
myth of return and attachment to territory”.170  Territorially defined homeland is often 
seen as playing a central role in conflict–generated diasporas making their homeland a 
“crucial place of emotional attachment”, and one that decisively defines their strategies 
of identification.171  “Without a state to champion their rights, they compensate with 
strong diaspora networks”.172    
A Complementary Argument to Conflict–Based Diaspora 
Mobilisation Explanations 
 
As emphasised earlier, a number of studies have looked at homeland conflict as a key 
force behind diaspora network formation and argued that some of the most highly 
mobilised diaspora groups are those whose identities are linked to conflict and 
statelessness.  This study takes into consideration that certain periods of hardship in the 
home country, such as conflict, can bring into existence elevated feelings of anxiety or 
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concern among diaspora groups, which can in turn affect the level of their mobilisation.  
However, it is often the case that without a collective validation, reasoning, and 
confirmation to give these feelings direction, there will be no significant action, no 
substantial movement.  In order for these feelings to develop into collective action, they 
need to be buttressed by a strategy that will give them greater value and meaning that 
then creates the ability to stimulate people into significant activity.  
Fiona Adamson points out that “diasporas, ultimately, are political constituencies.  As 
such, they are open to political mobilisation by a variety of actors, both state and non–
state”.173  The existence of diaspora networks scattered across the globe linking a 
diaspora with its homeland is a remarkable asset for the nation, making “long–distance 
nationalists an easy prey for shrewd political manipulators in [the] Heimat”.174  We 
witness successful diaspora mobilisations when homelands recognise this power of their 
diaspora as a unique and precious resource. 
However, in order to mobilise, it is crucial that the people identify themselves with a 
common imagination of identity, as noted earlier, or difference from others 175  This 
study follows Brubaker’s criticism of imagining bounded communities and shares his 
suggestion that one needs to focus on how this imagination is created, who is behind it 
and which purposes it fulfils.  Rather than breaking down and analysing this shared 
identity, Brubaker suggests looking at practices and processes, in which these are 
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made.176 In the case of ‘diaspora’, he suggests conceptualising diaspora “not in 
substantialist terms as a bounded entity, but rather as a stance, a claim”.177   
While recognising that the presence of war can be a powerful source of diaspora 
cohesion and unity, this study will provide a complementary view of diaspora 
mobilisation, claiming that homeland conflict on its own is important, but insufficient to 
generate a focused effort aimed at a common goal, and to sustain that effort.  This study 
will examine forces of diaspora mobilisation enabled by framing processes on the part of 
goal–pursuing homeland elites and their supporters in the diaspora.  Their framing 
strategies often used existing or previous conflicts as vehicles to reinforce, and also 
legitimise and justify diaspora support for the homeland.  The war itself, without a 
narrative to accompany it, is not enough to supply the much–needed symbolic and 
emotional resources to sustain diaspora mobilisation.  
The pages that follow outline how this study employs the frame analysis approach and 
bridges the literature on collective action frames and framing processes with the research 
done in Diaspora Studies.  In doing so, it uses the pronounced proliferation of 
scholarship on framing literature in relation to diaspora mobilisation.178  The study 
argues that framing processes, alongside resource mobilisation and political opportunity 
structures, are central for understanding the character, course and success of diaspora 
mobilisation and its consequent political influence.  The study also highlights the role 
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played by the leader (and his aids) as a primary decision maker and a ‘frame master’, 
addressed in the next chapter.  
From Framing to Engaging 
 
What determines the success of diaspora mobilisation?  As shown in the previous 
section, earlier studies put emphasis on the role of homeland conflicts in activating 
diaspora involvement in the political sphere of the homeland.  But is war the only 
mobilising factor, or are there other, more covert, driving factors behind it?  Are the 
common ethnic matrix and common socio–economic interests alone, even when 
amplified by conflict, sufficient for effective and sustained diaspora mobilisation?  The 
following sections examine the use of framing in ‘diaspora movement’ to show the 
extent to which effective framing techniques and successful mobilisation tactics advance 
the movement toward its stated goals.  Diaspora participation in homeland politics will 
be explained from a framing perspective, involving diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational framing tools used for the purposes of mobilisation.  
Diasporas, like nations, are not only “imagined communities”179 but “phenomena of the 
masses”180 and therefore in order to fully understand the concept of the diaspora and its 
collective consciousness, we cannot disregard the discourse that was instrumental in 
producing this shared awareness, broadcast out to the masses by elites or parties.  
Ideology, an effective combination of interests and affective ties is a particular way of 
creating an identity for collective subjects, linking identity and interests. 181  I will look at 
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how, in order to define common interests, leaders engage in a process of redefining 
some key concepts.  
In order to analyse the process where leaders generate new political significance of 
ethnic differentiae for the purposes of mobilisation, we have to look at the manner in 
which this was done; in this case the formation of external relationships, in the diaspora, 
using political ideologies and values.182  This will be analysed through the concept of the 
‘frame’, a set of schematic collective assumptions and beliefs about a particular object or 
situation that gives meaning and motivation to collective action.183  The process of 
framing is a process of generating meaning – “either passively and unconsciously or 
actively and consciously”184.  This study, illustrative of the power of cognitive frames, 
looks at the intentionally generated frames and their core framing tasks.  By 
purposefully supplying emotional triggers, the political discourse and its rhetorical 
strategies can fuel mobilisation by stimulating altruism and self–sacrifice.185   
People construe reality through a lens moulded by their personal history and their 
current social context;186 however, important players are also external actors such as 
leaders, elite groups and nationalist movements or parties.  This study will demonstrate 
the role Diaspora movement actors play as signifying agents actively involved in the 
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creation and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists and observers187.  
These actors are “deeply embroiled, along with the media, local government, and the 
state”188 in what has been referred to as “the politics of signification”.189  I will look at 
how the framing process, structured by the leaders, captures the truth from a particular 
perspective and presents a subjective ‘map’ of the circumstances at the time; how 
through their discourse the leaders generate a new reality, a mobilisation frame.  The 
study will pay special attention to how this discourse provides the audience with of a 
sense of historical injustice or oppression, and how, through a uniform structure, it 
provides diasporants with motivation for political engagement.190 
The following pages will first explore the concept of the frame and collective action 
frames before delving into the different stages of the framing process and applying each 
of these to the study of diasporas. 
Diaspora Collective Action Frames 
 
The concept of frames goes back to Erving Goffman, who referred to them as “cognitive 
organisation of situations”.191  In Goffman’s view, daily, raw experience was understood 
through frames, which, for him, denoted ‘schemata of interpretation’.   The role of the 
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frame is to transform meaningless information into meaningful material, and thus enable 
individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” experience.192  These frames, 
Goffman argued, are key for successful construction of what he called ‘guided doings’. 
Individuals constantly project around them interpretative frames that allow them to make 
sense of their reality.  The shifting of a frame or its transformation to something else 
happens at a time when it no longer fits into the current context.  The question to 
consider here is how political elites frame some of the key elements of the diaspora 
discourse in such a way as to encourage certain interpretations and discourage others.  
How do they succeed in monopolising the perception of a whole range of issues?  How 
do they control the discussion within the diaspora in order to spur mobilisation and 
attract financial and political support?  
One of the main mobilising factors is the language chosen by the framers to define the 
debate and, equally important, ensure that individual diasporants’ issues fit into the 
context of their dialogue.  The language that frames the discussion also limits it by 
setting the vocabulary, metaphors and metonymies through which potential movement 
adherents can understand and debate the issue.  This is often made possible through 
public discourse and persuasive communication during mobilisation campaigns.  An 
important element in the construction of frames is also the consciousness–raising during 
episodes of collective action, such as participation at cultural and political events, 
speeches and public addresses.  As we will see in later chapters, the language chosen by 
Tuđman and his aids developed into a new Croatian ‘diaspora lexicon’, carefully 
defining the debate at home and abroad. 
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The products of the framing activity are collective action frames.  The focus of this 
study will be on the interpretive function of these frames; that is, how the concept of the 
diaspora was reframed and its role and status redefined in order to “mobilise potential 
adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilise 
antagonists”.193  The study will also put emphasis on the interactive character of the 
framing process in the context of diaspora such as negotiating shared meaning.  Most 
importantly, the study will look at framers themselves and the role they play in the 
framing process. 
The following pages are an overview of diaspora collective action frames, grouped 
according to their ‘core framing tasks’194 – diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational.  
These have two sets of characteristic features: they are action–oriented but also 
interactive, discursive processes, thus able to generate collective action frames.195   
Framing the National Problem: The Diagnosis  
 
Studies of diagnostic framing have placed significant attention on ‘injustice frames’, as 
an important element of diagnosis.196  This study will explore how political parties and 
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their representatives highlight the ‘victim’ aspect of the diaspora frame and how that is 
linked to already existing or previously used ‘victim’ references in relation to the nation.  
How are certain traumatic aspects of the nation’s history foregrounded by the framers? 
Which examples are used and why? What role do these events play in the lives of the 
Croatian Diaspora? Are injustices defined by the leaders as ‘twofold’? i.e. are they 
portrayed  as  imposed both on the people residing in the homeland and those settled 
overseas? 
To what extent is the ‘injustice frame’ essential for the success of the framing of a 
particular diaspora?  In the Croatian case, I will examine how these frames amplified the 
desire for a ‘centuries–old dream’ and introduced the ‘diaspora as an organic part of the 
nation’ sub–frame.  The attribution component of diagnostic framing, i.e., identifying 
the source of blame and naming the culpable agents197 will also be examined as it can 
lead to what Gamson referred to as ‘adversarial framing’, an attribution process that 
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political elites and their parties engage in in an effort to delineate the boundaries 
between ‘good’ and ‘evil’.198 
I will look at injustice frames in Chapter IV but the focus will be on how leaders identify 
and frame a question of urgency, portraying it as intrinsically problematic, pointing at 
the same time to causes of this ‘national distress’ as well as those responsible for it.  
This particular framework has a high mobilisation potential because it clearly identifies 
‘the Other’, ‘the Aggressor’, to which it “assigns the role of antagonists, thereby 
simplifying rejection of the status quo by personifying the causes of the nation’s ills”.199  
My analysis will highlight the role of the leader as a legitimate identifier of a ‘national 
problem’.  
Framing the Solution: The Prognosis  
 
Snow & Benford identify prognostic framing as one of the core framing tasks.  When 
applied to the study of diaspora mobilisation, I will look at the role it played in providing 
the audience with a sense of direction.  To what extent was the task of identifying a 
solution, together with articulating and disseminating that solution, act as a key enabler 
of diaspora mobilisation.  In the Croatian case, I will examine the ‘centuries–long dream 
of Croatian statehood’ as a potential compelling prognosis, one that resonated across 
multiple generations of Diaspora Croats. 
The plan to change the status quo generally includes suggesting an alternative method of 
successfully dealing with existing worries in the home country.  I will look at the extent 
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to which this plan identified leading figures – political leaders, intellectuals and religious 
representatives from the homeland, but also leaders from within the Diaspora – as 
capable of putting that plan into action, and to what extent these Diaspora 
representatives acted as self–legitimated spokesmen of the whole collective Diaspora 
identity.  The study will also look at possible evidence of “counterframing”200 i.e., the 
counter solutions offered by movement opponents and Diaspora communities with less 
radical views.  Chapter V will look at how those counterframings were deflected and 
what tactics were used to ward them off relatively early on.  
An important element of my analysis of the framing process is the one looking at the 
vocabulary used to justify ‘the big idea’ expressed through frames and introduce the 
element of agency.201  To do this, the study will focus on the language used by the 
diaspora entrepreneurs.  Benford202 identifies four generic vocabularies of motive: 
vocabularies of severity, urgency, efficacy, and propriety.  These provide followers of 
the movement with “compelling accounts for engaging in collective action and for 
sustaining their participation”203.  The analyses of the Croatian Diaspora activists, elites, 
politicians and significant others’ speeches, interviews, slogans and statements will be 
examined to see whether there is evidence that points to the existence of the four 
previously identified vocabularies, and whether Benford’s list lacks any important 
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components.  Later chapters will look at a vocabulary of particular salience in the 
Croatian Diaspora mobilisation, one which we can define as the ‘perceived justness of 
the cause’, referring to the feeling of duty and a sense of obligation to do what is 
perceived as right.  This vocabulary will be further analysed in Chapter IV, ‘The 
Framing of a Dark Diagnosis: Interpreting Injustices and Naming Enemies’. 
This motivational framework provides a repertoire of stimuli that encourages diaspora 
mobilisation, facilitating its early stages, its increase, and development, continually 
provoking interest, enthusiasm, and excitement among its supporters.  I will examine the 
extent to which this framework relied on the power of emotion, and the role it played in 
the sustainability of the framing strategy.  Later chapters will look at to what extent the 
embellished internal Diaspora homogeneity, despite its diverse composition, increased 
the effectiveness of the framing strategy and enabled the achievement of its desired 
results.  
Gerhards and Rucht204 hypothesise that the larger the range of problems covered by the 
frame, the larger the range of social groups that can be drawn into the process of 
mobilisation.  This direct correspondence of the number of issues encompassed by the 
frame to the mobilisation capacity of it is relevant in the process of diaspora 
mobilisation as well.  The master frame, broad in scope with magnet–like attributes, 
functions “as a kind of master algorithm that colours and constrains the orientations and 
activities of other movements”.205  The flexibility of the Croatian Diaspora master frame 
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will be examined to assess whether it had the capacity to include a wide range of related 
problems. 
Diaspora Frame Resonance  
 
The frame is successful for two different reasons: for its verisimilitude and its 
pertinence.  Snow and Benford refer to this as resonance.206  For frames to be “culturally 
resonant to their historical milieu”,207 they have to have a high degree of credibility as 
well as logical and precise relevance to potential followers’ lives.  I will examine the 
credibility of the frame creators, Franjo Tuđman and his party, to see what role the 
credibility of the leader plays in defining the degree of credibility of the frame.  Chapter 
III will take a closer look at Tuđman’s credibility as the guardian of Croatian values, 
which goes back to the Croatian Spring in the 1970s and later in 1981 when he was 
imprisoned for clashing with the Communist elites.  This chapter will also examine how 
Tuđman’s brand of nationalism, pushing for Croatian statehood and independence, 
particularly appealed to the Croatian Diaspora, many of whom became instrumental in 
funding his party.  The following chapter will also look at how Tuđman engaged in the 
so–called ‘credentialing process’208 during his visits to the Diaspora.  
Chapter IV and V will look at to what extent Tuđman’s frames were examples of 
pertinence.  The ‘Homeland War’ will be analysed as the key leitmotif as well as the 
underlying blame that was assigned to ‘the Aggressor’.  Chapter V will look at political 
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and personal salience and how it led to Diaspora political engagement.  Tuđman’s 
discourse will also be analysed to uncover additional motivational elements, such as ‘the 
justness of the cause’ principle.   
Existing literature in Diasporas Studies observes that periods of hardship in the 
homeland can cause immigrants to form new diasporic formations or join existing ones.  
As they become inspired to be a part of the complex diaspora reality, certain individuals 
shift from one category to another, from migrants to diasporants, and start voicing their 
views in the political arena.  Homeland conflict shakes and rearranges all previously 
established diaspora strategies, tactics and types of organisation, with a potential to unify 
split, ‘dormant’, and dispersed entities.209  However, the following chapters will look at 
the covert factors that, alongside homeland conflict, can lead to Diaspora mobilisation.  
Specifically, I will examine how the collective Diaspora identity, as framed by the 
nationalist elites, was put into effect and stimulated action in the name of the Diaspora 
and the nation at the time of a conflict.  
Frames also need to show cultural resonance.  The framing discourse needs to achieve 
resonance with a pre–existing narrative of popular beliefs concerning a nation’s 
ethnicity, such as common ancestry, history, culture, and association with a particular 
territory.  To what extent did the concepts covered by the frames resonate with the 
Diaspora’s cultural chronicle and its ‘myths’?210  Fisher211 refers to this narrative 
accuracy as ‘narrative fidelity’: its objective being to shape and often simplify intricate 
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values, histories, and political objectives, forming a mobilisation toolkit.  Chapters IV 
and V will look at Tuđman’s discourse to determine how effectively it uses factual, 
moral and aesthetic framing devices through prognostic, diagnostic and motivational 
interpretations: key for the success of political mobilisation. 
How the Frame is Developed 
 
A number of works highlight the importance of a series of actions that need to take place 
for a frame to emerge212.  The framing literature defines these processes as discursive 
and strategic processes.  
The Diaspora Discourse 
The Role of Homeland Conflict in the Discourse 
The echoes of the war were deafening in early 1990s Croatia.  Any dialogue not 
mentioning the war could easily go unnoticed; therefore, it could not have been ignored 
by the Diaspora collective action framers.  Chapter IV will examine how the ‘Homeland 
War’ was used by the framers to magnify its resonance.  How did the framers further 
amplify the gravity of its effects?  How did they frame the discourse of war to use it as a 
mobilising force?  The chapter will examine the discourse used to invariably accentuate 
                                                 
212 See Gamson, W. A., Fireman, B., & Rytina, S. (1982). Encounters with unjust authority. Homewood, 
IL: Dorsey.; 
 Gamson, W. A., (1992a). Talking politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.; 
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 Kubal, T. J. (1998). The presentation of political self: cultural resonance and the construction of 
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 Neuman, W. L. (1998). Negotiated meanings and state transformation: the trust issue in the progressive 
era. Social Problems, 45, 315-35.; 
 Johnston H., & Snow, D. A. (1998). Subcultures and the emergence of the Estonian nationalist 
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the ongoing devastation.  It will look at how the conflict became a recurring point of 
discussion throughout the 1990s – the repercussions of war and its destructions, both 
physical and emotional.  Furthermore, focusing on previous Croatian Diaspora 
injustices, I will examine how the framing discourse was used to connote, prompt and 
allude all at the same time, examining how references to the war – referring to other 
injustices in the past – provided a “conceptual handle or peg for linking together various 
events and issues”.213  To what extent did various issues and events, relevant to either 
past or present Diaspora experience, when coupled together function “much like 
synecdoches, bringing into sharp relief and symbolising the larger frame or movement of 
which it is a part?”214  For example, did HDZ’s slogans that appeared during the 
campaign function as frame amplifiers?  How did promises of sovereignty and 
independence help equate the Croatian nation with the HDZ? 
Diaspora Identity in the Discourse 
 
Diasporas are typically fragmented entities, divided not only by generations, 
background, and the reasons behind their emigration, but politically as well.  It is the 
political divide that is much harder to bridge.  By focusing the discourse on the common 
aspects of the diaspora, framing strategies can overpass those differences.  Hunt et al. 
have noted that “not only do framing processes link individuals and groups ideologically 
but they proffer, buttress, and embellish identities that range from collaborative to 
conflictual.”215 I briefly touched on the changing trajectory of the Croatian Diaspora 
                                                 
213 Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and 
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discourse, but the following chapters will further look at the shift in discourse that 
occurred on the eve of the 20th century.  More specifically, I will look at how the HDZ 
constructed a collective Diaspora identity by referring to the Diaspora as a single unit, 
and, more importantly, as an organic part of the Croatian nation.  How did the Diaspora 
framing process facilitate the alignment of personal and collective identities and thus the 
amplification of personal identity of mobilised Croatian Diaspora members?  The study 
will look at how, because of the deliberate and well thought–out discourse by the 
political elites, mainly HDZ and its supporters in the Diaspora, the concept of the 
Croatian Diaspora underwent a deliberate process of expansion, resulting in a significant 
change in its conceptual domain.  This will be examined as one of the key elements of 
the collective action framing process, constructed for the purposes of Croatian Diaspora 
mobilisation. 
The following chapters will further explore to what extent the Diaspora identity 
dialogue, steered by the elites, resulted in something we can refer to as ‘embroidered 
identity’ – a collective Diaspora identity, a common ‘we’ that gave Diaspora direction 
and succeeded in bridging the most dividing differences.  This collective identity is 
‘embroidered’ as it carries a set of embellished and slightly moulded meanings, values, 
and traditions; i.e., cultural narratives, or what Swidler216 referred to as a ‘tool kit’, an 
abundant source of new cultural ingredients.  Snow & Benford refer to it as a “cultural 
resource base (…) as well as the lens through which framings are interpreted and 
                                                                                                                                                
Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity. (pp. 185-208). Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 185-208.  
216 Swidler, A. (1986). Culture in action: Symbols and strategies. American Sociological Review, 51, 273-
86.  
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evaluated”217, leading to a conclusion that movements are “both consumers of existing 
cultural meanings and producers of new meanings”.218  Tarrow notes that new meanings 
are “woven from a blend of inherited and invented fibres into collective action 
frames”.219  I will examine how political elites crafted a new meaning of Diaspora by 
rekindling a hyperbolised myth of national pride, ideologies, and practices, highlighting 
particular details to make the narrative more compelling.  The study will look at how the 
HDZ created a new concept out of old ideas and by painting a new pattern on an old 
fabric, practically embroidering its initials onto the Diaspora sphere.  As we shall see, 
this was later embodied in one of HDZ’s most famous slogans, “Naturally, HDZ!” 
(“HDZ zna se!”), or “HDZ, it is so!”220 
Walsh et al.221 note that “early framing of protest ideology to appeal to wider publics 
may be more important factors in determining the outcome of grass–roots protests (…) 
[than] static variables such as a host community’s socioeconomic status, its degree of 
organisation, its level of discontent (…) and the proposed facility’s size”.  Was the 
Croatian Diaspora framing strategy constructed in a way to appeal to a wide public – to 
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the Diaspora as a whole, both “strangers and friends”?222 This question will also be 
included in my analysis of Diaspora collective action frames. 
The Strategy behind the Frame 
 
The study will examine how the Diaspora frame was developed with a specific purpose 
in mind, aimed at activating the somewhat inert members of the Diaspora, and further 
mobilising the already active members of the community.  The analyses of Diaspora 
mobilisation on behalf of homeland leaders will be focused on their efforts to influence 
Diaspora financial and electoral contributions, e.g. Diaspora as a source of financial 
resources and a source of political power, including how their mobilisation techniques 
were structured, what they promised and whom they targeted.  
The framing literature refers to the framing strategy as a ‘frame alignment process’223 
and identifies four basic types of alignments: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame 
extension and frame transformation.  The Croatian case will be analysed to see how a 
strategy aimed at revitalisation and amplification of a nation’s ‘true’ values and beliefs 
proved effective in not only mobilising potential beneficiaries but also ‘conscience 
constituents’.224  Snow et al. observe that, in their strategies, frame designers rely even 
more heavily on the ‘frame transformation’ approach225 whereby concepts are rethought 
and given new defining characteristics.  Furthermore, frame transformation becomes 
necessary when the already existing frames “may not resonate with, and on occasion 
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may even appear antithetical to conventional lifestyles or rituals and interpretative 
frames”.226  Apart from some notable exceptions,227 this alignment approach has not 
received much attention in movement studies. In view of this, I will examine the 
Croatian Diaspora collective action frames to uncover potential examples of frame 
transformation.  
Diaspora and Context 
 
The existing literature on framing points out three major factors that, by either 
constraining or facilitating, affect framing processes: political opportunity structures, 
cultural opportunities and constraints, and the targeted audiences.  The next chapter will 
look at the political opportunity structures, identified as changes in the configuration of 
political opportunities, especially shifts in the institutional structures or informal 
relations within a political system.228  These will be incorporated into a wider analysis 
focused on Franjo Tuđman, the leader of Diaspora mobilisation, which aims to highlight 
the importance of the leader alongside political opportunity structures and cultural 
opportunities and constraints. 
There is a plethora of definitions of political opportunity.  Meyer229 highlights that used 
by Tarrow: “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the 
political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics”.  Political 
                                                 
226 Snow, D. A., Rochford Jr., R. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment processes, 
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opportunity structures are rarely clear and unambiguous structural entities and are open 
to debate and subject to interpretation.230  In fact, “framing of political opportunity is 
(…) [a] central component of collection action frames”.231  They suggest that collective 
action frames imply the presence of an opportunity, thus making people “potential 
agents of their own history (…) [and] making their opportunity frame a self–fulfilling 
prophecy”.232  Others also suggest that the role of political opportunity structures in 
affecting the outcome of the movement is heavily dependent on how they are framed by 
movement actors.233 
When political opportunity is on the rise, as it was in 1990 Croatia, the existing political 
system is receptive and vulnerable to change.  This weakness is the result of a 
combination of factors, mainly influenced by the growth of political pluralism and elite 
cleavages and disunity.  Political leaders, if resourceful enough, can take advantage of 
those political opportunities.  In the Croatian context, it would have been difficult for 
HDZ to take full advantage of the political opportunities in the 1990s, and achieve the 
success it did, without the help of the Croatian Diaspora.  This opportunity to create 
change illustrates the self–fulfilling aspect of political opportunity structures ‘publicised’ 
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by movement actors.  Did Croatian Diaspora involvement, bringing with it much–
needed financial resources, create part of that opportunity? 
Research Design  
 
Research Strategy 
 
This research is explanatory by nature and focuses on why questions.  Answering the 
why questions inevitably involves developing causal explanations between the 
dependent variable (diaspora mobilisation) and the independent or explanatory variable 
(diaspora discourse, as a result of framing processes).  The study will also look at other 
possible mechanisms that connect the presumed cause to the presumed effects 
(intervening variables).  The objective of the study is to explain why diasporas mobilise: 
to discover “under what conditions (and through what paths)”234 a successful 
mobilisation of a Diaspora occurs.  The Croatian Diaspora is used as a case study to 
explain the drivers and outcomes of the Croatian Diaspora mobilisation.  It does so by 
employing the frame analysis approach and linking the literature of collective action 
frames with the research done in Diaspora Studies. This research objective is a theory–
building objective and fits under the disciplined configurative case study model;235 it 
uses an established theory (framing theory) to explain a case.  
Why Croatian Diaspora? 
 
Apart from its political, financial, cultural, humanitarian and military contributions, the 
importance of the Croatian Diaspora is marked by its size.  The presence of the 
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phenomena of interest, diaspora mobilisation and the unique status of the Croatian 
Diaspora, makes this study an ideal testing ground for my hypothesis and an interesting 
arena for exploring the drivers behind diaspora mobilisation.  The Croatian case will 
provide the strongest possible inferences on theory as it represents a case where the 
variables are at extreme values and the causal mechanisms are unambiguously evident.   
The Croatian Diaspora was critical to the unfolding of events in Croatia during the early 
1990s and played a crucial role in influencing US policy toward the region.  Without the 
absolute and unreserved support of the Croatian Diaspora, the independent Croatian 
state would never have been established.  The Croatian Diaspora played a key role in 
Croatian politics in the 1990s and enjoyed an unparalleled position of privilege, i.e. 
unique voting rights, prominent political positions, and an unprecedented representation 
in the Croatian Parliament, with as many as 12 parliamentary seats (out of 127), more 
than were given to Croatia’s own ethnic minorities.  The number has since been reduced 
to three, but the voice of the Croatian Diaspora, albeit controversial, remains influential. 
The Case Study Method 
 
This study will make use of the value of case methods in testing hypotheses as well as 
for theory development.  Most of all, it will make use of their potential for achieving 
high conceptual validity, their strong procedures for developing new hypotheses, their 
significance as a useful channel for analysing the hypothesised role of causal 
mechanisms in the context of specific cases, as well as their relevance and aptness for 
addressing causal complexity.  Of special interest for this study is the ability of case 
studies to accommodate complex causal relations.  Context is of key importance for 
causal mechanisms.  Case studies enable us to analyse the process of causal mechanisms 
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by delving into one particular case and examining it in great detail.  This provides the 
opportunity to take into consideration multiple intervening variables and induce any 
unanticipated elements of the causal mechanism process as well as detect and categorise 
conditions or prerequisites needed for the activation of that particular causal mechanism. 
This study focuses on the importance of the independent variable (diaspora discourse), 
as developed by political elites, in shaping outcomes.  The study will look for different 
elements of the independent variable (diagnostic, prognostic and motivation framing) in 
order to develop a more discriminating analysis of the effectiveness of framing and to 
identify some of the factors that favour the success of a particular variant. 
Theory development via case studies is primarily an inductive process.  This research 
highlights the usefulness of deviant cases, such as the Croatian Diaspora, where a 
variable (diaspora mobilisation) is at an extreme value, for inductively identifying new 
theoretical variables or postulating new causal mechanisms.  This study of the Croatian 
Diaspora will show how the outcome in a deviant case such as this one is caused by a 
variable (collective action frames) that had been previously overlooked but whose 
effects are well known from other research.  This research, being a single case study, 
will shed more light on the role of framing in shaping diaspora mobilisation as well as 
other conjunctural factors operating together with the framing mechanisms, such as 
“first mover advantage” with Tuđman travelling overseas and engaging the Diaspora 
early on. This will lead to an improved historical explanation of the case and will refine 
some middle–range contingent generalisations. 
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A fundamental strategy of social research involves evaluating ‘plausible rival 
hypotheses’,236 i.e. examining alternative ways of explaining a particular phenomenon to 
avoid the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent.237  To do this we also need to 
evaluate our own theories (falsification), ask what data would contradict and disprove 
our preferred explanation, and collect data to evaluate our theory from this more 
challenging perspective.  This theory, used in this study, will be tested against additional 
evidence from the case that was not used to derive the theory.  In doing so, it will make 
the theory falsifiable as an explanation for the case, and circumvent confirmation bias. 
Comparative Methods and Within–Case Methods 
Comparative Methods 
 
Part of this study will briefly rely on comparative methods.  However, instead of trying 
to find two different cases that are comparable in all ways but one, as a controlled 
comparison requires, this study will achieve ‘control’ by dividing a single longitudinal 
case into sub–cases (pre, during and post war  –  the peak of Diaspora activity) to 
analyse the extent to which Tuđman’s frames influence Diaspora involvement in 
homeland affairs.  To do this the study will also analyse the discourse of the modern–
day Croatian Diaspora.  This will be the focus of my last empirical chapter, ‘Diaspora 
after Tuđman’. 
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Within–Case Methods  
 
“Within–case comparisons are critical to the viability of small–n analysis”.238  The main 
part of the study will focus not on the analyses of variables across cases, but on the 
causal path in a single case.  In conjunction with cross–case comparison explained 
above, the bulk of the study will employ within–case methods of casual interpretation, 
including both congruence and process–tracing that will serve as a supplement to 
comparative methods.  The aim of using these tools is to increase confidence in the 
theory, with the congruence method seeking to show that a theory is congruent (or not) 
with the outcome in a case.  Process–tracing, as a tool for causal inference, will be used 
to uncover a causal chain coupling independent variables with dependent variables, and 
evidence of the casual mechanisms posited by the theory used.  In the context of this 
study, process–tracing is understood as the unfolding of events or situations over time, 
both in Croatia and within the Diaspora. 
By employing congruence this study aims to contribute to theory development by using 
the ‘disciplined–configurative’ type of case study239. It uses established theories to 
explain the case.  It interprets the phenomenon under study by putting into operation a 
known theory to explore new territory.  It looks at a particular event from a unique 
perspective.  Although this method may not directly test a particular theory, one of the 
aims of case study is to demonstrate that the scope of one or more known theories can be 
broadened to account for a new event.  As Harry Eckstein notes, “aiming at the 
disciplined application of theories to cases forces one to state theories more rigorously 
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than might otherwise be done”.240  Odell observes that, “as a result of this conceptual 
work, the author may often be able to generate an additional type of contribution: new 
suggestions for improving the theory”. 241 
The key for employing the congruence method is the ‘congruity’ standard, i.e. the 
similarities in the relative strength and duration of hypothesised causes and observed 
effects242.  The theory employed in the congruence method used in this study is well–
established and highly regarded framing theory.  The congruence method will thus also 
contribute to the refinement and development of the framing theory, its scope and 
applicability to Diaspora Studies, hence advancing the theory on Diaspora Studies in 
general, and diaspora mobilisation in particular.  A number of key questions are to be 
asked in order to evaluate the possible casual significance of congruity in a case: Is the 
consistency spurious or of possible casual significance?  Is the process of successful 
diaspora framing a necessary condition for a successful diaspora mobilisation, and how 
much explanatory or predictive power does it have?  Is the independent variable a 
necessary condition for the outcome of the dependent variable? 
Data Collection Methods 
 
As explained earlier, the aim of this study is to explain diaspora mobilisation through the 
creation of collective action frames.  Framing is the manner in which we as human 
beings package our messages in order to generate a desired ‘reading’ in the receiver.  To 
gain more understanding about these frames, I look at discourse.  The word ‘discourse’ 
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was first used in the 1950s by Zelling Harris but became scientifically accepted in 
Europe through the work of Michel Foucault in The Archaeology of Knowledge in 
1969.243  Discourse is seen as closely linked to framing, where discourse is actually the 
way of framing and framing refers to the process of creating the discourse.  I interpret 
frames as discursive cues that we use to induce or align the message with certain pre–
existing interpretations of reality.  In social movement theory, collective action frames 
are “discursive matrixes constructed by movement actors to make sense of social 
relations and endow them with meaning with a purpose of guiding action.”  They are 
discursive procedures or strategies that use language creatively to shape how something 
is to be interpreted and understood.244 
The main method I use in this study is discourse analysis, a valuable tool used to study 
the political meanings that inform naturally occurring written and spoken text.  It 
enables us to reveal the hidden motivation behind a text and view it from a higher 
stance, providing us with a more comprehensive perspective.  By employing this type of 
analysis, this study binds itself to the tradition of social constructionism, which claims 
that reality does not exist on its own but is instead constructed by its subjects: in my case 
political elites, specifically Tuđman and his supporters.  Discourse analysis “concerns 
itself with the use of language in a running discourse, continued over a number of 
sentences and involving the interaction of speaker (or writer) and auditor (or reader) in a 
specific situational context, and within a framework of social and cultural 
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conventions”.245  We can narrowly define discourse as practices of talking and writing246, 
a counterpart to rhetoric, where text is the basic unit of data.  Texts in this study are 
either spoken words in speeches and public addresses or written articles, public 
statements, other political announcements and written comments in a survey.   
What we can learn from discourse analysis is: 
How specific actors construct an argument, and how this argument fits 
into the wider social practices.  More importantly we can demonstrate 
with confidence what kind of statements actors try to establish as self–
evident and true.  We can also reveal how their statements and the 
frameworks of meaning they draw from proliferate through 
communication practices.”247  
  
In contrast to simple content analysis, and given that I focus on how discourse is framed, 
in my analysis I am agnostic about the authors’ ‘real’ views, thoughts, feelings or beliefs 
as represented in their words, both written and spoken.  In my analysis I look at verbal 
and written communication as a vehicle for action, where the action being studied is the 
representation of reality.  What sets this type of analysis apart from content analysis is 
the scientific attention to the historical, cultural or political context in which the 
communication arises, as well as the possible effect that discourse has on the minds and 
actions of people.  Texts are not meaningful on their own; they gain meaning through 
their interaction with others.248  This is a major contribution of discourse analysis, as 
many other approaches (e.g. interviews) are unable to provide such “subtle forms of 
                                                 
245 Abrams, M. .H. & Harpham, G.G. (2011). A glossary of literary terms (10th ed.). Boston: Wadsworth. 
246 Woodilla, J. (1998). Workplace conversations: The text of organizing. In D. Grant, T. Keenoy, & C. 
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evidence”. 249  This type of integrated analysis offers a richer insight into the complexity 
of diaspora politics.  
In my discourse analysis I follow the ‘Toolbox for Analysing Political Texts’ written by 
Florian Schneider, social science and area studies scholar and lecturer at Leiden 
University.250  For every source material, I look at the social and historical context in 
which it was produced, who wrote it, who published it and when.  Only texts that were 
available to the Diaspora were examined.  These are either speeches delivered in person 
in front of diaspora Croats, speeches broadcast to the Diaspora on the radio, or texts 
published by Croatian Diaspora organisations.  In my analysis I also look at whether 
particular sources were responses to any major event, whether and how they tie into 
broader discussions and, when possible, how they were received by the Diaspora at the 
time of publication. 
I also take into account the medium of the publication and the genre that I am working 
with.  Scholars go as far as to argue “the medium is the message”251 as “the medium in 
which the information is presented is the crucial element that shapes meaning”252.  For 
example, most Tuđman’s speeches were delivered to the Diaspora in a highly emotional 
setting, in front of large crowds.  These were also not every day occurrences, which 
made them memorable, with the audience attaching more meaning to such events, 
making the effect more durable and potentially more powerful.  Other speeches were 
                                                 
249 van Dijk, T. A. (n.d.). What is Political Discourse Analysis, (p. 31).  University of Amsterdam. 
Retrieved from  
http://discourses.org/OldArticles/What%20is%20Political%20Discourse%20Analysis.pdf 
250 Schneider, F. (2013). How to do a discourse analysis. Politics East Asia Website. Retrieved from 
http://www.politicseastasia.com/studying/how-to-do-a-discourse-analysis/ 
251 McLuhan, M. & Kegan, P. (1964). Understanding media. London: Routledge  
252 Schneider, F. (2013). How to do a discourse analysis. Politics East Asia Website. Retrieved from 
http://www.politicseastasia.com/studying/how-to-do-a-discourse-analysis/ 
97 
 
broadcast via radio, in between reports of political and military tensions during the 
‘Homeland War’, making them equally emotionally charged. I limit the institutional 
background of my sources to a number of primary sources such as speeches, public 
addresses, and articles by President Tuđman and publications by the HDZ, as well as 
Diaspora publications.   
In my analysis of Diaspora publications, my main focus is on the publications of the 
CFU, the most influential Croatian diasporic organisation in North America.253  The 
thesis also draws insights from other Diaspora publications, such as the Croatian 
American Association (CAA), the Croatian World Network (CROWN), the American 
Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS), the American Initiative 
for Croatia (AIC), the Canadian Association of Alumni and Friends od Croatian 
Universities (AMCA), and the National Federation of Croatian Americans (NFCA),  an 
umbrella organisation which links major Croatian American organisations, including the 
CFU, the Croatian World Congress (CWC) and the Croatian Catholic Union (CCU). In 
addition to these, the last empirical chapter, ‘Diaspora after Tuđman’, also draws 
insights from the Croatian Worldwide Association (CWA). 
However, the CFU is the oldest and largest organisation in North America, boasting 
around 100,000 members.  Its publication, the Fraternalist, commonly referred to as the 
‘Z’, (Zajedničar in Croatian) is published in both the English and Croatian languages, 
since 1909, and averages 20 pages per bi–weekly edition.  It enjoys a certain influence 
on the host country and is widely accepted as legitimate representative of the Croatian 
Diaspora in North America, with a readership of around 40,000.  Thanks to its ‘middle 
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of the road’ editorial policy, the Fraternalist escaped censorship by the Yugoslav 
regime.254 
The CFU membership has traditionally been strongest across Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Illinois, California and the Canadian province of Ontario.  The current hubs of 
fraternalism are Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles and Toronto, Canada.  My 
research focuses on locations that Tuđman visited the most often and examines 
significant Diaspora activities that took place in Cleveland, Pittsburgh and Toronto 
during the relevant period.  The activities of the CFU were, “to a large extent, 
determined by the interests of the majority of its members, Croatian immigrants in both 
the US and Canada”, and the same is true of the organisation's attitudes toward the 
changes that took place in Croatia255.  The Fraternalist remains the most important 
means of communication between the CFU Home Office, lodges, and the general 
membership.  The newspaper has been a tool by which the management of the 
organisation could express their own political views.”256 The CFU encourages all 
members to become involved and attend meetings as well as participate in the fraternal 
activities sponsored by the local Lodges and Nests, which serve as the channel with the 
most direct interaction with members.  A number of CFU Lodges and Nests maintain 
their own Croatian Homes to serve as a central meeting place for their members and 
friends of members.257  Lodge activities range from “picnics, holiday parties, celebratory 
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saint days, banquets, and dances.  In some instances, numerous local lodges combine 
their efforts to hold regional events where fraternalism is shared amongst all”258.  Events, 
including significant meetings with Croatian leaders, are then often reported in the 
Fraternalist.  Meetings with President Tuđman were often held in these Croatian Homes 
that “foster a feeling of community and fraternalism”.259  
I also look at relevant international daily and weekly publications available to the North 
American Diaspora at the time, such as The New York Times, Washington Post, as well 
as Canadian sources.  I use mainly primary sources (Tuđman’s speeches, public 
addresses and articles), secondary sources (selected literature) and interviews (with 
persons chosen for their direct involvement in the events, or for their indirect 
involvement – mainly diplomats and professors).  A few dozen semi–structured 
interviews and questionnaires that I conducted with diaspora Croats have also been 
coded and are used in my study as anecdotal evidence, to add liveliness to the research 
and highlight areas of data, without overstating its relevance. Seven of these were 
conducted in person, while the rest of the answers were collected via semi–structured 
questionnaires between 2008 and 2012. Open ended questions were used to allow 
interviewees the freedom to express their views in their own terms providing the 
opportunity for identifying new ways of seeing and understanding the topic at hand. 
While coding my material, I worked with only a small number of theoretically pre–
determined coding categories, informed by my theoretical framework, while, for the 
most part, I allowed for patterns, themes and topics to emerge in the course of the 
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analysis.  Mayring260 refers to this as ‘evolutionary coding’, where coding categories 
evolve from theoretical considerations into an operational list informed by empirical 
data.  I then proceeded to collect and examine discursive statements, including any 
cultural, historical or political references that informed the message communicated by 
the source material.  I subsequently looked at linguistic and rhetorical mechanisms, 
including relevant word groups, grammar features, modalities, evidentialities, and 
literary figures that shape the meaning of the source material.  This is particularly 
relevant in the context of framing.  To identify frames, I looked for reoccurring 
arguments, themes and messages.  I kept in mind the core framing tasks, diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational, discussed in more detail in my next chapter. 
With all the elements of my analysis completed, I then proceeded to interpret my data, 
keeping the following questions in mind: Who is the author of the material?  When was 
it produced?  Who was the intended audience?  Who might benefit from the discourse 
constructed by the sources?261  In my findings I focus on the most relevant results, 
moving through the analysis based on my theoretical framework.  I add evidence from 
my work as needed, by adding original or translated examples to illustrate my point.  
I do not claim that all of politics is discourse, nor that all political analysis can or should 
be reduced to discourse analysis. However, if we get down to the “nitty gritty of how 
politics is actually ‘done’ in everyday life, we usually end up studying what some 
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political actors were saying or writing”.262 Given my study focuses on events that took 
place 25 years ago, I am also limited in terms of methods suitable for this type of 
enquiry, hence the focus on written texts or transcribed speeches and public addresses. 
As mentioned earlier, I have chosen the period from 1987 to 1995 in order to trace the 
process of Diaspora mobilisation.  Although one can trace earlier attempts by the 
Croatian Diaspora to exert influence on the politics at home,263 I look at 1987 as a 
starting point for my research to mark Tuđman’s first visit to the Diaspora.  The late 
1980s are characterised by the weakening of the Yugoslav Communist regime and the 
beginning of a new, albeit long and painful, journey for Croatia and the rest of former 
Yugoslav republics.  This is also the period in which Tuđman developed and solidified 
his relationships with his core supporters and later allies in the Diaspora.  What follows 
is the creation of the HDZ in February 1989, and its programme published in the 
Fraternalist.  Later that year the HDZ established branches around the world, including 
in Canada and the US.  As briefly summarised in the introductory chapter, the most 
significant events in early 1990s are the first Croatian democratic elections in May 1990, 
Tuđman’s victory and the proclamation of Croatian independence in 1991, as well as the 
period of war.  I also look at earlier periods to contextualise the discussion and focus on 
the modern history of the Croatian Diaspora in my last empirical chapter, to establish the 
extent to which frames can be seen as institutionalised in the Diaspora and the leader 
still ‘alive’ through his discourse that continues to be traceable in the Diaspora and 
mirrors that of the 1990s. 
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Potential Limitations  
 
According to the conventional case–study wisdom, one cannot generalise based on a 
single case study.  Contrary to that, Bent Flyvbjerg264 observes that carefully chosen 
cases were critical to the development of the physics of Newton, Einstein, and Bohr, just 
as the case study played a key role in the works of Darwin, Marx and Freud.  Ragin 
explains that defining single case studies as inferior to multiple case studies is 
misguided, since even single case studies “are multiple in most research efforts because 
ideas and evidence may be linked in many different ways”.265  “In social science, too,” 
Flyvbjerg argues, “the strategic choice of case study may greatly add to the 
generalizability of a case study”266.  He goes on to say that:  
Atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because they 
activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied 
(…).  Cases of the “most likely” type are especially well suited to 
falsifying hypotheses.  Random samples emphasising representativeness 
will seldom be able to produce this kind of insight; it is more appropriate 
to select some few cases chosen for the validity”.267 
Hence the focus in this study on strategically selected Croatian Diaspora locations in 
Ontario, Canada, and Cleveland and Pittsburgh in the US, and on the CFU as the oldest, 
largest and most influential Croatian Diaspora organisation.  
Another commonly listed limitation of case studies is the potential bias toward 
verification, interpreted as a tendency of the case study to confirm the researcher’s 
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predetermined views.268  Francis Bacon269 goes even further in stating that bias is a 
fundamental human characteristic, applicable to other methods beyond the case study.  I 
was particularly enlightened by the strategy Charles Darwin developed to avoid 
verification bias: 
I had (…) during many years followed a golden rule, namely, that 
whenever a published fact, a new observation or thought came cross me, 
which was opposed to my general results, to make a memorandum of it 
without fail and at once; for I had found by experience that such facts and 
thoughts were far more apt to escape from memory than favourable ones.  
Owing to this habit, very few objections were raised against my views, 
which I had not at least noticed and attempted to answer.270 
 
The case study, however, has its own rigour, different to quantitative methods, and its 
advantage is that it can ‘close in’ on real–life situations and test views directly in relation 
to phenomena as they unfold in practice”.271  
A potential disadvantage of the discourse analysis method is that it does not provide 
absolute answers, given that no amount of discourse analysis can provide adequate 
evidence of what goes on in people’s heads272.  To a certain degree discourse analysis 
also involves personal interpretation and instinct.  However, advocates of this type of 
analysis argue that meaning is never fixed, leaving everything open to interpretation and 
negotiation.  
Clarification of Terms  
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Different definitions generate different findings273.  In order to make meaningful 
observations in the course of this study, the concepts used need defining.  I have 
previously defined the concept of diaspora, linking it to the definition used by Gabriel 
Sheffer.  The definition, as emphasized earlier, refers to ethno–national social and 
political formations that maintain links with their homelands (e.g. Croatian political 
émigrés), but excludes wider transnational groups of different nationalities gathered 
around shared political and religious views, or moral and/or ethical perception of 
injustices. Communities with shared lifestyle orientations, such as music, art or sport, 
will also be excluded from the definition of diaspora in this study.   
An additional conceptual word of caution is also in order.  The term ‘Croatian–
American’ or ‘Canadian–American’ will be used interchangeably with ‘Diaspora’.  The 
term ‘Croatian–American’, for instance, may perhaps inadequately mirror the strength of 
the relationship some Diaspora groups, as fully integrated citizens of the US, share with 
their country of origin.  The use of ‘hyphenated’ identities does not imply that the two 
identities are at odds.  In fact, this study will argue that Diaspora homeland and hostland 
identities are undeniably concurrent.  The above terms are also contrasted to ‘exile’, or 
‘émigré’ which, when used in this study, will refer to emigrant groups that fled their 
countries because of their political beliefs.  
Conclusion 
 
Diasporas are often fragmented, both geographically and politically.  It has been 
emphasised that wars can bridge split and dispersed diaspora entities and prompt 
decisions among the diaspora to organise and launch massive political campaigns on 
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behalf of the homeland.  “Dormant diasporas face serious dilemmas during periods of 
dramatic change in their homelands.”274  Although conflicts have the power to ‘awaken’ 
and bridge identities, this study argues that the mere presence of homeland conflict is not 
enough for a sustained diaspora participation in homeland affairs.  
The study examines Croatian Diaspora as a case study for identifying the drivers behind 
diaspora mobilisation.  It aims to show how the mobilisation of Croatian Diaspora was 
the result of a successful framing strategy designed by homeland leaders and their 
supporters in the Diaspora.  Acting as a centripetal force that pulls the Diaspora toward 
the homeland, its centre, the leaders’ discourse will be analysed as the voice behind the 
strategy that mobilises Diaspora supporters around a cause.  How do leaders of the 
movement obtain authority and legitimacy?  To what extent do they employ ‘injustice 
frames’ referring to previous and present grievances and use references to national 
history to entice Diaspora support?  The study aims to show how leaders diagnosed the 
national problem and proposed solutions in the form of Croatian statehood, freedom and 
prosperity.  The study also intends to demonstrate how the political elites, through their 
discourse, represent themselves as visionaries and advocates of positive change. 
The study argues that framing, alongside resource mobilisation and political opportunity 
structures, are critical for understanding the processes of diaspora mobilisation.  The 
frames resonate with the diaspora population and have credibility and legitimacy in the 
cultural repertoire.  In the Croatian case, I examine how these prognostic and diagnostic 
frames were constructed to promise security, stability and relief from foreign oppression.  
                                                 
274 Sheffer, G. (2003). Diaspora politics: At home abroad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
106 
 
To what extent was Diaspora support framed as a struggle for these values and how 
much resonance was achieved mong Croatians abroad?  The study will also look at the 
collective identity discourse, focusing on shared meanings and cultural narratives, to see 
how it echoed within the fragmented groups of the Croatian Diaspora and spurred them 
into action.  The last empirical chapter ‘Diaspora after Tuđman’ will look at the 
modern–day Croatian Diaspora, to analyse the extent to which Tuđman’s frames are still 
present in today’s discourse and can be seen as entrenched in the Diaspora, with a 
discourse that mirrors that of the 1990s. 
The main protagonist of the framing process, the leader, will be given much–deserved 
attention in the next chapter, ‘The Man Behind the Frame: Tuđman’s Path to Power – 
from Prisoner to President’.  This chapter will discuss characteristics of Tuđman as a 
leader through a Weberian lens of charismatic authority, also touching on his capacity to 
attract allies and highly talented aides.  The chapter will also examine the conditions that 
led to his rise to power, including the changes in the Croatian political arena in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, culminating in the creation of the HDZ275 and setting the scene 
for a new era of the Croatian Diaspora. 
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CHAPTER III: The Man behind the 
Frame – Tuđman’s Path to Power – from 
Prisoner to President 
 
There is (…) a great deal of the creative artist in the political leader who, through his 
rhetoric, slogans and tactics, manipulates existing symbols and creates new ones.276 
 
How did the defeat of the South Slav brotherhood result in a joint effort by Croats at 
home and those abroad towards the realisation of the old separatist drive for 
independence?  The previous chapter provided a theoretical framework for 
understanding the drive behind the mobilisation of diasporas.  It offered a 
complementary view to conflict–based arguments, linking diaspora mobilisation to 
framing theory.  This will help examine how the process of diaspora mobilisation is 
triggered by homeland leaders’ efforts to galvanise diaspora action in order to advance 
their political goals.  
As explained in detail in the previous chapter, this study will argue that a successful 
diaspora mobilisation is primarily a product of collective action frames (CAF) used by 
goal–seeking elites, bridging the literature on framing processes with Diaspora Studies.  
These framing processes are supported by the presence of a strong charismatic leader, 
effective resource mobilisation and existing political opportunity structures (POS).  In 
their analysis of leadership in social movements, Morris and Staggenborg argue that 
human agency has been neglected by the recent emphasis on structures of opportunity in 
social movements and that the theory would benefit from an examination of the 
numerous ways in which leaders generate social change and create the conditions for the 
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agency of others.  They identify leaders as being critical to social movements as “they 
inspire commitment, mobilise resources, create and recognise opportunities, devise 
strategies, frame demands, and influence outcomes.”277   As mentioned earlier, a number 
of scholars have noted that leadership in social movements has yet to be adequately 
theorised. 
Morris and Staggenborg argue that the framing perspective has been an important factor 
in explaining social movements by revealing how meaning–generating processes set in 
cultural frameworks boost collective action.  Yet, this approach is, they observe, 
“limited by its own blind spots”.  Similar to resource mobilisation and political 
opportunity/process theory, the focus of social movements “is slanted toward structural 
and organizational factors”.278  Framing theory depicts SMO as the major actor in the 
framing process while the importance of leaders is not sufficiently highlighted.  “The 
few times they refer to framers as leaders they fail to examine how movement leaders 
drive the framing process.”279 
However favourable the ‘breeding ground’ presented by the opportunity structure, it 
only provides potential actors with options.  It is ultimately always the parties 
themselves who must make the best of them.280  The focus of this chapter will be on the 
leader in charge of the framing processes and his characteristics as one of the key factors 
                                                 
277 Morris, A. & Staggenborg, S. (2002). Leadership in social movements (pp. 25–26).  Retrieved from 
http://www.sociology.northwestern.edu/documents/faculty-docs/Morris-Leadership.pdf 
278 ibid 
279 ibid 
280 Sovak, M. & Cisar, O. (2011). Conditions for success and failure of radical nationalist parties in 
countries of the former Yugoslavia: A fuzzy-set analysis. Retrieved from 
https://horde.fss.muni.cz/~cisar/download/papers/sovak_cisar2011.pdf  (last online access 3 June 
2014) 
109 
 
explaining his success.281  In doing so, the study will address the existing gap in the 
framing literature and focus attention on the central role that leaders play as the main 
actors in charge of framing.  In placing the focus on the leader, the study does not intend 
to minimise the role of other factors, the right configuration of which is essential for the 
framing processes to be effective. 
With the above in mind, the focus of this chapter is Franjo Tuđman, the frame–master in 
charge of framing processes aimed at securing Diaspora support in 1990s Croatia.  Often 
referred to as the ‘Founding Father’ of the modern Croatian state, Tuđman led Croatia 
into independence with the help of the Croatian Diaspora.  This chapter will discuss 
characteristics of Tuđman as a leader and a politician.   Given the context of a growing 
sense of crisis around the disintegration of Yugoslavia, his leadership will be analysed 
through a Weberian lens of charismatic authority.  The chapter will look at Tuđman’s 
specific traits and experiences from his past that contributed to his ‘charismatic 
personality’.  Given that Tuđman seemed to combine both intellectual and political 
leadership roles, the chapter also touches on his capacity to attract allies and highly 
talented subordinates.  Furthermore, the chapter provides more context to explain the 
shifting trajectory of Tuđman and unpacks the conditions that led to his rise to power 
and opened doorways to a successful Diaspora mobilisation.  This includes the 
transformation of the Croatian political arena in the late 1980s/early 1990s and the 
creation of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), a party that continued to dominate 
the Croatian political scene for decades after Tuđman’s death.  The discussion will also 
touch on Tuđman’s bond with the Diaspora and the enabling factors that contributed to 
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the development of that bond.  In doing this, the chapter will further expand upon the 
complexity of causal relationships between the various explanatory factors linked to the 
processes of framing and the success of diaspora mobilisation.  This will set the scene 
for a discussion of Tuđman’s formulation and articulation of frames and their projection 
to the Diaspora, as the central focus of this thesis. 
Tuđman as a Charismatic Leader – “the Good 
Shepherd of the Croatian Flock”282 
 
10 December 2015 was the 15th anniversary of President Tuđman’s death.  He was born 
in 1922 in Croatia, at that time part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
and died in 1999 in the Republic of Croatia, as its first president.  A historian, writer and 
politician, Tuđman was, to borrow a term from Sidney Hook, an “event–making”283 
person who shaped events; he did not merely ride the waves of history.  While Tuđman 
continues to remain present in political discussions decades after his presidency, his 
image today is mixed in the wider population.  It ranges from his being seen as an 
ignoble political figure and the epitome of stern nationalism to being a heroic leader and 
the father of his nation.  Often criticised for his lack of appreciation for democracy, his 
ethnocentric views, his mythomania, narcissism and excessive nepotism,284 Tuđman also 
had positive qualities.  He was a man of many talents: a determined activist, an army 
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general, a historian, a publisher, and a strong, charismatic leader.  He was also the only 
active antifascist combatant among all post–communist statesmen.285  
In my analysis of Tuđman as a leader, I will begin by adopting a Weberian ‘ideal–
typical’ approach to classifications of legitimacy and power and identify leadership traits 
in Tuđman that can be viewed as ‘charismatic’.286  Weber defines charismatic authority 
as “resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an 
individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by 
him”.287 Tuđman, the first democratically elected President of Croatia, portrayed himself 
as the creator of a new movement, driven by a mission to achieve great things for the 
Croatian nation.  Tuđman often stressed that it was his burning desire and the drive to 
change things for the better that kept him going.  He promised to offer national 
reconciliation and unity to all Croats and bring to life the ‘thousands–year–old Croatian 
dream of statehood’.288  This appealed to the Croatian nation at the time and although 
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there was much truth in these claims, the reality is much more complicated.  Tuđman’s 
early unifying claims and pledges are not to be disparaged but one must remember that 
first and foremost they were carefully constructed and deeply tendentious statements.  
Tuđman was a man of contradictions.  These contradictions are evident in the 
complexity of his political views but also in many of his personal beliefs.  As a young 
man, he was recruited into the Yugoslav Partisans in 1942, led by Yugoslav 
revolutionary communists during World War II and under the command of Marshal 
Josip Broz Tito.289   He was promoted to the position of colonel in 1953, and in 1959, at 
the age of 38, became the youngest general in Tito’s army.290  From a passionate 
Yugoslav patriot, Tuđman transformed into an equally, if not more, enthusiastic 
Croatian nationalist.  After being known as a devoted communist, he became an ardent 
anti–communist.  He was a determined atheist who gained the support of the Catholic 
Church hierarchy in Zagreb and later in Rome.291  An immediate question that poses 
itself is how firmly established were the political convictions he is known for today?  
Hard–core nationalism and separatism are synonymous with his name today; however, 
neither were his original political convictions.  Sadkovich observes that Tuđman’s 
words, as well as his actions, always reflect a given phase of his evolution and reflect 
not just his own mentality in a particular period, but also the mentality of Yugoslavia 
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and Croatia.  His political convictions and his ideas cannot be taken out of context.292  
They developed as a result of unusual experience and permanent learning by trial and 
error,293 and were influenced by life–changing events and extraordinary experience.  
These events, including political persecutions, dismissals, arrests and imprisonment, 
were numerous and dramatic.  Interestingly, although discussed in relatively closed 
circles between Tuđman and small groups of émigrés in the Diaspora in late 1980s, these 
contradictions were never the cause of public astonishment or surprise.  In spite of being 
publicly well–known facts, when Tuđman came to power there was no sign of 
vociferous public disapproval, condemnation or judgment of his past.  This is indicative 
of his skill in not only framing ideas, but also his own persona, in a way that a large 
number of people will find satisfying, and most of all, compelling.  Successful leaders of 
any era, and regardless of whether they are later praised or condemned by history, can 
endure by being able to not only remain relevant, but build on that, weaving in new and 
multiple generations.  Tuđman was well attuned to the needs of his audience and an 
innovator in the sense that he was well skilled in reworking pre–existing ideas of the 
Croatian predicament and projecting them in fresh rhetoric.  Tuđman’s chameleon–like 
qualities in being the right person at the right time and saying the right thing to the right 
people meant he continued to reach, and impact, a mass audience – earning himself the 
title of “the good shepherd of the Croatian flock”.294  Indeed, one of the most important 
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characteristics of a charismatic leader is his ability to gather supporters attracted by 
different motivations.295  
The changing trajectory of Tuđman from being a former dedicated Yugoslav partisan to 
becoming a Croatian nationalist is explicable in the context of the 1970s Croatian Spring 
of which Tuđman was one of the leaders.  It was a mass nationalist–based demonstration 
of discontent with the position of Croatia within Yugoslavia, crushed by the Communist 
government on Serbia's National Day in December 1971.  It created waves of emigrants 
from Croatia and formed a Diaspora that would later become an important resource in 
Tuđman’s pursuit of power.   A gradual disintegration of Yugoslavia after the death of 
Tito, coupled with a renewed interest in the Croatian historical narrative, and an 
increased mood for separatism, were important events that framed his transformation 
into the leader many thought he was destined to be.  Let us examine Tuđman’s 
characteristics as a charismatic leader and in doing so touch on some of the points raised 
above. 
Tuđman had a great personal presence and his charisma can largely be explained by the 
power of his personality.  Also, his public displays of self–confidence inspired 
confidence in others that he indeed was a mastermind capable of extraordinary things.  
His strength lay in putting forward his strong views to others with composure and 
conviction.  His military career instilled him with a deep sense of discipline.  There are 
many depictions of him dressed as the military commander in chief or wearing a brilliant 
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white uniform296 with outsized epaulettes.297  Former Austrian chancellor Franz 
Vranitsky “chided the Croatian leader for prancing around in the sort of fantasy uniform 
not even seen in the Vienna opera these days.”298  This style was typical of Tito, who 
was said to be a charismarch,299  a ruler staying in power by charisma, often emulated by 
Tuđman.  Tuđman mesmerised his followers with his presence but also with his power 
of oratory and exemplary rhetorical skills, including his timely and well–placed use of 
metaphors, metonymies and other figures of speech.  One can also trace numerous 
conceptual metaphors in his speeches, particularly those depicting the nation and the 
war.  Tuđman acted as a creative political entrepreneur300 and, as we shall see, used 
frames as tools for political engineering301, ensuring Diaspora loyalty, support and long–
term commitment.  He is known for his longwinded speeches, introducing patterns of 
repetition that created strong rhythm and reinforced his messages.  His complex 
sentences with constant references to carefully picked historical events evoked strong 
emotional responses.  This is exemplified in the excerpt below from a speech Tuđman 
gave in 1995, stressing the importance to 
value what we conquered at the price of Croatian blood and we shall 
never allow anyone to jeopardize our freedom, our democracy, our 
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beautiful Croatian land in which there must be room not only for all 
Croatian people here, but also for all those expelled Croats whom I 
invited to return when I was speaking in Gospić.  302 
 
My next chapter, ‘The Framing of a Dark Diagnosis’, looks at Tuđman’s oratory skills 
in more detail, demonstrating that “there is thus a great deal of the creative artist in the 
political leader who, through his rhetoric, slogans and tactics, manipulates existing 
symbols and creates new ones.”303  
Tuđman’s confidently held, well–informed and articulately expressed opinions further 
contributed to his sense of charisma.  Described as a “Prometheus of Croatia, igniter of 
the drowsing spirit of patriotism for the fatherland”,304 Tuđman was indeed seen as a 
‘forethinker’.  He was educated, well–read and travelled, and one of the few post–
communist leaders with a PhD.305  He was a well–known academic, a title he earned 
following his military career when he decided to focus on his academic research.  It was 
as a historian that he began his dissident path.  As the director of the Institute for the 
History of the Workers’ Movement and as an associate professor of history at the 
University of Zagreb from 1963 to 1967, he wrote articles on history, military history 
and international relations.  His writings soon became the source of alternative 
interpretations of Yugoslav history, directly criticising the Yugoslav socialist 
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establishment and causing much conflict with official Yugoslav historiography.  His 
best–known work, clashing with the Yugoslav communist elite and the central Yugoslav 
dogma, was Great Ideas and Small Nations, a monograph on political history.  
Outspoken on nationalist issues, Tuđman publicly supported the goals of the Declaration 
on the Status and Name of the Croatian Literary Language, garnering a substantial 
following through his publications, a gain that proved tremendously useful a few 
decades later.  He also accused the Yugoslav authorities of exaggerating the crimes 
committed by the Ustaše during World War II, one of his many criticisms of the 
government that eventually led to his expulsion from the Communist Party in 1967 and 
removal from all offices and duties.  He went from promotion to prosecution and was 
deprived of his human rights for nearly 20 years because of his political convictions.  In 
1971 he was sentenced to two years in prison for participating in the activities of the 
Croatian Spring.  His daring side led him to Sweden on a forged Swedish passport in 
1977, where he was interviewed by Swedish TV about the situation of Croats in 
Yugoslavia, for which he was put on trial in 1981 and accused of having spread enemy 
propaganda.  Neither an international outcry nor an Amnesty International’s ‘Prisoner of 
Conscience’306 badge managed to save him from being sent to the notorious Lepoglava 
prison in 1982, where he suffered a series of four heart attacks.307 308 Years later, Tuđman 
often referred to Croatia’s troubled past and injustices suffered by its people, including 
political prosecutions similar to his own.  We can identify other elements of his own life 
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used within a wider narrative he developed around his mission. These are explained 
below. 
A Unified Diaspora 
 
Multiple divisions in the Tuđman family,309 divided religious identities and political 
allegiances between ‘Yugoslavhood’ and ‘Croathood’,310 including Tuđman’s own 
mercurial political views, are divisions that were also present in the Croatian Diaspora at 
the time and some are still visible today.  We shall see how these themes from Tuđman’s 
own life became interwoven with some of the central themes of Diaspora Collective 
Action Frames (CAF) designed by him later.  Some of the key themes of CAF addressed 
divisions within the Diaspora itself.  They advocated for a Croatian national unity of 
Croats within and outside the homeland and the full national reconciliation of the 
supporters of former Croatian Domobrans (the NDH home guard), Partisans, as well as 
Ustaše.311  In a speech celebrating Croatia’s first Independence Day,312 Tuđman stressed 
that “in order to achieve [Croatian independence] (…) we had to unite the disunited 
Croathood.”313 He emphasised the fact that all members of the Croatian Diaspora, as an 
organic part of the Croatian nation, had the right to return home.  They “no longer have 
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to hide in exile – today they can proudly say they are Croats”. 314  Divided identities, 
prosecutions and perceived past injustices all form leitmotifs in Tuđman’s life story but 
also in the story he told the Diaspora. 
Collective Grievances  
 
This brings us to another event from Tuđman’s past.  We are seldom reminded of his 
father’s and stepmother’s fate.  They were found dead at their home in their native 
village of Veliko Trgovišće in 1946 where, according to the official police investigation, 
they took their own lives.  However, multiple theories emerged providing alternative 
explanations of the events that took place that day.  One of the explanations was that 
they were killed by Ustaše terrorists, while another theory, and the one favoured by 
Tuđman in his later years, claimed that they were killed by members of KNOJ (later 
UDBA, the secret police in communist Yugoslavia).  In his personal diary in 1986,315 
Tuđman describes the latter theory as a more plausible explanation for what happened to 
his parents, given their democratic, nationalist, and religious views.  Regardless of 
which theory one chooses to subscribe to, the tragic and/or mysterious fate of his parents 
is, together with Tuđman’s later political persecution and imprisonment,316 an important 
ingredient in the development of Tuđman’s ideas as a person and a politician.  These 
events also become important in the development of his image, as they cast him as a 
martyr in the eyes of Croats both at home and abroad.  If his parents were indeed killed 
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by the Yugoslav secret police, then they shared the fate of thousands of Croats from 
Bleiburg, killed by partisans after being handed over to Tito’s forces by the British in 
1945 near the Austrian border.  Bleiburg, too, as we shall see, will become an important 
theme in Tuđman’s wider narrative, also featuring in some of the CAF constructed by 
him in the early 1990s.  
The Bleiburg tragedy has been an important theme in the Diaspora and one of the main 
sources of collective resentment.  For many it became the metaphor for the Croatian 
holocaust.  Tuđman relied heavily on this and similar examples from the Croatian past317 
already present in the Diaspora discourse.  His mottos and slogans portray him as a 
leader aware of his people’s plight, having lived through it, and equipped to work 
toward a brighter future in the interests of his people.  As a leader ‘merely obeying the 
wishes of his people’, he was able to enter into a symbiotic relationship with his 
followers.318 His frequent use of collective pronouns, such as ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘ours’, 
implies collaboration and stresses that the people have a clear say in their own future.  
Similarly, the use of ‘they’, ‘them’ and ‘theirs’, targeting the enemy, was sufficient for 
engendering antagonism and demonising the ‘Other’.  A collective enemy – the 
‘greater–Serbian aggressor’ – was identified, creating clear ethnic, confessional and 
national boundaries between Croats and Serbs.  Boundaries were time and time again 
confirmed through the glorification of the leader and his followers, and ‘ostracizing the 
undesirables’.319 As we shall see later, the use of diagnostic and ‘boundary framing’ 
highlighted all existing differences, including the claim that Croatia was and always has 
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been a part of Western European tradition, while Serbs belonged to the other side, the 
East, having more in common with the Byzantine culture.  Tuđman stressed that Croatia 
was a European nation, both traditionally and culturally.  His message focused on ‘us’ 
against ‘them’; it was a joint venture between him and the Croats, both at home and in 
the Diaspora, in fighting the enemy.  It showed that “political faith needs an anti–
hero”320, one that can be overcome collectively.  
There were two main battles to be fought (collectively) – one Tuđman defined as a battle 
for democracy and the other one, under the motto of “Always and everything for 
Croatia, our sole and eternal Croatia under no circumstances” (Croatian: “Uvijek i sve za 
Hrvatsku, a našu jedinu i vječnu Hrvatsku ni za što!),321 as the battle for Croatia.322 The 
fetishisation of the state was part of the HDZ’s platform as well, as evidenced by the 
engraving on Tuđman’s monolithic grave in Mirogoj Cemetery: “Always and everything 
for Croatia; our sole and eternal Croatia under no circumstances.” 
We can take the argument of a symbiotic relationship one step further and also include 
the Diaspora.  The Croatian example has shown that the multiplicity of close and often 
long–term interactions between the Diaspora and its homeland, including the nature of 
the relationships they spawn, can in some measure be understood through the idea of a 
symbiotic relationship.  The creation of a symbiotic relationship ties in with Madsen and 
Snow’s 323 argument based on efficacy theory.  They observe that, at a time of crisis 
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when fundamental beliefs are being challenged and general understanding limited, with 
the emergence of a leader and the establishment of the charismatic bond the followers 
regain a sense of hope, meaning and efficacy.  Also, Tuđman’s personal history helped 
others identify with him and “come to terms with complexity through the image of a 
single person who is held to be special, but in some way accountable”. 324  This 
identification was a strong feature among core activists, many of whom spent most of 
their lives in exile after being persecuted for their political convictions, much like 
Tuđman. 
The Charisma of Religion 
 
More recently, the writings on charisma concentrate on the nature and the causes of what 
constitutes a ‘charismatic bond’, i.e. the relationship between the leader and the 
followers, which is often seen in quasi–religious terms.325  In Tuđman’s case, there was a 
“compulsive, inexplicable emotional tie linking a group of followers together in 
adulation of their leader”326  This tie is still evident today, as, at the time this is being 
written, and more than two decades after he addressed the Croatian nation as its first 
president, a statue of Tuđman is being erected in the eastern city of Osijek ahead of local 
elections there.  During the 1990s, though, the tie was not just between the leader and 
the followers, but also between the followers themselves.  This bond linked Tuđman’s 
supporters in Croatia with the ones in the Diaspora, but also broke bonds with the 
‘Other’, as we shall see in later chapters.  
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The term ‘charisma’ was first used by St. Paul, who defined it as the gifts of divine grace 
that manifest themselves in forms such as wisdom, knowledge, faith and the grace of 
healing and prophecy327.  Tuđman never explicitly exemplified elements of cultic 
charisma.  He never deliberately tried to adopt the role of a prophet and never openly 
referred to his mission as a leader as being the will of God.  However, he relied heavily 
on the Catholic faith to attract and gather followers and, despite his previous 
(non)religious beliefs, many vested him with a religious aura.  
Tuđman was known as a firm supporter of communism and anticlericalism in his earlier 
days.  In fact, he and Ankica Žumbar were married in 1945 at the Belgrade city council, 
openly demonstrating their loyalty to the communist movement and the importance of 
civil rituals over religious ones.  This was shortly after the Yugoslav government 
introduced a law allowing civil weddings, limiting the jurisdiction of the Church.328  
Nevertheless, he later identified Catholic religion to be important for the modern 
Croatian nation and was the main instigator of the era of Catholic revival in Croatia.  As 
a historian and later as a politician, he often highlighted the dichotomy between Croatia's 
Habsburg and Serbia's Ottoman past, exploiting it as a tool for asserting the cultural 
superiority of the Croatian nation over its Balkan neighbours.329  This dichotomy 
appealed to Croats at home and to those in the Diaspora and was used by Tuđman in the 
construction of his CAF as a device for attracting Diaspora support.  When Tuđman took 
his presidential oath in 1992 he added “So help me God!” (Croatian: “Tako mi Bog 
                                                 
327 1 Corinthians 12:8-10 
328 Sadkovich, J. J. (2010). Tuđman – Prva politička biografija [First political biography]. Zagreb: 
Večernji list.  
329 Ingrao, C. (1996). Ten untaught lessons about Central Europe: A historical perspective. University of 
Minnesota, Center for Austrian Studies. Retrieved from the University of Minnesota Digital 
Conservancy, http://purl.umn.edu/90608. 
124 
 
pomogao!”), a sentence that was not in the official text of the oath until 1997 when 
Tuđman officially included it.330  The Catholic Church, with its values and principles, 
was portrayed by Tuđman as a preserver of Croatian identity.  This was mirrored not 
only in his speeches but was also present in the HDZ anthem “God Protect Croatia” 
(Croatian: “Boze Čuvaj Hrvatsku”), still sung widely in the Diaspora today. 
There are uncertainties regarding Tuđman’s religious convictions.  According to 
Tuđman’s wife Ankica, he lost his faith and adopted his father’s anticlerical attitudes 
when his mother Justina (nee Gmaz) died bearing her fifth child, leaving Franjo and his 
two younger brothers in the care of their father, and Olga, their stepmother.  Živko 
Kustić, Croatian Eastern Catholic priest and journalist in Jutarnji List also expressed 
doubt that Tuđman had ever been truly religious.331  According to Vjekoslav Perica, 
Tuđman was sufficiently nationalistic as well as ethnocentric332 to earn the sympathies of 
the Croatian Catholic Church.  He further suggests that “a strong and rigid man, and a 
former general, Tuđman made the bishops feel less afraid of the Serbian menace”.333  
Tuđman and the Catholic Church, once on opposing sides, now joined forces promising 
the Croatian people a national renaissance.  These and other promises were expressed in 
Tuđman’s CAF, the church being one of the main messengers.  Whether Tuđman was 
genuine in expressing his religious convictions or whether these were manufactured and 
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put together in a way to make him more attractive to a broad spectrum of potential 
supporters, remains unknown.  
Even though Tuđman never referred to his mission in messianic terms, there was a very 
strong charismatic bond between him and his followers.  His charisma was not a 
manufactured ‘pseudo–charisma’.  However, the notion of ‘pseudo–charisma’ is of little 
value unless it is used to demonstrate “that the created charismatic in some way lacks the 
range of manipulative tools open to the true charismatic” 334, which is not the case with 
Tuđman.  Marin Sopta, a former émigré politician, observes that “somehow we knew he 
was the man, that he would be the leader to finally pull the Croats together”.335  “He had 
the charisma of a great leader”, says Sopta, referring to Tuđman, “Like Churchill or De 
Gaulle”336.  In his observations, Hockenos explains that the political émigrés were most 
impressed by “his potential to take change and lead the nation toward its rightful 
destiny”.  Tuđman “was prepared to lead, and this group of émigrés was ready to 
follow.”337 
Political Opportunities 
 
It is most doubtful that even the most charismatic of leaders could mobilise a Diaspora 
in the absence of at least some conducing factors.  Tuđman had an ability to turn past 
ideas into ideas relevant in the present, giving them an appropriate framework, but the 
mere existence of these ideas was not enough to create change.  It was the combination 
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of a successfully planned design of well–articulated ideas and his leadership skills, in 
conjunction with several favourable conditions that made change happen.  
Apart from CAF, previous research has identified key ingredients for the emergence of 
social movements, including political and cultural opportunities, organisational bases, 
material and human resources, sudden and unanticipated events, and grievances.  
Oberschall338 suggests that potential leaders are almost always available, but their 
emergence depends on political opportunities.  However, political opportunities are 
often missed, and leaders play an important role in recognising and acting on 
opportunities. 339 Studies of charisma dating back to Weber focus on the need for a 
structural crisis as an essential starting point.  The socio–political and economic reality 
of the late 1980s spurred demands for change in the country.  Domestic political 
instability and the increasing economic turmoil spurred the Croatian people into a quest 
for a national solution and the person able to deliver it.  The level of dissatisfaction with 
the establishment and the disillusionment with the government in power, seen only as 
capable of advancing the needs of certain groups without benefiting the Croatian nation, 
awakened a desire to overthrow existing problems and create an environment that would 
lead to political stability and economic prosperity.  As a confident man with strong 
leadership qualities stemming from his army days, Tuđman rose to the opportunity to 
attend to these problems as a leader of the Croatian nation and as its trusted guardian.  In 
an environment marred by political instability, tension and uncertainty, Tuđman set out 
on his mission equipped with an unwavering faith in his abilities to realise the 
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‘thousand–year–old dream of Croatian statehood’.  But “few dreams have been fulfilled 
in such unpromising circumstances”340 and the price was high. 
Charismatic leaders can make a grim objective reality seem even worse by further 
dramatising the events to add tension, leading to an apocalyptic portrayal of the future.  
Once formulated, these figurative constructions spread around as objective reality.341  In 
times of duress, political ambiguity or economic chaos, observes Cohen, “[s]ome 
individuals may prove to be more perceptive, more creative, and more articulate than 
others, and their formulations may appeal more than those of others to a wide 
collectivity of people who are in the throes of the same problem”.342  Progressively, 
these symbolic ideas become simplified as they “shed the irrelevant details created by 
circumstances of time and space and as their central theme is dramatised”.343  Through 
repetition, they develop into routinised forms.344  Past collective grievances are brought 
back into the present and further contextualised in the current political climate to serve 
their mobilising purpose.  An important element of Tuđman’s Diaspora CAF was the 
need to escape from “national slavery and Bolshevik darkness.”345 To dramatise the 
issue, traumatic events from Croatian history were brought to the surface, with past 
injustices emphasised and Croatia portrayed as a perpetual victim.  
                                                 
340 Tanner, M. (2010). Croatia: A nation forged in war (3rd ed.) (Quote taken from Preface.). New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press.   
341 Cohen, A. (1976). Two-dimensional man; An essay on the anthropology of power and symbolism in 
complex society (p.30). Berkeley: University of California Press. 
342Cohen, A. (1976). Two-dimensional man; An essay on the anthropology of power and symbolism in 
complex society (p.59). Berkeley: University of California Press. 
343ibid 
344ibid.  
345Franjo Tuđman’s wartime speech, delivered on 5 November 1991 in Zagreb. Retrieved from http://free-
zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-milas/FT/ft-08.htm 
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A number of studies have looked at times of distress, including conflict, as a key force 
behind Diaspora mobilisation.  The presence of a crisis can be a powerful tool for 
leaders wanting to generate Diaspora support, but it is not sufficient to produce and 
sustain a focused movement.  For collective action to emerge a strategy giving meaning 
to the movement and creating value is needed.  This will be examined in later chapters 
that focus on framing processes and the resulting CAF constructed by Tuđman and 
disseminated by his supporters at home and in the Diaspora. 
From Humble Beginnings to History – the Rise of 
Tuđman’s Party 
 
By the end of the 1980s it was clear that the communist regime in Yugoslavia was 
slowly disintegrating.  The same decade saw the collapse of the historical truth dictated 
by the communist regime in Yugoslavia for nearly half a century.  The transformation of 
the political arena in the late 1980s brought attacks on the ideology and founding myths 
of communist Yugoslavia and initiated a debate about the country’s recent past (and 
future) and culminated in a review of history346 that manifested itself not only verbally, 
but also through legislation, and later education and also symbolically.  The 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the dire political situation in Croatia will be a major 
part of the diagnostic frames and is discussed in the following chapter, ‘The Framing of 
a Dark Diagnosis’. 
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Tuđman’s emergence as a charismatic leader was also aided by the political climate at 
the time where “political parties are weak, or held in contempt”347. In late February 1989, 
a few months before HDZ was officially founded at a secret gathering in Zagreb, at a 
time when the multi–party system in Croatia was only just sprouting and open 
manifestations of nationalism were unwelcome, Tuđman spoke openly in front a group 
of Croatian writers.  In his words, the emergence of HDZ clearly marked the end of 
Croatia’s long and imposed silence.  Some are clearly against this, stated Tuđman, and 
would like to “divert or murk the waters even before it emerges from the springs”.348 
Vladimir Šeks, a member of HDZ and a representative in the Croatian Parliament since 
the nation's independence, explains that HDZ was founded as a “response and kind of 
self–defence against the imperialist Greater Serbian policy, because the Croatian elites 
had a policy of silence”349.  
Tuđman, as a charismatic leader, cannot be separated from the development of his party.  
As Yugoslavia began to fragment, Tuđman offered Croats a new organisation and a 
political alternative, a ‘solution’.  In May 1989, together with his supporters, he founded 
the HDZ, a party that explicitly called for self–determination for Croatia, including the 
right to secession and a revival of Croatian values primarily based on Catholicism and 
combined with Croatian historical and cultural traditions censored during communism.  
Tuđman stressed that HDZ, when it was formed, had a unique position on the Croatian 
political scene.  It claimed to represent no particular class or previous ideology (middle 
                                                 
347 Costa Pinto, A., Eatwell, R., & Ugelvik L., S. (Eds.) (2006). Charisma and fascism in interwar Europe 
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348 Franjo Tuđman’s speech, announcing the founding of HDZ. Zagreb, February 28. 1989. Retrieved from 
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class, peasant, workers, Christian, liberal, socialist).  It identified nation–building as its 
focus nation–wide, with an aim to bring together “all nation–building forces in all layers 
and classes of society, from the radical right through the moderate position to the 
revolutionary left”.350 The HDZ emphasised the agency of the Croatian people with the 
slogan “Let us decide on the fate of Croatia” (Croatian: “Odlučimo sami o sudbini 
Hrvatske”) while the later, more popular slogan “HDZ zna se”, meaning ‘of course’ or 
‘it is so’ equated the Croatian nation with the HDZ as a matter of course.351  In 
presenting “a unified front, epitomised by a single leader”, Tuđman became appealing to 
a large number of people, allowing support to come from a variety of sources.  Eatwell 
refers to this type of charisma as centripetal, where the leader operates in confident yet 
abstract and general terms, thus managing to attract a wider audience. 352 
The party was founded with substantial finance from the Croatian Diaspora where 
nationalism remained strong during the years of Yugoslav Communism.  With this 
resource in mind, in his speech at the founding assembly of HDZ, Tuđman expressed his 
concerns over the number of Croatians living abroad.  Historical injustices, he asserted, 
had scattered around one third of the Croatian nation around different continents of the 
world.  And for that reason, he added, the HDZ will put out a request whereby a legal 
postulation will allow all Croatian emigrants, regardless of their past or present political 
affiliations, to return, either permanently or temporarily, to their homeland.353  With 
                                                 
350 Speech by Franjo Tuđman on the seventh anniversary of the first convention of the HDZ, 23 February, 
1997. Also quoted in Bellamy, A. J. (2003). The formation of Croatian national identity: A 
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socialist Yugoslavia collapsing, the HDZ issued a statement to its citizens and the 
Croatian Sabor354 promising a legal and political guarantee of a safe return home for all 
Croatian emigrants, regardless of their political affiliation.  Tuđman also announced the 
establishing of ‘Homeland’ (Croatian: ‘Domovina d.d.’), a shareholding company aimed 
at stimulating entrepreneurship in all fields of economic and cultural life and thus acting 
as a tool in strengthening Diaspora and homeland links.  Domovina d.d. would also help 
finance an independent HDZ weekly that would address different socio–economic and 
cultural issues.355   The company later developed a reputation for corruption and 
mismanagement. 
Through his party Tuđman was able to organise support and get access to new recruits.356  
The network of future HDZ members gradually expanded as party representatives 
travelled around Croatia and all over the world gathering sympathisers.  In an interview, 
Šeks tells about his visits to places around Slavonia as well as Germany, Sweden and 
Australia, looking for like–minded supporters.  Meanwhile, Tuđman went to the US and 
Canada.357  By January 1990, dozens of HDZ branches emerged in the US and Canada 
with several more dozen in Australia, Latin America, and Europe.  Germany alone had 
more than 20 branches. Despite humble beginnings, the party very soon grew to 
enormous proportions.  HDZ supporters from the Diaspora were united in February 
                                                 
354 The Croatian Parliament. 
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1990, jointly demonstrating their support at the HDZ’s first party congress in Zagreb.  
By that time, Tuđman’s party reportedly had 250,000 followers in former Yugoslavia 
and another 30,000 overseas358.  “Like fire or wind on the savannah, the HDZ spread 
throughout the world”. 359  Chapter V, ‘From Victim to Victory – Framing Solutions and 
Attracting Support’, will focus in more detail on how Tuđman attracted capable 
lieutenants and political allies.   
Silencing Competition 
 
At a time when domestic resources for party–building were extremely scarce, and 
competition over these resources high, the incentives to court the Croatian Diaspora 
were significant.  Tuđman very quickly recognised this important potential source of 
political and financial support and the prominence of Diaspora’s role in Tuđman’s 
political agenda becomes evident as early as the late 1980s.  
There were other leaders of Croatian opinion at the time, and it would be inaccurate to 
claim that Tuđman was alone in his realisation and that his contemporaries did not share 
the same awareness.  However, it was Tuđman who managed to mobilise the Croatian 
people around his views and lead them through what many of them defined as ‘the 
wasteland’.  While it can be argued that someone else may have been better able to lead 
the Croatian people through the desolation of war and its aftermath during the early 
1990s, Tuđman was most equipped with the political ability to seize the opportunities 
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that presented themselves and subsequently enabled him to assume leadership. Let us 
briefly examine his competition. 
The Croatian political scene in 1990 was very much focused on answering the ‘national 
question’, which resulted in the formation and revival of a number of political parties.  
Croatian parties of the right and centre–right were Tuđman’s biggest competition in 
securing Diaspora support.  Other well–known individuals in the Croatian political 
sphere were leaders from the 1971 Croatian Spring movement – Savka Dabčević–Kučar, 
Miko Tripalo, Vlado Gotovac – who also had the ability and the potential to make use of 
Diaspora’s resources.  They had personal commitment, political recognition, excellent 
reputations, and nationalist credibility.  Dabčević–Kučar and Tripalo together formed 
the Coalition of People’s Accord in an effort to avoid the nationalist and anti–
Communist votes being split, thus allowing the League of Communists of Croatia to 
remain in power.  It was joined by the centrist Croatian Social Liberal Party, right–wing 
Croatian Democratic Party and Croatian Christian Democratic Party, as well as the 
nominally left–wing Social Democrats of Croatia.  The Croatian Peasant Party, a 
moderate conservative party, initially formed in 1904 under Stjepan Radić and Vlatko 
Maček, was also reconstituted in 1990 and won several seats in the Croatian Parliament.  
In the 1990s the increase in both Croatian and Serbian nationalism also inspired the 
restoration of the oldest Croatian political party, the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)360 
where the ‘right(s)’ in the party's name refer to the legal and moral validation for the 
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independence and autonomy of Croatia.361  The party was re–formed by Dobroslav 
Paraga362 and a delegation of HDZ dissidents who initially joined Tuđman’s HDZ 
expecting it to be far more radical than it was.  As a result, Tuđman and the HDZ faced 
heavy criticism in 1991 and 1992 from Dobroslav Paraga and the HSP.  Donald 
Horowitz363 identifies this as ‘flanking’, a central pattern and form of ethnic politics.  
Flanking, according to Horowitz, is the attempt of an insurgent party representing one 
ethnic group to challenge the dominant party of the same ethnic group by claiming a 
more radical, often referred to by themselves as more ‘patriotic’ or ‘loyal’, position.  The 
Croatian political scene of the 1990s is an example of the so–called centrifugal 
‘outbidding’ where party competition arises not between ethnic groups but within 
them.364   However, because of internal instability, the Croatian Party of Rights did not 
partake in the Croatian parliamentary elections in 1990, an absence which helped 
Tuđman’s HDZ gather the votes that would have otherwise gone to HSP.365 366  It was 
Tuđman and his party that would earn the reputation, especially internationally and 
among Serbs, as the quintessence of extreme Croatian nationalism even without the 
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direct link to the Ustaše such as exhibited by the HSP.367  However, Tuđman’s initial 
plan to improve the position of Croatia within a more loosely structured Yugoslavia was 
altered as a result of Milošević’s actions, as well as pressures from the Diaspora, driving 
Tuđman to seek secession.  Frame modification, which will explain how some of 
Tuđman’s ideas changed due to lack of resonance, is addressed in more detail in Chapter 
V, ‘From Victim to Victory’.  
The other major bloc that emerged at the start of the 1990 election campaign was 
dominated by the League of Communists of Croatia, re–branded as the League of 
Communists of Croatia–Party for Democratic Change (SKH–SDP), led by Ivica Račan.  
Račan saw the increasing nationalist tendencies and its ‘dangerous intentions’ as an 
opportunity to remain in power.  However, Tuđman s principles were seen by most 
Croats as the best answer to Serbian nationalism at the time. Tuđman’s nationalist 
framework carefully and clearly identified ‘the Other’, ‘the Aggressor’, making the 
decision to reject the status quo very simple. This was in contrast to the Coalition of 
People’s accord, for example, which not only formed too late in the process but was 
often criticised as being overly elitist and intellectual.368  This was an important first 
stage in broadening one’s support base and gathering resources, with an aim of securing 
political power.369  Tuđman’s brand of nationalism particularly appealed to its founders 
overseas within the Croatian Diaspora.  Given the nationalist roots of the politically 
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active core of the Croatian Diaspora, they were the best potential ally for right–of–
centre, anti–communist parties.  As Vesna Pusić, a leader in the centre–left Croatian 
People’s Party (HNS), observes, the Diaspora’s 
extremist circles, already leaning toward Tuđman and the HDZ, were 
reinforced in this tendency by Tuđman's first televised speech on behalf 
of his party, in which he implicitly called for territorial acquisitions in 
western Herzegovina, a region that was the homeland of key Croat–
émigré figures.  Extreme nationalists among the émigrés became 
instrumental in raising funds for Tuđman and the HDZ.  [They] joined the 
HDZ in large numbers and gradually came to fill certain key party and 
governmental posts.370  
It was clear that Tuđman party’s nationalist ideology was well appropriate for the 
political climate at the time.  The nationalist principles went hand in hand with 
Tuđman’s tendency to discredit his opposition by calling them ‘ignorant non–entities’ 
and to refer to those that opposed his views as ‘anti–Croatian’.371 Therefore, when 
categorising Tuđman as a charismatic leader, it is also important not to underestimate his 
power of silencing the opposition.  
Relatively quickly, Tuđman managed to overrun his rivals and acquire virtually 
unanimous Diaspora support.  One important advantage Tuđman had over his opponents 
at the time that greatly consolidated his relationship with the Diaspora was his ability to 
travel abroad.  In 1978, the year his passport was reinstated after 17 years, he was one of 
the only political non–conformists with an ability to travel abroad.372  His passport was 
his key to developing a relationship with the Diaspora, a luxury not available to his 
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political competition.373  Political opportunity, which, in Tuđman’s case, was his early 
access to the Diaspora proved to be of utmost importance, if not a deciding factor in his 
success.  
Tuđman was often criticised by his opposition for his policies and his actions.  
Nevertheless, his skills as a leader remain undisputed even by his opponents, his 
harshest critics and even by his enemies.  During his war crimes trial in The Hague, 
Slobodan Milošević, the former Yugoslav President, faced charges including genocide 
for conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.  When asked to give his 
assessment of Tuđman “as a leader or strategist or tactician at the time”, Milošević374 
stated,  
I thought Tuđman was an effective leader in the sense that he knew where 
he wanted to take Croatia.  He was able – he surrounded himself with 
some capable subordinates, such as the Foreign Minister Granić and the 
Defence Minister Šušak.  He was able to delegate to them and yet – and 
they were able to negotiate on his behalf, and yet he remained in 
command. 
Tuđman was fastidious in his choice of words and phrases, but also in his choice of 
subordinates.  In his first two years as president, Tuđman appointed and dismissed five 
prime ministers, five defence ministers, and six foreign ministers.375 
Diaspora Loyalties and Collective Benefits 
 
Issues relating to the Croatian Diaspora were an important part of Tuđman’s political 
programme.  This becomes evident as early as late the 1980s during his visits to North 
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America where he set the foundations for a new Croatian national awakening.  Tuđman 
openly advocated the idea of a pan–Croatian reconciliation and Croatian sovereignty, 
setting the groundwork for a new political movement.  His efforts culminated in May 
1990, when, with significant backing from the Croatian Diaspora, he won the first 
multi–party elections held in Croatia since World War II.376  Many Diaspora members 
were suitably rewarded for their efforts as they assumed key positions in the new 
Croatian Government.  
When the road connecting Zagreb and Belgrade – the ‘Motorway of Brotherhood and 
Unity’ (Croatian: ‘Autoput Bratstva i Jedinstva’) named by Tito after the motto of the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia – was closed due to fighting, it somehow aptly 
symbolised the failure of Tito's idealism and the opening of a new road for Croatia and 
its Diaspora.  With HDZ coming to power, more than a million ethnic Croats living 
abroad had access to Croatian citizenship.  The new citizenship law facilitated the 
naturalisation process for ethnic Croats in the Diaspora by exempting them from several 
major requirements that non–Croats had to meet.377  This appealed to euphoric right–
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wing Croatian emigrants, with their identity linked to a symbolically important territory, 
and their dreams of an independent Croatia.  They were highly influenced by Tuđman’s 
promises and vigorously supported his political ideology.  The gift of citizenship also 
appealed to Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, including some of Tuđman’s closest 
allies, many of whom were citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina only.  The 1992 Croatian 
parliamentary elections – held in exceptionally undesirable conditions with one quarter 
of the country’s territory under Serbian control and the rest involved in a war raging in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina – saw hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally 
displaced people facing obstacles in exercising their right to vote.  To boost turnout, 
Tuđman extended voting rights to anyone who claimed one Croatian parent or even 
merely an intention to acquire Croatian citizenship.  Given HDZ had the greatest 
Diaspora support dating back to the late 1980s, predictions by HDZ revealed that they 
would continue to receive the strongest support from the Diaspora.  These predictions 
proved correct as hundreds of people lined up in Croatian diplomatic and consular 
offices, churches, Croatian cultural centres and schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
North America, Australia and elsewhere to vote.  Over 200,000 ballots were sent abroad 
for the elections.  No information on the election officials was available, but the 
opposition was particularly concerned that the approved Croatian diplomatic officials 
abroad were all loyal HDZ devotees.  Tuđman was accused by the opposition of 
manipulating the election campaign to ensure that both he and his party were returned to 
office.378  Diaspora participation in Croatian elections has been the source of contentious 
debate in Croatian politics ever since. 
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In his analysis of charisma, Weber argues that it was unlikely that such a personalised 
reign could be ‘routinised’ because it would be difficult for charismatic leaders to 
sustain the support of their followers as that would require the constant achievement of 
‘miracles’.  Once Tuđman had assumed office it become increasingly difficult to 
separate personal charisma from office charisma, i.e. “the sense of national or 
ideological mission and legitimate status which comes simply through holding a 
particular office.”379  As the president of independent Croatia, Tuđman held a title that 
had never been held by any other person before him.  This alone was a ‘miracle’ in its 
own right and it kept him going long after the peak of his popularity.  The creation of 
independent Croatia, international recognition, and the liberation of occupied territories 
can be labelled as ‘miracles’ performed by Tuđman at the peak of his charismatic 
powers.  These proved his special capabilities as a charismatic leader but were soon 
replaced by the charisma of his office.  As the novelty waned, his appeal also started to 
gradually dissipate.  But charisma was not the only way Tuđman collected voters.  He 
used framing strategies combined with numerous incentives to attract followers 
throughout his career as a politician.  Some were aimed at strengthening educational, 
economic and cultural, but mostly political ties with the Diaspora.  To use Angelo 
Panebianco's380 framework, HDZ Diaspora policies were based on collective and 
selective incentives that secured Diaspora loyalties.  Collective benefits were visible in 
the form of access to Croatian citizenship, voting rights, and numerous symbolic 
homeland–Diaspora programmes and proposals.  These, in conjunction with selective 
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incentives in the form of high–ranking positions in the newly established Croatian 
Government and lucrative opportunities in the country’s privatisation process, helped 
maintain Diaspora allegiance to HDZ.  Chapter VI, ‘Diaspora after Tuđman’, focuses on 
the modern–day Croatian Diaspora and looks at how and why modern Diaspora 
organisations continue to internalise as well as disseminate ideas framed by Tuđman in 
the 1990s.  The chapter also discusses the current status of the Diaspora and its 
disillusionment with the current political settlement. 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce Franjo Tuđman, ‘the man behind the 
frame’, and address a gap in the literature by focusing on human agency – how leaders 
generate social change, how they take advantage of existing opportunities, but also 
create new ones, how they fine–tune their image and identity to resonate with their 
potential followers, and how they arouse commitment and mobilise masses. 
Tuđman is credited with setting the foundations for an independent Croatia, pulling the 
country out of communism and towards democracy.  His legacy lives on, with Croatian 
bridges, schools, squares and streets named after him.  However, he is often criticised by 
many for his policies and his adamant nationalism and unyielding discourse, and his 
reputation remains controversial.  Nonetheless, Tuđman’s leadership abilities, admired 
by his supporters and his opponents alike, are undisputed.  His abilities, identified by his 
followers as exceptional, demonstrated his right to lead.  As Weber states, recognition 
on the part of those subject to authority is decisive for the validity of charisma.381  
                                                 
381 Weber, M. (1957). The theory of social and economic organisation (A. M. Henderson & T. Parsons, 
Trans.). New York: Oxford University Press. 
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A conducive political environment was a crucial factor that contributed to Tuđman’s 
political success.  A growing sense of crisis left followers starved for a new leader able 
to supply them with meaning.  The Croatian political arena of the 1990s provided fertile 
ground for Tuđman’s ideas, which enabled him to form institutions and fully implement 
his vision.  Also, Tuđman’s access to the Diaspora in the 1980s gave him and his party a 
head start over every other political leader in the country in building momentum abroad.   
Tuđman was a man of many contradictions, evident from radical changes in both his 
political and religious views.  However, he endured by staying attuned to the needs of 
his audience and by being able to remain relevant.  His personal experiences, including 
political persecutions, arrests and imprisonments, helped him publicly identify with the 
historical injustices suffered by the Croatian nation, which later became key themes of 
his collective action frames.  As a charismatic and politically resourceful leader, 
Tuđman inspired masses.  As a “meaning–seeking, frame–producing”382 leader, he 
skilfully manoeuvred abstract conceptions of Croatian identity and interpreted and 
articulated these to legitimate his political programme.  He acted swiftly and creatively 
and through his discourse, rhetoric and tactics manipulated old ideas and created new 
ones.  
Tuđman and his supporters chose the right – nationalist – political framework, promising 
imminent transformation to Croats around the world.  Within this framework, they 
successfully identified a question of national urgency, pointing at the same time to the 
causes of this ‘national distress’.  This, as we will see in the next chapter, was achieved 
                                                 
382 Brysk, A. (1995). ‘Hearts and minds:’ Bringing symbolic politics back in.  
Polity 27(4), 559–585 (See p. 570). 
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by carefully constructing what the literature calls meta–frames or master frames.  These 
larger schemata of interpretation linked policies and generated larger narratives 
connected to collective Croatian perspectives in an effort to move masses to challenge 
existing policies and practices and to support alternative ones.  Although important, we 
will see that Tuđman’s charisma, his many skills and talents, and his ability to take 
advantage of political opportunity, were only a part of the puzzle that allowed Tuđman 
to assume power.  Of equal importance was choosing the right framework to tackle the 
issues that marked the turn of the decade. 
 
 
 
144 
 
CHAPTER IV: The Framing of a Dark 
Diagnosis – Interpreting Injustices and 
Naming Enemies 
 
Like a picture frame, an issue frame marks off some part of the world.  Like a building 
frame, it holds things together.  It provides coherence to an array of symbols, images, 
and arguments, linking them through an underlying organizing idea that suggests what 
is essential – what consequences and values are at stake.  We do not see the frame 
directly, but infer its presence by its characteristic expressions and language.  Each 
frame gives the advantage to certain ways of talking and thinking, while it places others 
out of the picture.383 
 
Croatian emigrants, similar to other emigrant groups, embarked on two kinds of 
journeys; two simultaneous pursuits for a home and a place of belonging.  The first was 
a physical one, across national borders, from Croatia to new chosen lands, and 
potentially back to Croatia again.  The other kind of journey was a journey through 
questions of identity, history, cultures, ancestry and belonging.  This chapter will look at 
how some of these notions were used by Franjo Tuđman and his allies to mobilise the 
Diaspora for a common cause.  The 1990s, as we shall see, marked a period when many 
Croats crossed paths on their respective journeys and joined forces in their support for 
Franjo Tuđman.   
In late February 1989, at a time when the multi–party system in Croatia was only just 
developing, Tuđman announced that HDZ, his new party, was about to mark the end of 
Croatia’s long and enforced silence.  Vladimir Šeks explains that HDZ emerged as a 
response to the plans of imperialist Greater Serbian policy.  Its aim, in Šeks’ words, was 
                                                 
383 Ryan, C. & Gamson, W. A. (2015). Are frames enough? In J. Goodwin & J. M. Jasper (Eds.), The 
social movements reader: Cases and concepts (3rd ed., p. 13). Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
145 
 
“getting Croatia out of slavery”384.  In late 1989, in its appeal to the citizens of Croatia 
and to its Communist controlled Parliament, the newly formed HDZ strongly advocated 
for a new multi–party government.  It called for a repeal of the Communist Party 
monopoly, asked for secret and direct elections for Parliament, unrestricted travel for 
Croatian emigrants and freedom for political prisoners.  It also specifically called for 
Croatian self–determination.  HDZ rapidly transformed itself into a mass nationalist 
movement led by Dr Franjo Tuđman, its founder.  HDZ formally took power on 30 May 
1990, which has been celebrated as Statehood Day since.  Tuđman became the father of 
his newly proclaimed state of Croatia and HDZ continued to dominate the Croatian 
political scene throughout the 1990s.  
The previous chapter looked at Tuđman as a leader and as a politician, analysing specific 
traits and experiences from his past that contributed to his charismatic personality and 
his rise to power.  The focus was on Tuđman’s charismatic authority and his symbolic 
and cultural capital385, both localised and universalistic.  The localised cultural capital 
equipped him with the knowledge of local idioms and communities’ experiences, values 
and practices and connected him with a mass base386.  The chapter also unveiled a great 
deal of his ‘universalistic cultural capital’, knowledge and understanding of values, 
                                                 
384 Prenc, M. (2009, June 18.). Secret Meeting Twenty years Ago: If Militia Burst, We Consider HDZ 
Founded”. June 18 2009. Dalje.com. Retrieved from http://arhiva.dalje.com/en-croatia/if-militia-
burst-in-we-consider-hdz-founded/266163 
385 Bourdieu, P. (1977) Cultural Reproduction and social reproduction. In J. Karabel & A. H. Halsey 
(Eds.) (pp. 487-511). Power and ideology in education. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press.; and 
      Bourdieu, P. (1986) The forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.) Handbook of theory and research 
for the sociology of education (pp. 241–258). New York: Greenwood Press.  
386 Nepstad, S. E. & Bob, C. (2006). When do leaders matter? Hypotheses on leadership dynamics in 
social movements. Mobilization 11 (1), 21-42.  
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sympathies, cultural principles and political trends within the broader public he sought to 
reach387. 
The focus of this chapter is to look at the first component of the framing process – the 
diagnosis.  The goal of diagnostic framing is to identify, and suitably frame a burning 
national issue as well as attribute blame.  “[T]o frame is to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as 
to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation.”388 This chapter will look at the ‘national problem’ of 
early 1990s Croatia, as identified by the framers, and show how the ‘critical mass’389 i.e., 
individuals who had a high interest in the movement goal and initiated the collective 
action at the pioneer stage of a movement, sought to identify the problem and then 
attributed it to a specific source that was then transformed into an object of blame and/or 
responsibility.390  To achieve this, the chapter will identify three fundamental elements of 
the diagnostic framing process, the first one being ‘problem diagnoses’, followed by the 
formation of ‘injustice frames’ and the closely linked ‘adversarial’ or ‘boundary’ frames.  
I shall examine how the frames promoted a particular “causal interpretation” and “moral 
evaluation”, which then enabled the framers to suggest a suitable “treatment 
recommendation”.391 
                                                 
387 ibid 
388Entman, R. (1993). Framing:  Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.  Journal of 
Communication, 43(4) (See p. 52). 
389Marwell, G. & Oliver, P. (1993). The critical mass in collective action: A microsocial theory. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
390Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and 
assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639.  
391Entman, R. (1993). Framing:  Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.  Journal of 
Communication, 43(4) (See p. 52). 
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The Framing of the National Problem 
 
There can be no return to the past, to the times when they, the Serbs, were spreading 
cancer in the heart of Croatia…392 
 
Addressing the pressing national problem, was, as we shall see in this chapter, closely 
linked to the process of naming the actors responsible for causing it, most frequently 
referred to by the HDZ as the ‘great–Serbian aggressor’ (Croatian: ‘velikosrpski 
agresor’) or ‘Yugo– communist hell’. 
The diagnostic frame is often characterised by its selectivity, in that it reduces a series of 
disparate social phenomena to a few principal themes393.  From Tuđman speeches one 
can identify the following ‘diagnostic themes’: a century–old hardship, associated with 
the loss of freedom, sovereignty and democracy as a result of years of struggle under 
foreign domination, linked to the present–day ‘greater–Serbian aggression’ which 
threatened Croatia’s territorial integrity.  The latter can be summed up under ‘greater–
Serbian aspirations’ as was generally referred to by Tuđman in his public speeches, also 
brought together under the same term in the media. 
HDZ based its campaign on a centuries–long desire for greater Croatian sovereignty and 
on a wide–ranging anti–Yugounitarist ideology.  These ideas were presented as a way 
out of the situation Croatia found itself in in the late 1980s.  Much of the HDZ campaign 
was based on a promise to protect the Croatian nation from the threatening Serb 
ambitions, led by Milošević, towards a Greater Serbia.  One of Tuđman’s main axioms, 
                                                 
392 Croatian President Franjo Tuđman’s Speech on "Freedom Train" Journey after Driving 250,000 
Serbian civilians from the Krajina Section of Yugoslavia. Posted 17 March 2006. Online: 
http://emperors-clothes.com/docs/tudj.htm 
393 della Porta, D. & Diani, M. (2006). Social movements: An introduction (2nd ed.). Malden, Oxford and 
Carlton: Blackwell Publishing.  
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attentively reverberated in his speeches, was his claim that Croatia, built on European 
traditions, faith and civilisation, should not accept systems based on different 
civilisational – Balkan – frameworks.  In an interview in 1990, when asked why his 
party won so convincingly in the national elections, President Tuđman’s answer was: 
“Because we knew the answers to the questions and the hopes of the nation.”394  
An important part of ‘problem identification’ was setting the scene for Diaspora 
involvement.  It was important to show how the Diaspora’s separation from its 
homeland was a part of the ‘national problem’, but also, as we shall see later, a key part 
of the solution.  From the beginning, Tuđman’s party had strong sympathisers within the 
Croatian Diaspora.  Many of them were political émigrés longing for a lost homeland, 
still affected by their tragic exile and looking for a way to redress their historic 
grievances.  HDZ, as an openly nationalist party and the first one to discard the official 
socialist logos and use the traditional Croatian emblem, outlawed under SFRY,395 greatly 
appealed to these groups of migrants.  Croatian Diaspora was a central part of Tuđman’s 
political agenda even before HDZ. Its importance is evident as early as the late 1980s 
during his lectures in the Diaspora, where he advocated for the idea of an all–round 
Croat reconciliation and later promoted the creation of an independent Croatian state. 
The Croatian Diaspora openly supported the idea.  One example of their support is the 
1987 letter to the editor of the Fraternalist, the official newsletter of the Croatian 
Fraternal Union.  The letter emphasised that “a nation without its independence is like a 
                                                 
394Il Manifesto (1990, May 10). Conversation with Silvije Tomašević. Retrieved from 
http://www.slobodanpraljak.com/MATERIJALI/RATNI%20DOKUMENTI/TUDJMAN%20GO
VORI%20I%20INTERVJUI%201990.-1998/1.pdf 
395Hockenos, P. (2003). Homeland calling: Exile patriotism and the Balkan Wars. Ithaca, London: Cornell 
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homeless person living in someone else’s home as a slave.”396  These sentiments were 
not only expressed by Diaspora elites but were also voiced at micro levels, as illustrated 
by the letter: 
Those elements in Yugoslavia which are at present in control must 
understand that the Croatian people will never give up their rights to 
liberty, justice and self– determination.  We want freedom and 
independence and for this we do not owe an apology to anyone.  In 
today’s Croatia, foreign elements can sing and hoist their flags, but if the 
Croatian people do the same, they are declared an enemy of the state and 
placed in jail.  Mr. Editor, we Croatians are slaves in our own homeland.  
If you examine our historical past, I am sure that you will be able to 
conclude that we Croatians have done so much to advance the cause of 
Slavism and Yugoslavism, which has brought us nothing more than 
oppression and misery.  For this reason, I am and always will be for 
Croatian independence and liberty.397 
 
In his speech in June 1989 at the founding assembly of HDZ, Tuđman openly introduced 
the Diaspora into his discourse, expressing concerns over the number of Croats living 
abroad.  “This is due to historical injustices,” he stressed, “which is why,” he added, the 
HDZ needs to ensure that all Croatian emigrants, are able to return to their homeland.398   
Diaspora return was also a key theme of a popular song ‘My Homeland’ (Croatian: 
‘Moja Domovina’), a theme tune of Croatian Radio Television which played at the 
beginning and end of broadcasting from 1991 to 2000.  The song was released in the 
initial stages of the ‘Homeland War’ and is one of the most popular Croatian patriotic 
songs, still widely sung today as a symbol of unity and pride. 
                                                 
396A brief historical review of the first 50 CFU years (1987, June 3). Fraternalist, p. 2. As quoted in 
Djuric, I. (2001). The Croatian Diaspora in North America: Identity, Ethnic Solidarity and the 
Formation of a 'Transnational National Community. Spaces of Identity, 3, 89—105. 
397Letter to the Editor (1985, January 9). Fraternalist, p. 2. 
398Franjo Tuđman’s speech, announcing the founding of HDZ. Zagreb, February 28. 1989. Retrieved from 
http://free-zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-milas/FT/ft-01.htm 
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In an interview for Spiegel in 1990, discussing Croatia’s links with the Diaspora, 
Tuđman stated unreservedly that “We will enable their return”.399  Later in 1995, he 
talked about “hundreds of thousands of dispersed Croats” who settled around the world 
“from the South to the North Pole”.  He stressed the need for them to “return to the 
houses of their grandfathers”, adding that he himself had 
encountered second generation Croats, who were born over there and 
have never seen the beautiful lands of Croatia, yet Croatian words and the 
Croatian national anthem brought tears to their eyes.  Today we have an 
independent Croatia and we have something to offer to them.  Ask them 
to return home.400 
 
With HDZ in power, more than a million diaspora Croats became Croatian citizens.  The 
key enabler was the new citizenship law, which made it easier for ethnic Croats to 
become citizens.401 
In his speech in Knin in 1995, Tuđman’s sums up his definition of the ‘national 
problem’ Croatia faced at the beginning of the 1990s: 
And there can be no return to the past, to the times when the Serbs were 
spreading cancer in the heart of Croatia, cancer which was destroying the 
Croatian national being and which did not allow the Croatian people to be 
the master in their own house and did not allow Croatia to lead an 
independent and sovereign life under this wide, blue sky and within the 
international community of sovereign nations. 402 
 
                                                 
399Der Spiegel (1990 Month, day) 18.6. 1990. Translation: Profikon. Retrieved from 
http://www.slobodanpraljak.com/MATERIJALI/RATNI%20DOKUMENTI/TUDJMAN%20GO
VORI%20I%20INTERVJUI%201990.-1998/4.pdf 
400Tuđman’s speech in Split (1995, August 26). Retrieved from http://free-zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-
milas/FT/ft-12.htm 
401The issue of citizenship will be explored in more detail in the ‘Diaspora after Tuđman’ chapter. 
402Croatian President Franjo Tuđman’s Speech on "Freedom Train" Journey after Driving 250,000 Serbian 
civilians from the Krajina Section of Yugoslavia. Posted 17 March 2006. Retrieved from 
http://emperors-clothes.com/docs/tudj.htm 
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According to Tuđman, to address the problems of the nation, the nation needed unity.  
Diaspora, according to him, was an organic part of the Croatian nation, it had a say in 
the future of its homeland and its homeland needed its support.  This message of unity 
was heard on many occasions, including as early as 2–5 November 1989, at the 21st 
National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic 
Studies (AAASS), hosted by the Midwest Slavic Conference, which took place in 
Chicago at the Palmer House Hotel.403  Franjo Tuđman attended the event.  This event 
was preceded by an earlier meeting from 19–21 October in Zagreb, which gathered 
representatives from the Diaspora and Croatia proper.  It became evident that “the wall 
between Croatia and its Diaspora has fallen and that political and cultural efforts from 
both the home and host countries have merged, ending the decade on an optimistic 
note”.404  
On 29 November 1989, on the last ‘Day of the Republic’ the newly formed HDZ 
symbolically stressed the need to fight for freedom and again reached out to Croats in 
the Diaspora inviting them to return home.  Less than two months later the growing rift 
among the branches of the Communist Party and their respective republics led to the 
effective dissolution of the Communist League of Yugoslavia at its 14th Congress held 
in January 1990 in Belgrade.405  On the same day at the ‘Croatian home’ in Eastlake, 
Cleveland, the HDZ organised its first convention.  Franjo Tuđman, who was also there 
                                                 
403 Ohio Slavic and East European Newsletter, 17(5). Retrieved from 
https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/58959/CSEES_Newsletter_1989_January.pdf?s
equence=1 Ohio Slavic & East European Newsletter  
404 Prpić, J. (1997). Hrvati u Americi [Croatians in America]. Zagreb: Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika. 
405 Prpić, J. (1997). Hrvati u Americi [Croatians in America] (p. 366). Zagreb: Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika.  
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a year earlier406 spoke at the convention and invited all participants to attend the first 
HDZ General Assembly on 24 and 25 February 1990.  The meeting was a historical 
event, held at the famous ‘Vatroslav Lisinski’ concert hall in Zagreb, with a large 
number of attendees from the Diaspora.  Ina Vukić, author, political and humanitarian 
activist, and member of the Croatia Diaspora, remembers it as follows: 
1,760 delegates from Croatia and the diaspora participated, 297 observers, 
320 guests and 54 journalists.  Among the guests were the US, the 
French, the Italian and the Soviet consuls as well as a representative from 
the Canadian Embassy.  Thundering applause followed almost every 
word spoken by Dr. Franjo Tuđman.  The resolution on the Croatian 
hymn was delivered at this event (…) I remember these days as if they 
happened yesterday! I remember the utter joy at seeing democracy in 
Croatia on the horizon… reaching for it.407 
 
The Canadian and US chapters of HDZ collected nearly $1 million to support the 
democratic process replacing the Communist Party in the Republic of Croatia.  Given 
the communist controlled media, the money was used for office supplies, printing and 
advertising in support of democratic parties.408   
Research conducted for the purposes of this study identified two diagnostic frames 
designed by HDZ in late the 1980s and early 1990s, here labelled as an ‘injustice frame’ 
and a ‘boundary’ and ‘adversarial frames’.  These diagnostic frames were both heavily 
used in an effort to attract followers from the Croatian Diaspora who mobilised around 
grievances suffered by Croatians now living abroad and their co–ethnics at home.  
However, before discussing these frames in more detail, let us have a look at how they 
                                                 
406 ibid 
407 I. Vukić (2014, February 25). Croatia: Days of Pride And Celebration – 24 and 25 February 1990. 
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february-1990/ 
408 Barkan, E. R. (Ed.) (2013). Immigrants in American history: Arrival, adaptation, and interrogation. 
Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.  
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fit into the wider Diaspora framing process. Below I gather the main elements of 
Tuđman’s collective action frames. Some of these will be discussed in later chapters but 
the below framework is a useful overview of the frames used by Tuđman to inspire and 
mobilise Diaspora Croats. 
HDZ Diaspora Collective Action Frame (CAF) 
 
1. Abolition of ‘National Slavery’ 
 It was stressed that Croatia had to escape from “national slavery and 
Bolshevik darkness.”409 To dramatise the issue, traumatic events from 
Croatian history were brought to the surface, with past injustices emphasised.  
Croatia was portrayed as a perpetual victim (during the 1990s and throughout 
history), including the injustice suffered by numerous members of the 
Diaspora forced to leave their homeland in the past (political émigrés, e.g. 
those that left Croatia after World War II and during the 1970s Croatian 
spring);  
2. ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’ 
 A collective enemy – the ‘greater–Serbian aggressor’ –  was identified (also 
referred to as the ‘Yugoslavian and socialist devil’410 and ‘Yugo–communist 
aggressor/hell’)411; 
 Clear divisions were created between the Croats and the Serbs, highlighting 
all existing differences, making a clear point that Croatia was and always has 
                                                 
409Franjo Tuđman’s wartime speech, delivered on 5 November 1991 in Zagreb. Retrieved from http://free-
zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-milas/FT/ft-08.htm 
410Selected speeches by President Tuđman. Retrieved from 
http://www.slobodanpraljak.com/MATERIJALI/RATNI%20DOKUMENTI/TUDJMAN%20GO
VORI%20I%20INTERVJUI%201990.-1998/29.pdf 
411ibid 
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been a part of Western Europe (Mediterranean) tradition, while Serbs 
belonged to the other side, the East.  Tuđman stressed that Croatia was a 
European nation, both traditionally and culturally; 
3. All for one and one for all: national reconciliation and pan– Croatian unity 
 Tuđman recognised Croatian national unity as a prerequisite for Croatian 
national sovereignty – unity of Croats within and outside the homeland.  He 
advocated national reconciliation of supporters of former Croatian 
Domobrans (the home guard of the Independent State of Croatia – NDH), 
Partisans, Ustaše, and other colours and camps.  His plan was to bridge the 
fractious divide in Croatia between the “sons and daughters of Ustaše”, in his 
words, and the “sons and daughters of Partisans”412. In a speech celebrating 
Croatia’s first Independence Day,413 he stressed, “in order to achieve 
[Croatian independence] (…) we had to unite the disunited Croathood.  We 
had to muster all Croatian wit and reject all Croatian stupidity”414.  In his own 
words, he mirrored Susurro’s claim that “Diasporas are like trees, the limbs 
may be distinct but the roots are one”.415   
 Tuđman was not only the advocate of his political aspirations; he was the 
embodiment of it.  He insisted that “we had all been fighting for the same 
                                                 
412Hockenos, P. (2003). Homeland calling: Exile patriotism and the Balkan Wars (p. 46). Ithaca, London: 
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413Selected speeches by President Tuđman. Retrieved from 
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cause, the Croatian cause, just in different ways.”  All for one and one for all, 
was the Croatian motto416 (also the slogan of the Fraternalist); 
 The Croatian Diaspora was identified as an organic part of the Croatian 
nation; 
 The Croatian Diaspora (its support: financial, political, moral) was portrayed 
as indispensable for the creation of new Croatia; 
4. The ‘thousand– year– old dream of Croatian statehood’ 
 Croatia was portrayed as one of the oldest nation states in Europe and 
Croatians around the world were reminded that they are entitled to the 
realisation of their ‘thousand–year–old dream of statehood’.417 This was 
portrayed as their right. 
5. Return of all Diaspora Croats 
 Tuđman advocated the return of Diaspora Croats.  Furthermore, he pushed 
for legislation that assisted their naturalisation.  Croats in the Diaspora “no 
longer have to hide in exile – today they can proudly say they are Croats” 418; 
6. The Catholic Church – the preserver of Croatian identity 
 The Catholic Church was portrayed as a preserver of Croatian identity.  The 
church became an important ally of the HDZ, reinforcing the role of catholic 
values and principles in the Croatian society, in their fight against the ‘devil’.  
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The Pope, in Tuđman’s words, is defined as “the first moral power of the 
world.”419  In a speech from 1992 celebrating Croatian Independence Day, he 
stressed that it was achieved with God’s help.420  The HDZ anthem “God 
Protect Croatia” became a popular song within the Diaspora. 
Below is an excerpt from a speech Tuđman gave in 1995.  It is an example of CAF 
themes expressed in typical Tuđmanesque sentences, described by Gordana Uzelac as 
“long, often long enough to form a paragraph, with lots of references to history, 
metaphors and burdened with adjectives.”421   
It goes without saying that from fertile areas to all these parts we liberated 
there will be room for all our people, and our nation will celebrate its 
freedom and build its Croatia for which, since King Zvonimir 11th 
century, too many Croatian people died and too many of our sons 
suffered in the dungeons of Venice, Vienna, Budapest and Belgrade.422   
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Developing Injustice Frames 
 
Injustice focuses on the kind of righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the 
soul.423  
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Franjo Tuđman started to use popular discourse that 
proved successful in arousing the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the Croatian 
people.  Much of this discourse used symbolic representation referring to events from 
Croatian history, translating them into familiar popular language, giving everyone an 
experience of the past in the present.  The carefully constructed discourse, used by 
Tuđman and his HDZ allies, was aimed at forming a collective memory, “the active past 
that forms our identities”.424 These symbolic representations, often allowing for 
individual changes, revisions, or additions were instrumental in justifying the presence 
of the new ideology.  Collective memories were communicated to the public arena both 
at home and abroad and grew to be the dominating element of the late 1980s and early 
1990s political discourse in Croatia and its Diaspora.  For example, the international 
channel The Voice of Croatia, the international programme of the Croatian Radio, was 
introduced as an hour– long programme of the same name, which began airing in 1991 
on short wave radio and was intended for Croatian audiences living abroad.  The 
programme was also referenced in one of the articles of the Fraternalist.425  It has 
evolved since and continues to systematically and expansively cover current events at 
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home, reports on the lives and activities of Croatians living around the world and 
provides information about the work of state and social institutions relevant to relations 
between Croatians at home and those living abroad.  It also reports on issues related to 
the return of diaspora Croats and tells stories about Croatia's heritage and culture and 
carries key sporting events.  It airs exclusively Croatian music.426 
In the early 1990s, the government expected the Croatian media to be ‘responsible’ and 
to contribute to the war effort.  Special military censors were appointed, with powers to 
ban articles and arrest journalists.  Tomislav Marčinko, editor–in–chief of television and 
radio news programmes, laid down rules for the coverage of the war, including: 
Do not broadcast pictures of blown up, badly wounded and shot Croatian 
soldiers. Casualty figures of guardsmen and police must always be 
accompanied by [such terms as] ‘fell for Croatia’s freedom’, ‘heroes in 
the defence of the Fatherland’.  
 
Soon after the 1990 elections, Radio–Televizija Zagreb had been renamed Hrvatska 
(Croatia) Radio– Televizija (HRT) and remained in state ownership, with its directors, 
including the director general, Ines Saskar, a known supporter of the HDZ, being 
appointed by the government.427 
Ivan Zvonimir Čičak, an opponent of the HDZ government, argued that 
Croatia compensates for losing on the battlefield by showing severed 
heads and massacred civilians to create a stronger feeling of hatred, which 
would wipe away the feeling of aimlessness and bitter defeats.428 
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Nationalism continued to drive censorship throughout the early 1990s and the war years, 
leaving disobeying reporters of Croatian nationality exposed to the most drastic 
persecution.   
During the war in Croatia, 80 per cent of HRT’s transmitters and more than 30 TV 
translators were either occupied, damaged, or completely destroyed, but they continued 
to transmit with reduced power from reserve locations until they were repaired in 1992 – 
“something that makes HRT proud of its technical staff”.429  A separate Croatian section 
of the Voice of America (VOA) radio service, granted in 1992 and soon expanded to 
television, was also instrumental in disseminating information to the Diaspora (VOA 
will be discussed in more detail later).  Djuric also reports that in January 1994, as well 
as the Voice of Croatia, a special satellite Croatian TV programme for North America 
was introduced, broadcasting one hour per day.  In February 1994, an agreement was 
established with SPAN cable TV to transmit the main daily news.430  Contribution was 
expected in return. 
Fast and qualitative information from the homeland is of extreme 
importance for all Croatian emigrants who want to participate and 
contribute to Croatia's economic prosperity.431 
 
Injustice frames constituted a key element of collective memories communicated to 
Croats at home and abroad.  Literature defines injustice frames as affirmed grievances 
and suffering that function as drivers of collective action (Gamson in Johnston & 
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Klandermans;432 Tarrow;433 Benford & Snow;434 to name a few).  More specifically, 
“before a collective action frame can be generated, evaluations of existing circumstances 
must be cast as shared grievances”.435  Injustice frames are one of only a limited 
number436 of broad collective action frames that are expansive, inclusive, and flexible 
enough to be accepted as master frames within the framing literature.437  “Master frames 
are generic; specific collective action frames are derivative.  Master frames can be 
construed as functioning in a manner analogous to linguistic codes in that they provide a 
grammar that punctuates and syntactically connects patterns or happenings in the 
world.”438  Tuđman’s ‘political grammar’ was wide–ranging and inclusive enough to 
accommodate a variety of different perspectives and interests both in Croatia and within 
the Croatian Diaspora.  Most importantly, it achieved a cultural resonance to the 
“historical milieu” that it was situated in.439 
Social movement theorists (SMTs) observe that the motives that transform people from 
mere observers into active participants in a movement do not develop spontaneously.  In 
order for them to emerge a pre–condition needs to exist, typically in the form of a 
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grievance or an outrage caused by perceived injustice committed by another.  The 
success of the movement is conditioned upon the effective framing of the grievance in 
question in order to render it relevant in a broader social and political context.  Existing 
literature on diasporas observes that periods of hardship in their homelands causes 
immigrants to form new diasporic structures or join existing ones.440  Political and 
economic circumstances in the late 1980s and the early 1990s Croatia encouraged 
individuals and groups abroad to shift from one category to another, and motivated them 
to enter the intricate and often harsh Diaspora reality by voicing their views in the 
political arena.  Homeland conflict, when used successfully in framing strategies as an 
instrument of promoting issue salience, has the potential, as evident in the Croatian case, 
to shake up and rearrange all previously established Diaspora strategies, tactics and 
types of organisation.  It can unify split, ‘inert’, and dispersed entities441.  Focusing on 
shared injustices in this period of national crisis, the HDZ evoked a collective Diaspora 
identity, which was put into effect and encouraged action in the name of the Diaspora 
and the nation. 
Injustice frames interpret the relevant surrounding events and provide the people with a 
guide to action.  In Croatia’s case, injustice frames made it possible for movement 
leaders not only to identify the problem but also to bring the issue closer to the people by 
illustrating how significant it is was as well as the alternatives that existed to alleviate 
these injustices.  The injustice frame provided a fertile ground for identifying the victims 
and the nature and severity of the violations perpetrated against them.  It also determined 
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who the perpetrators were and identified the reasons behind their actions.  As we shall 
see in the next chapter, this information was essential for later establishing what kind of 
solution was required to improve the situation and which actors had the necessary 
capacity and willingness to deploy their resources. 
A Grieving Nation 
 
The goal of injustice frames used by Tuđman and his followers was to echo the feelings 
of both past and present suffering among Diaspora members.  Past suffering is linked to 
memorable events and difficult periods from the Croatian past, explained in more detail 
in the following section.  These are evens that many of those in the Diaspora 
experienced first–hand.  Present suffering refers to the situation at home that many 
diaspora Croats identified with.  “Diaspora patriots were very aware of the life and death 
situation at home and of the fact that their homeland was in a desperate need of material 
and moral support”.442 
In due course these sufferings were converted into instigators of collective effort for 
change.  The injustice frame used by HDZ, aimed at amplifying the victimisation of the 
Croatian people, was a compilation of ideas and symbols used as tools to demonstrate 
the severity of the problem Croatia faced and identify the guilty actors.  Tuđman’s 
programme “Iseljena Hrvatska”, roughly translated as “Croatia in exile” or “Expelled 
Croatia” was based on shared grievances implying that if not all, then most of Diaspora 
Croats left their country not because they wanted to, but because they had to.  Used by 
Tuđman in his speeches, delivered both at home and abroad, “Croatia in exile” alluded 
to populations being coerced into leaving their homeland, escaping from persecution, 
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war or poverty.  Discourse analysis of Tuđman’s speeches and HDZ publications point 
to some common 20th century themes including the 1945 Bleiburg massacre and the 
1970s Croatian Spring, analysed in more detail later in this chapter.  
Further, Tuđman’s CAF promoted a particular moral evaluation.  The frames contained 
implicit or explicit appeals to moral principles443 that defined the act of the ‘aggressor’ as 
morally wrong.  Closely linked to the issue of morality, the function of the word 
‘homeland’ in ‘Homeland War’ as opposed to ‘civil war’ or simply ‘conflict’ in the 
political discourse of the 1990s (and present–day) Croatia, was to further amplify the 
‘justness of the cause’ principle.  Confident of their cause being morally just, Tuđman 
and his followers portrayed the conflict of the 1990s as a key reason for action.  As a 
result, Diaspora members were more easily mobilised around that agenda.  
Below is an excerpt from Tuđman’s “Address to the Croatian people during an open 
aggression by the greater–Serbian aggressor on the Republic of Croatia” in October 
1991.  It states that the: 
United greater Serbian imperialists and vampire– like remains of the 
Yugoslavian communist army are carrying out a full attack on Croatia, 
breaking all international peace agreements.  444 
 
Tuđman then calls on the Croatian people to join in the defence of their homeland, as it 
is their “sacred duty” to fight for the freedom of “our Croatian land, our sea and our sky 
over our eternal and only Croatia”.  Tailored for this particular speech, this was an 
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adapted version of his signature closing statement: “Eternal life to our one and only 
Croatia!”445 
This is one of many speeches delivered by Tuđman and his ‘co–fighters’ (Croatian: 
suborci) aimed at awakening the Diaspora’s need to consolidate its political voice and, 
consequently, its financial and humanitarian support.  Diaspora was a powerful resource 
with an important voice both at home and abroad and, therefore, it was crucial for 
Tuđman to win their support abroad in order to advance his interests at home446.  A 
shared Croatian identity, based on the idea of a common historical fight and a common 
struggle for Croatian statehood, continued to be reinforced all throughout the 1990s. 
The HDZ focused on overcoming historical differences by making it evident to both 
Croats within and outside Croatia that many social groups were structurally and 
ideologically placed in opposition to the recent policies endorsed by the previous 
government in Yugoslavia.  This conviction, as explained through the injustice master 
frame, was based on shared grievances suffered by various groups and functioned as a 
channel for identity reformulation.  
When I think of the war in our homeland, our struggle for independence 
(…) I think of it as a touchstone of our identity.447   
 
The ‘Homeland War’ is often described as a defining moment, “a moment of truth”.  
According to one member of the Diaspora, it generated “a shift in the hearts and minds 
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of the people, terminated friendships, transformed lives and linked identities”.  It is 
explained as a:  
Shift towards what matters (…) our homeland, our history, our identity.  
We were all grieving and we wanted to help and be closer to others who 
felt the same. 448 
 
Tuđman’s focus on the ‘grieving nation’ rearranged all previously established Diaspora 
strategies and types of organisation.  It united split and dispersed Diaspora entities and 
prompted decisions to organise on behalf of the homeland.  “The merciless war against 
the Republic of Croatia and her citizens, unparalleled in recent history”449, prompted 
Diaspora members to invest substantial effort and resources in renewing old and 
building new host–home country links devoted to preserving and cultivating their 
relationships with their homeland.  Convinced of the justness of their fight for a free, 
peaceful, and democratic Croatia diasporants were prompted to organise and launch 
massive political campaigns on behalf of the homeland.  Action was seen as their duty. 
In its century–old history, the CFU has continuously supported the Croatian people and 
their fight for sovereignty.  During the 1990s the CFU assisted the Croats “morally, 
materially, and politically in their struggle for a free and independent Croatian state”.450  
When communist Yugoslavia fell apart, the CFU supported the democratic processes in 
Croatia.  In a letter to Franjo Tuđman, CFU National President, Bernard M. Luketich, 
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declared CFU's “support of all efforts to establish a new democratic government”.451  
Another example of their support is the establishment of the CFU Croatian 
Humanitarian Aid Fund at the 18th CFU Convention in 1991.  Fifty thousand dollars 
was remitted into the Fund by the Convention itself, and another $6,000 was raised by 
the delegates during the Convention.  “This resulted in the greatest outpouring of 
humanitarian aid by CFU members and friends.”452  Frequent supplies were shipped 
from various CFU locations to the homeland and added to the Home Office totals, 
amounting to more than $150 million in humanitarian aid in the form of medicines and 
medical equipment, food, clothing and other supplies, transportation and funds for the 
reconstruction of Croatian hospitals, orphanages and churches.453  According to the CFU, 
members and friends contributed over $1,300,000 to the Fund.  The Croatian 
Humanitarian Aid Fund remains as a fraternal programme to this day.454 
In addition to the Humanitarian Aid Fund, from 1991 the CFU collaborated extensively 
with the DORA humanitarian organisation in Croatia to deliver financial support for war 
orphans.  It also resulted in the creation of a network of godparent relationships for 674 
war orphans that CFU members supported to their 18th birthday.  The CFU–DORA joint 
effort provided 1,266,947 US dollars, with aid coming both from the well–off and those 
themselves in need , many of whom lived in very modest conditions, in some of the 
major cities across North America.455  The names of donors appeared in every issue of 
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the Fraternalist.  CFU’s contributions were also documented in the US Congressional 
Record. The Croatian Fraternal Union also  
ardently supported the Republic of Croatia's establishment as a stable 
democratic and free market– oriented nation– state as a result of the 
devolution of the Soviet Union and the Balkan Wars in the 1990s.  The 
CFU was instrumental in developing American support as a founding 
member of and in steady concert with the National Federation of Croatian 
Americans for the new Republic's full accession into western multilateral 
organizations.  This includes full membership in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, NATO, in early 2009 and the European Union on 
July 1, 2013. 456  
 
Franjo Tuđman personally thanked CFU national president and the membership of all 
CFU lodges for the aid they had provided in Croatia's struggle to regain its 
independence.457  
Toronto in 1993 was no exception.  A 10–piece youth ensemble played the national 
anthems of Canada and Croatia on tamburicas, stringed instruments halfway between 
guitars and ukuleles, symbols of Croatian melodies.  A large audience of 500 people 
pressed around 60 tables “in the hot and smoky meeting hall of a Roman Catholic 
church, sang along – louder for Croatia than for Canada”.458 “Nearly everyone there was 
a Canadian citizen, but this night was for the home country”459.  Žarko Domljan, the Vice 
President of the Croatian Parliament, visiting this suburb of Toronto, received two 
standing ovations before he even started his speech: 
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I know a lot of you want to know, when can you come back?  When can 
you invest?  I tell you, Croatia needs your capital.  Croatia needs your 
talents.  Croatia needs your experience. 460 
 
The crowd was cheering.  They were on their feet again.  It was the fifth fund–raising 
event in six days, including one for children whose fathers were killed during the 
‘Homeland War’.461 
The Canadian Association of Alumni and Friends of Croatian Universities (AMCA) also 
actively supported Croatia during that period.  Its mission today is to connect former 
students of Croatian Universities with each other and with the University of Zagreb, and 
to “advocate the benefits of the integration of Croatian culture into the Canadian 
multicultural landscape”.462  It was founded in 1990, when it was known as the centre of 
intellectual life of the Croatian community in Southern Ontario.  In the period of 1990–
1995, AMCA’s president was scientist, inventor and entrepreneur Ivan Hrvoić (Toronto 
Chapter) who immigrated to Canada in 1972.  His activities were important for 
systematically “spreading the truth”463 about Croatia in Canada, and in particular among 
members of the Canadian Government and Parliament, as well as in Canadian media.  
He frequently appeared in public and initiated public debates with representatives of the 
Canadian government and the media, lobbying and “spreading the truth about the 
situation in Croatia”464.  He also organised the delivery of humanitarian aid to Croatia 
during the war and donated two magnetometers to the Mining and Geological Faculty of 
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the University of Zagreb, including a global positioning device and a red spectrum 
transceiver to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia.465   
AMCA’s publication Gaudeamus, published from 1990 until 1999, was printed in 3000 
copies and distributed to AMCA’s members in North America, Europe, Australia, 
numerous libraries, including the Library of Congress, as well as to all members of the 
Canadian Parliament, senators, and selected diplomats and UN representatives.  In a 
recent interview,466 Hrvoić stated: 
When we first founded AMCA in the pre–war years it was obvious that 
Croatian citizens will need our help.  We gathered around 350 Croatian 
intellectuals and began with our work.  We collected everything from 
blankets, shoes, clothes and money.  We represented Croatian interests in 
front of Canadian authorities and in front of the Canadian media.  Of 
special importance was our meeting with the Canadian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs.  One also needs to stress that Canada’s relationship with 
Yugoslavia was very strong at the time and the Canadian government did 
not look favourable upon our organization.  We gradually changed that. 
 
The enormous amount of activity generated by the Diaspora was aimed at broadening 
support to their homeland as well as advancing the security, prosperity and international 
standing of their home country and the people of their nation.467  Tuđman’s discourse, 
when referring to the ‘Homeland War’, evoked the concept of ‘homeland in distress’ 
which added to the perceived justness of the cause and had a powerful mobilising effect.  
It brought to mind the centuries–long struggle to firmly and irreversibly put an end to 
foreign domination.  The conflict of the 1990s and Croatia’s fight for independence 
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provided the Croatian Diaspora with direction and, as a result, Diaspora members fell 
into orbit around that agenda.  The collective Diaspora identity was put into action in the 
name of the nation.  This led to millions of emigrant dollars being poured into Croatia 
during the war.  “Croatians were like water boiling boisterously in a pot.” 468 
On 12 September 1996 Franjo Tuđman welcomed a CFU delegation from Pittsburgh.  
The President presented Bernard Luketich, the President of the Croatian Fraternal 
Union, with a red Croatian Pleter medal for “the work that has been done to uphold the 
ties between the US and Croatia”.  Mr Luketich thanked the President, affirming that the 
CFU would continue to be the bridge between Croatia, US and Canada.469   Two hundred 
and fifty representatives from the Diaspora visited Croatia for two weeks on this 
occasion.470   
All Croatian Diaspora members who took part in the research report a significant 
increase in their contact with family and friends during the conflict.  “We remained in 
daily contact with them; we wanted them to know that we are with them in our hearts 
and in our minds,” states one member of the Croatian Diaspora.  The general attitude 
toward the situation in Croatia is illustrated in a statement by another Croatian–
American interviewed for the purposes of this study.  Echoing the words of many other 
Diaspora Croats, he refers to homeland conflict as a source of strength, a pool of energy 
that was soon translated into political action towards Croatia: 
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I believe that in many ways the path to achievement of Croatian 
independence strengthened the Croatian–American community.  I believe 
that the most affected generation was the zero generation, older people, 
with still vivid memories of the prior war, and of the country in struggle, 
with means and wish to get involved and with full appreciation of what 
was accomplished.   
 
CFU activities also included protests organised in Washington DC as early as 1988 
against the abolition of the Croatian language’s official status in socialist Croatia.  
Language identity has been a highly emotional issue for Croats throughout their history 
and particularly in the early 1990s when it also became exceedingly politicised.  The 
dispute over renaming the official Croatian language ‘Croato–Serbian’ in the second half 
of the 1980s and the failure to do so caused collective distress among the Croatian 
Diaspora and triggered an eruption of memories of other historical injustices, especially 
those during the 20th century.471 
Croatian language was an important motivator used symbolically by Tuđman.  For 
instance, Boris Maruna, a Croatian emigrant, author and poet, who lived in exile in Italy, 
Argentina, Spain, United Kingdom and the US for three decades, was personally invited 
by Tuđman to return home.  In 1990 Maruna returned to Croatia and was appointed 
director of the Croatian Heritage Foundation, an organisation that works with the 
Croatian Diaspora in helping them connect back to the home country.  It also runs 
several programmes within Croatia and around the world, from language to folklore, in 
an effort to prevent the assimilation of Diaspora Croats into other cultures.  Maruna 
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became the editor of its monthly magazine, Matica, and later the editor of its literary and 
cultural magazine, Vijenac.472 
Sučić observes that in many theories of nationalism language is identified as one of the 
defining characteristics of nationality and a precondition for the existence of the nation–
state.  She also points out that, in the case of Serbo–Croatian, “the symbolic function 
seems to have emerged victorious over the communicative function”.473  Together with 
his political elites Tuđman promoted the new ‘linguistic reconstruction’ through 
publishing Croatian dictionaries and books, introducing new ‘purified’ Croatian 
vocabulary, consisting of words taken from ancient Croatian or an entirely new 
vocabulary, with a goal of articulating Croatian identity and further distinguishing 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
Apart from language, an amalgamation of historical, cultural and political references, 
recognisable and adaptable enough to appeal to the worldwide Croatian Diaspora, 
functioned as powerful symbols and were instrumental in the process of ethnic 
homogenisation and mobilisation.  
Events worth Remembering 
 
This section will address key themes identified through discourse analysis.  They include 
the Bleiburg massacre of 1945, the 1970 Croatian Spring movement and the campaign 
and the debates around the placement of Ban Josip Jelačić’s monument in the main 
square of Zagreb in 1990 (named Ban Jelačić Square in 1848).  We can look at these 
                                                 
472Prpić, J. (1997). Hrvati u Americi [Croatians in America]. Zagreb: Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika.  
473Sučić, D. S. (1996). The fragmentation of Serbo-Croatian into three new languages. Institute for 
Journalism in Transition, 2(24). 
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themes rendered by the framers as ‘events worth remembering’.  The following pages 
will also look at how these were perceived by the Diaspora.  
The Bleiburg Massacre 
 
One of the sources of discursive references was the historical memory of the Bleiburg 
tragedy, a massacre that happened near the end of World War II, during May 1945, near 
the village of Bleiburg on the Austro–Slovenian (then German–Yugoslav) border.  
Thousands of victims, Croatian soldiers and civilians, fled from the defeated 
Independent State of Croatia (NDH), hoping to surrender to the British Army.  However, 
they were forcibly repatriated by the British who directed them to surrender to the 
Yugoslav Partisan Army (Operation Keelhaul).474 
The Bleiburg post–war massacres of Croatians, still heavily commemorated both within 
and outside Croatia, are relatively unknown outside the Croatian community.  To 
Croatians, however, these events not only trigger instant shared memories of the 1945 
tragedy, but carry strong symbolic weight.  “The single word ‘Bleiburg’ summarises the 
pain endured by an entire nation.”475  The events are also often talked about in a more 
emotional context as ‘the Bleiburg tragedy’.  The remembrance of Bleiburg was 
prohibited in pre–1990 Yugoslavia.  Hence, the only people who went there were from 
the Diaspora.476  The Croatian Diaspora, mainly the Croatian political emigration, had 
always been very vocal about the event and had published numerous accounts on the 
                                                 
474 Tomasevich, J., (2001). War and revolution in Yugoslavia 1941-1945: Occupation and collaboration, 
Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press. 
475 McAdams, C. M. (1992). Croatia: Myth and reality. Studia Croatica. Retrieved from 
http://www.studiacroatica.org/libros/mythe/mtud02.htm 
476 Interview with Vjeran Pavlaković, lecturer on culture of memory at the Department of Cultural Studies 
at the University of Rijeka. Retrieved from: 
https://www.academia.edu/9946664/Interview_in_Novosti 
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Bleiburg atrocities and talked of genocide committed against the Croatian people.  John 
Ivan Prcela, a high–school teacher from Cleveland, made it his life’s mission to write 
about the Bleiburg tragedy.  He translated and published two books by Josip 
Hećimović,477 a Bleiburg witness.  His most significant work is Operation 
Slaughterhouse, Post–war Massacres in Yugoslavia, published in 1970.478  According to 
Prpić, although banned in Croatia and the rest of Yugoslavia, the publishing of the book 
was an important event for Croatian–Americans and the Diaspora as a whole479 at a time 
when Washington DC was supportive of Tito’s regime.  An equally important 
convention on the topic of Bleiburg was held three years later in Cleveland.  These 
Diaspora voices, however, remained largely unheard due to communist Yugoslavia’s 
position as the protégé of the West.  Importantly, the Diaspora elevated the number of 
Bleiburg victims to 600,000, especially during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.  The debate 
on the issue continues.480 
The Croatian Spring 
 
The HDZ discourse also featured references to the Croatian Spring, a 1970s political 
movement in Croatia, initiated by the Declaration on the Status and Name of the 
Croatian Standard Language published in 1967 by a group of prominent Croatian 
linguists and poets.  Thousands of Zagreb students, many of them prosecuted and 
                                                 
477 Hećimović, J. (1961). In Tito’s Death Marches. Testimony on the Massacres of the Croatian War 
Prisoners and Civilians after World War II. Chicago: Croatian Franciscan Press.;  
      Hećimović, J. (1962). In Tito’s Death Marches and Extermination Camps. New York: Carlton Press. 
478 A co-editor of this book was a Croatian-American historian Stanko Guldescu. 
479 Prpić, J. (1997). Hrvati u Americi [Croatians in America]. Zagreb: Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika. 
480 Tomasevich, J., (2001). War and revolution in Yugoslavia 1941-1945: Occupation and collaboration, 
Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press. 
Tomasevich states that the number of victims is almost impossible to ascertain. The records of the 
Croatian Heritage Foundation mention approximately 30,000 POWs, surrendered personnel, and refugees 
in Corps area, including a further 60,000 reported moving north to Austria. 
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arrested, participated in organised demonstrations and called for greater rights for 
Croatia as well as democratic and economic reforms.481  These events cleared the path 
for an emerging class of Croatian nationalist intellectuals, including its most prominent 
member Franjo Tuđman.  Among those arrested was also the dissident journalist Bruno 
Bušić who later continued his political engagement from the Diaspora, promoting a free, 
democratic and independent Croatia.  Bušić, one of the best–known preys of UDBA, the 
Yugoslav Security Service, was portrayed as one of the greatest Croatian heroes and was 
elected into the Croatian National Council (Croatian: Hrvatsko narodno vijeće, HNV) a 
representative body of Croatian emigrant groups that operated from 1974 to the nation's 
independence in 1991.  Bušić was in jail until 1973 and killed by UDBA in Paris two 
years later.  When Croatia achieved independence, his remains were relocated to the 
Mirogoj cemetery in Zagreb and were laid to rest next to those who died in the 
‘Homeland War’.  
Ban Josip Jelačić  
 
One cannot deny the symbolic importance of monuments in the construction of 
collective memory.  As Rihtman–Auguštin points out: “[t]he statue of a historical 
personality displayed in a public place is a medium which makes history tangible in 
everyday life.  The monument rescues the historical personality from oblivion”.482  A 
                                                 
481 Lampe, J. R. (1996). Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a country. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; and  
      Grubišić., V. 1989, November 1). Hrvatsko proljeće: dvadesetak godina kasnije [The Croatian Spring: 
Twenty years later]. Fraternalist, pp.13–14. 
482 Rihtman-Auguštin, D. (2004): The monument in the main square: Constructing and erasing memory in 
contemporary Croatia. In Todorova, M. (Ed.), Balkan identities: Nation and memory (pp. 180-
196). London: Hurst.  
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large statue of ban Josip Jelačić483 on a horse in the main square of Zagreb was originally 
erected in October 1866 by Austrian authorities to commemorate his battle against the 
Magyars in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848.  The perception of his historical role 
changed with the change in government.  Jelačić was removed from the public eye, 
songs celebrating him were banned in 1947 and he was condemned by the Communist 
government of Yugoslavia as an Austrian collaborator.  On 16 October 1990, on his 
birthday and after the 1990 Croatian parliamentary elections, he was symbolically 
reinstalled484 and was again considered an admirable figure of Croatian history.  In late 
1989, HDZ members handed out a proclamation that stated the following:  
The fate of the unhappy ban’s statue has become a symbol of how 
Croatian national feelings were trampled on in socialist Croatia, a symbol 
of a policy of heartless hatred for one’s own nation, its history, culture, 
heritage.485   
The statue of Jelačić was originally faced towards the north, with his sword raised 
against Hungary; today the statue's position is reversed.  
A month before the statue was returned to the square, on 20 and 21 September, Tuđman 
visited Cleveland’s Croatian home in Eastlake together with Croatian Cardinal Kuharić.  
They were greeted by thousands of Croatian–Americans expressing their moral and 
material support.  Tuđman went on to visit Croatian communities in other states, 
including Minnesota, where he met with former governor Rudy Perpich.  On 16 October 
a number of these diaspora members joined Tuđman in attending the symbolic event in 
                                                 
483 Jelačić was the ban of Croatia between 23 March 1848 and 19 May 1859. He was a noted army 
general, remembered for his military campaigns during the Revolutions of 1848 and for his abolition of 
serfdom in Croatia.  
484 To celebrate the return of Jelačić and to commemorate his legacy, an entire week, named ‘Ban Jelačić 
Week’, with entertainment and concerts was dedicated to the event.  
485Malešević, S. (2014). Nation-States and nationalisms: Organization, ideology and solidarity (p. 132). 
New York: Polity.  
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Zagreb’s main square where the statue of Jelačić was reinstalled, symbolising Croatian 
struggle for independence.  CFU’s Fraternalist wrote extensively about the importance 
of the ban and its symbolism.486  
A hero to some and a villain to others, during his lifetime Jelačić was criticised from 
many angles – as a Panslavist, as a pro Russian, as an Austrophile, and a reactionary, 
among other and often contradictory labels.487  To Croatians he was first a symbol of 
their struggle against the Hungarians and a martyr of the Austrian regime488 but grew to 
represent freedom from any foreign oppression.  As Rihtman–Auguštin writes, in his 
speech during the ‘Ban Jelačić Week’ Franjo Tuđman presented himself “as a 
personality who creates history – and then interpreting history for us.  So he placed 
Jelačić in the context of current politics”.489  Tuđman “mentioned the ‘undaunted spirit of 
the Croatian people’, extolled the homeland, and boasted how “Croatia`s prestige has 
been reinstated”.490 
“Ustani Bane” (lit.  Rise/Stand up Viceroy) a patriotic song that glorifies Jelačić, written 
at the turn of the 20th century by an anonymous author, was recognised as a threat and 
banned by the Yugoslav authorities who thought of him as a Croatian nationalist 
leader491 for whom the Croats called whenever they felt repressed.  In the 1990s the song 
                                                 
486 The Ban Jelačić Monument (1989, October 10).  Fraternalist, p. 12. 
487 Čuvalo A. (2008) Josip Jelačić – ban of Croatia. Review of Croatian History, 4(1), 13-26. 
488 ibid 
489 Rihtman-Auguštin, D. (2004). The monument in the main square: Constructing and erasing memory in 
contemporary Croatia. In Todorova, M. (Ed.), Balkan identities: Nation and memory (pp. 180-
196). London: Hurst. 
490 Rihtman-Auguštin, D. (2004). The monument in the main square: Constructing and erasing memory in 
contemporary Croatia. In Todorova, M. (Ed.), Balkan identities: Nation and memory (pp. 180-
196, see p. 189). London: Hurst. 
491 Pettan, S. (1998). Music and Censorship in ex-Yugoslavia – Some views from Croatia. Speech at the 1st 
Freemuse World conference.   
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became one of the important HDZ symbols representing Croatian enthusiasm for 
freedom and independence.  A picture of Josip Jelačić is depicted on the front of the 
Croatian 20 Kuna banknote, issued in 1993 and 2001.492 
Apart from ‘new old monuments’, updated street names and new vocabulary, 
independent Croatia received a new national anthem.  Its opening words, “Lijepa Naša” 
(“Our Beautiful”), are commonly used as a metonymy for Croatia by Croatians.493  The 
new checkerboard coat of arms (Croatian: šahovnica) adopted in December 1990 is a 
proud reference to the endurance of the Croatian nation, as it is widely thought to have 
been created by Stephen (Stjepan) Držislav, a Croatian King in the 10th century.494  In 
1994 Croatia also received its new currency Kuna (marten)495, a pantheon of old heroes, 
featuring great historical figures such as Stjepan Radić and Ante Starčević, celebrated 
Croatian poets such as Ivan Gundulić, Marko Marulić and Ivan Mažuranić, and religious 
figures such as Juraj Dobrila, a notable 19th ct. Croatian bishop. 
These specific references were selected in order to highlight the continuity of Croatian 
statehood, and a nation that endured and withstood all past injustices.  Throughout the 
early 1990s, these historical references, aimed at connecting the modern state of Croatia 
with particular aspects of its past, became recurring themes in President Tuđman’s 
                                                 
492Croatian National Bank. Features of Kuna Banknotes: 20 kuna (1993 issue). 
http://www.hnb.hr/novcan/novcanice/e20k.htm?tsfsg=72c2ffab4bf1c37eca77ca1333e8e02b. 
493 “Lijepa Naša Domovina” (“Our Beautiful Homeland”). The original lyrics were written by Antun 
Mihanović and first published under the title "Hrvatska domovina" ("Croatian homeland") in 1835. The 
Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has an information website on the anthem with sound files of it. 
494 Bellamy, A. J. (2003). The formation of Croatian national identity: A Centuries-old dream?  
Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. 
495 The kuna was a currency unit in several Slavic states, most notably Kievan Rus and its successors until 
the 15th century. The idea of a kuna currency appeared again in 1939 in Banovina of Croatia (part of 
Yugoslav Monarchy). In 1941, the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) introduced the Kuna, which 
remained in circulation until 1945, when it disappeared together with NDH. From 
http://us.exchangecurrency.biz/currencies/hrk 
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‘political rituals’.  We can also refer to these, in Hobsbawm’s terms, as ‘invented 
traditions’ – a “set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules 
and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of 
behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.”496  
Hobsbawm observes that invented traditions can function as instruments in establishing 
or symbolising social cohesion and collective identities.497  The purpose of utilising 
invented traditions, defined as “responses to novel situations which take the form of 
reference to old situations”,498 goes beyond strengthening group cohesion but also 
extends to legitimising action.499  Legitimising one’s own action was directly associated 
with the attribution component of injustice frames whereby the movement leaders 
delineate boundaries between ‘good’ and ‘evil’.   
Nurturing Identify in the Diaspora 
 
The above resonated in the Diaspora given much of Croatian cultural heritage has 
focused on the notion of freedom and independence, both in Croatia and beyond, 
inspiring a number of authors in the Diaspora.  These include earlier works by Antun 
Bonifačić and Mladen Kobalin, Josip Novakovich, Vladimir P. Goss, Hrvoslav Ban, 
Edward Ifkovich, Melkior Masina, Ivo Sivrić, and Janko Deur.500  There are also 
                                                 
496 Hobsbawm, E. (1983) Introduction: Inventing tradition. In E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (Eds.), The 
invention of tradition (pp. 1-14, see p. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
497 Hobsbawm, E. (1983) Introduction: Inventing tradition. In E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (Eds.), The 
invention of tradition (pp. 1-14). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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numerous painters such as Tomislav Gabrić, Marijana Grišnik, and Josip Turkalj, with 
references to Croatian history, culture, religion and immigrant themes.501   
The articles published in the Fraternalist mirror this emphasis on Croatia’s history, 
national heroes, religious leaders, and poets “which served to revive common memories, 
a sense of unity and of ethnic identity”502.  Djuric further argues that Diaspora served as 
an essential link in the mobilisation of the Croatian national movement, in keeping with 
Benedict Anderson’s observation that “the periodical press is of crucial importance in 
the emergence of national communities”503.  The checkerboard coat of arms, for 
example, featured on the front page of the Fraternalist, as a part of its logo.  It is also the 
logo of the Croatian Fraternal Union. 
The preservation of the Croatian language was another important theme.  In the 1980s 
the Croatian Diaspora was at the brink of losing its native language.  Below is an excerpt 
from a note first published in the Fraternalist:504  
I sit writing this in a jet plane returning to the United States from three 
weeks in Croatia.  I have lived the monumental frustration of my hunger 
that I do not know if I will ever surmount.  I cannot communicate in my 
grandfather's native tongue.  Oh father of my father, why must I suffer 
this so.  I am a bird with spirit in my heart, with wings to fly, to soar in 
this beckoning sky.  Trapped in the small cage of my few words 
laboriously learned, I am deaf and dumb and nearly blind. 
 
                                                 
501 Josip Turkalj “The Mother of Immigrants”, a five foot tall statue made for the Croatian Cultural Centre 
in Toronto, Canada. As cited in Prpić, J. (1997). Hrvati u Americi [Croatians in America]. Zagreb: 
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In 1987 the Fraternalist reported on a Croatian Diaspora initiative to, as a response, start 
a fundraising campaign to establish the first Department of Croatian Language and 
Culture outside the home country, at York University in Toronto, Canada.  The CFU 
also demanded a separate Croatian section of the Voice of America (VOA) radio 
service, which they were granted in February 1992.  The service initially began on radio 
only but was quickly expanded into television and was also one of the first VOA 
services to establish an online presence.  Voice of America’s Croatian TV NewsFlash 
was broadcast daily on eight affiliate stations.  The popular Breakfast Show, a roundup 
of US, Croatian and world news, was aired for 19 years, “without a single day of 
interruption”,505 while an evening radio show aired on shortwave and ten affiliate FM 
stations in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  VOA’s director David Ensor referred 
to the service as “a model of journalistic integrity that provided the people of Croatia 
with fair and impartial news during the dark days of civil war in the Balkans.”  Ensor 
praised the service, which he said, “served as a vital source of independent reporting and 
insight into American policy.”506 It was also an important vehicle for preserving Croatian 
culture among Diaspora Croats. 
A large number of articles also appeared in the Fraternalist celebrating Croatian 
national culture.  A reader comments: 
I am impressed by the many articles on history and culture.  You are 
using history and culture as a learning tool: looking to the past and 
                                                 
505King, K. (2011, November 22). VOA Ends Croatian Broadcasts. VOA website. Retrieved from 
http://www.insidevoa.com/content/voa-ends-croatian-broadcasts-------134407798/178578.html. 
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learning from it to bring about a better and more prosperous future, I 
certainly support your efforts.507 
 
The 1980s also saw the reopening of a number of World War II debates in the Diaspora, 
“challenging and reinterpreting what was prescribed as official Croatian history”508 with 
the year 1987 marked as the turning point in the official discourse of the Fraternalist.  
Djuric observes that instead of its usual ‘middle of the road policy’, the discussion 
turned more radical.  This was evident in a number of articles reporting on past 
grievances as a response to the “nationalistic Serbian claims and Serbian xenophobic 
roll–calls hinting at collective Croatian guilt for the atrocities of the Ustaše regime 
during World War II.” 509  The defensive tone of a letter from Lucian Reichherze is a 
reaction to those claims:  
[The Ustaše ] just wanted a sovereign Croatia. The Ustaše  wanted only to 
liberate their country from the Serbian yoke and be independent, which 
they once were when they had their own kings etc.  Their goal was 
separation from Yugoslavia.  It can be compared to the struggle of the 
Basques in Spain or the Kurds in Turkey or the Armenians in Turkey or 
the Irish in Ulster.  A nation without its independence is like a homeless 
person living in someone else’s home as a servant or slave.510 
 
At the end of 1980s, the Fraternalist was closely monitoring the political developments 
in former Yugoslavia and paid particular attention to Tuđman’s Croatian Democratic 
Union.  Mirroring Tuđman’s discourse of unity, the 1990s also saw a number of 
Diaspora activities aimed at solidifying relations among different Croatian Diaspora 
                                                 
507Djuric, I. (2001). The Croatian Diaspora in North America: Identity, Ethnic Solidarity and the 
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organisations in an effort to initiate a “broad Croatian cultural action in North 
America”511.  Published in an Open Letter512 in the Fraternalist to all AMCA members, 
the AMCA encouraged reconciliation of the different political ideologies among the 
diaspora Croats in North America.513 The inter–ethnic gap, however, was broadening.  
“Once again,” Djuric states514 “traumatic memories and history worked towards creating 
intra–ethnic homogeneity while at the same time widening the interethnic gap.” 
The Croatian Ethnic Institute in Chicago, founded by the Croatian Franciscans in 1975, 
with a collection of over 20,000 volumes on Croatian culture, history, language, fine arts 
and literature, including rare editions from the 15th and 19th centuries Croatia, has also 
played an important role in promoting Croatian history, language and heritage in the 
Diaspora.  Tuđman’s references to the continuity of Croatian statehood, openly stressed 
by Tuđman during his early encounters with the Diaspora, and later on 20 September 
1992 in front of a large group of Croats in Eastlake, Cleveland, firmly resonated among 
Diaspora Croats. 
These references were further articulated by Tuđman when he spoke in front of the UN 
General Assembly in New York515, a first–ever speech delivered by a President of a 
sovereign Croatian state.  
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The Croatian nation is one of the oldest people of today’s Europe.  It 
possesses written documents and stamps of its national statehood 
independence, as well as of belonging to the Western European 
civilization, from the Seventh century (A.D.) onwards, in stone and on 
parchments, in literature and the arts, and what is most important, in its 
spiritual being.  The Croatian nation can be proud of its contribution to 
the spiritual and real cultural heritage of mankind.  Incidentally, it is not 
by chance that a small part of it is also present here.  The entrance 
through which we pass into the United Nations General Assembly hall is 
made of Marble from the Croatian island of Brač.  That stone in my 
country symbolizes Croatian survival.  In it, during many centuries, the 
greatest of Croatian sculptors have reflected themselves, including Antun 
Augustinčić whose equestrian figure, “Monument of Peace”, is found in 
the park behind this very United Nations’ building. 
 
For the first time in their history, Diaspora Croats felt that they have a state they can 
refer to as their own – an emotion that was strengthened when Petar Starčević, the first 
Croatian ambassador to the US, visited President Bush, in November 1992.  The New 
York Times as well as CFU’s Fraternalist regularly reported on these events at the 
time.516  Thinking about those days, one member of the Croatian Diaspora stated: 
Our ancestors who helped preserve our identity through tough times, 
struggling under Hungarian and Hapsburg domination, would be proud.  
It is a dream come true to be able to openly celebrate our heroes, our 
history, and, now our future!517 
 
Croatia’s ‘Western orientation’ continued to be stressed in Tuđman’s speeches during 
his visits to Argentina, Chile and Brazil, as well as during his speech in front of the UN 
General Assembly in New York in September 1994.  It was an emotional experience: 
This is the crown of international recognition.  Croatia is now a member 
of the United Nations where it belongs.  I am proud to see our flag 
waving proudly in the heart of New York City!518 
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Zvonimir Šeparović, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, also remembers the occasion: 
I was present (…) during the raising of the Croatian flag in front of the 
UN building on East River, the same as that of China, USA, Monaco and 
San Marino.  My small drop, as Cesarić said, was present during that act 
and drowned in the big waterfall of Croatian statehood.519 
 
Regardless of their political orientation, diaspora Croats spoke of their 
Collective transformation from a historically repressed minority group 
from the former Yugoslavia to a proud new nation that successfully 
shrugged off the yoke of communist rule and asserted a new sense of 
purpose and pride.520   
 
 
Boundary and Adversarial Framing: Naming 
Enemies 
 
Too many Croatian people died and too many of our sons suffered in the dungeons of 
Venice, Vienna, Budapest and Belgrade.521 
 
Boundary setting is directly associated with ‘adversarial framing’ which defines 
movement antagonists as a source of blame thereby setting a clear line between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, and thus making injustice frames a more powerful tool for collective action.  The 
literature notes that ‘boundary’ and ‘adversarial frames’ explain the situation at hand 
from a different angle, allowing prospective supporters to attribute a source of 
culpability and thus hold particular actors responsible for their circumstances.522  
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Gamson identifies the nature of the target as a critical dimension of an injustice frame.  
Unclear and abstract causes of injustice or harm can dilute the will to act while 
attributing unjust doings to clearly identifiable persons or groups will heighten the 
emotional component of the frame.  Concreteness in the target is vital for an injustice 
frame.  Gamson contends that as long as the righteous anger is “narrowly focused on 
human actors with regard to the broader structure in which they operate” injustice 
frames will be an effective tool for collective action”.523  Tuđman’s target was clearly 
identified and placed within the broader Yugoslavian political structure. 
The Enemy: the ‘Greater–Serbian Aggressor’ 
 
At the outset of the Croatian Diaspora mobilisation, in order to sustain collective action, 
the framers successfully bridged the abstract and the concrete.  The responsibility of the 
human actors, as identified by the framers, for carrying out the physical and material 
harm in the early 1990s Croatia was publicly visible as well as heavily broadcast by the 
media, making the injustice frame more credible.  With some exceptions,524 Croats have 
always identified their common enemy as the communist Yugoslav state, and later the 
‘greater–Serbian aggressor’ who, very visibly in Tuđman’s discourse and the media, was 
attempting to annihilate the past, the present, and the future of all Croats.  In émigrés 
words: 
We were oppressed by Serbs, by the Yugoslav Army, by Yugoslav 
diplomacy, Yugoslav trade, Yugoslav commerce, the Yugoslav banking 
system, Yugoslav oragnizations, Yugoslav domination.525 
                                                 
523Gamson, W. A. (1992). Talking politics (see p. 33). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
524Winland, D. (2003). Session – Diasporic influence on host country domestic political activity: Croatians 
in Canada or Croatian-Canadians? In V. Šakić, H. Duncan, & M. Sopta (Eds.), Immigrants and 
homeland. Institut Društvenih Znanosti Ivo Pilar. 
525Radeljić, B. (2012). Europe and the collapse of Yugoslavia: The role of non-state actors and European 
diplomacy. London and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. As cited in Hockenos, P. (2003). 
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This shared conviction was communicated in Diaspora narratives highlighting a history 
of adversity and the ongoing oppression and curtailment of the Croatian people – filled 
with examples of atrocities.526 
Towards the end of 1992 articles appear in a number of weeklies, including The New 
York Times, reporting on the discovery of mass graves of Croats around Vukovar, 
Croatia, heavily criticising the US for its passive politics in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.527  The reporting continues into 1993 with distressing images of the war in 
Bosnia on the cover of Newsweek.  During these months, a number of articles appear in 
Croatian Diaspora publications such as Danica and Naša Nada, with the Associated 
Press publishing an article on 30 January 1993 in which it describes Croatian forces as 
courageous and capable.  Other publications include The Christian Science Monitor and 
The New York Times and most major Croatian and US newspapers and TV channels.  
CFU’s Fraternalist continuously reported on the situation at home, often recounting 
articles from Croatian daily newspapers, depicting Serbia as the enemy. 
Shared identity is one of the central characteristics of a diaspora.  Within a diaspora, as 
elsewhere, processes of identity formation are heavily dependent on socio–political and 
cultural contexts; they do not happen freely and independently – they always involve an 
opposite, the ‘Other’, onto which the image of the ‘Self’ is projected.528 In the case of the 
Croatian Diaspora, there were plenty of ‘Others’ to choose from – there were the co–
                                                                                                                                                
Homeland calling: Exile patriotism and the Balkan wars (p. 44). Ithaca, London: Cornell 
University Press. 
526 Fraternalist 
527 The New York Times, 29 November and 20 December accuses the West of passive politics in the 
Western Balkans. 
528 Kokot, W., Tololyan, K., & Alfonso, C. (2004). Diaspora Identity and religion: New directions in 
theory and research.New York: Routledge.  
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ethnics back home, their fellow Diasporants around the world and the ones within the 
national borders of their host country.  However, it was often the Diaspora groups from 
other ex–Yugoslavian Republics that had the most significant effect on the definition of 
their identity.  Findings from interviews conducted with members of the Croatian 
Diaspora suggest that the conflict brought differences between the Croatian and Serbian 
Diaspora groups’ identities to the fore.  Emphasis was no longer on what diaspora 
groups, Serbs and Croats in particular, had in common.  As one interviewee put it “the 
friendships between Croats and Serbs did not survive the war.”  The relationship 
between Croatian and Serbian Diaspora communities mirrored tensions and resentments 
that fuelled the war at home at the time. 
The injustice component, as one of the fundamental constituent parts of CAF, Gamson529 
argues, encompasses not the rational judgment regarding what is fair and just, but a state 
that cognitive psychologists call a ‘hot cognition’ of injustice, a highly emotional state 
of mind where a person’s responses to stimuli are heightened530.  An important 
component of an injustice frame, one that often gives direction to this ‘hot cognition’, is 
a clearly identified human actor or a group of actors responsible for some or part of the 
injustice.  When shared Croatian grievances, experienced not only in the early 1990s but 
throughout Croatian history, were directed at a specific target, i.e. the Serbs, they 
became an even more effective tool in animating the Diaspora front.  The process of 
HDZ boundary framing clearly identified the ‘Other’: “greater–Serbian aggressor” / 
creators of “Yugo–communist hell” / “the wave of greater–Serbian adversarial band of 
soldiers”/ advocators of “mythological greater–Serbian plans” / “Serbo–communist 
                                                 
529 Gamson, W. A. (1992). Talking politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
530 Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108 (3), 480–498. 
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hordes” to name only a few531, thus not only creating a clear enemy but also a potential 
ally (i.e. all those who had suffered from the repressive policies of the ‘aggressor’).532  
Moreover, the “greater–Serbian aggressor” was portrayed not only as the enemy of 
Croatia, but also as the enemy of the international community, breaking international 
agreements, and the enemy of the Catholic Church (“devil”).533  Thus, injustice, 
combined with specific boundary and adversarial frames, proved to be an even more 
effective tool in spurring Diaspora action.  534  
As a result, on 11 September 1993, Croatians in the US created the National Federation 
of Croatian Americas, an umbrella organisation created for Croatian–Americans, related 
professional associations, and the many fraternal lodges that collectively represent 
approximately 130,000 members.  Together they promote the interest of the Croatian 
people.  Its early mission was to ‘inform the White House’ of developments in Croatia.535  
The Croatian American Association, formed in 1989, has a similar mission – to lobby 
the US Congress on Croatian issues, as does the Croatian American Congress. 
Conclusion 
 
The diagnostic task of the Croatian Diaspora CAF, presented in this chapter, is an 
important first stage in broadening one’s support base and gathering resources, with an 
                                                 
531Selected Tuđman’s speeches. Retrieved from http://free-zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-milas/FT/ft-govori-
index.htm 
532Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and 
assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639 (see p. 616). 
533Franjo Tuđman’s wartime speech, delivered on 5 November 1991 in Zagreb. Retrieved from http://free-
zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-milas/FT/ft-08.htm 
534Johnston, H. & Klandermans B. (Eds.) (1995). Social movements and culture. London: University 
College London Press.  
535Prpić, J. (1997). Hrvati u Americi [Croatians in America]. Zagreb: Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika.  
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aim of securing political power.536  According to SMTs, an essential prerequisite for a 
movement is the existence of a contextually framed shared injustice that will provide a 
reason for mobilisation and trigger action.537  Accordingly, this chapter has identified 
three major elements of the diagnostic stage of the Croatian Diaspora CAF, referring to 
them as ‘problem diagnoses’ ‘injustice frames’ and ‘boundary’ or ‘adversarial frames’.   
In the Croatian case, it can be argued that the role of the problem diagnoses, as a 
justification towards challenging the status quo, was an important driver of collective 
action.  Through CAF, the political elites isolated and suitably framed a question of 
national urgency, presenting it to their audiences as fundamentally problematic, 
identifying at the same time the main causes of this ‘national distress’ as well as the 
perceived perpetrators.  This was achieved by carefully constructing meta–frames or 
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larger schemata of interpretation that generated larger narratives around collective 
Croatian perspectives and galvanised masses into challenging the status quo. 
Research conducted for this study suggests that HDZ elites, in the first stages of the 
diagnostic process, highlighted the ‘victim’ aspect of the Croatian nation, including the 
Diaspora, foregrounding certain traumatic aspects of the nation’s history – most notably 
the Bleiburg massacre and the events surrounding the Croatian Spring.  Injustice in this 
case was presented as twofold – as suffered by the Croats at home and those residing in 
the Diaspora.  Past grievances have also been blamed for crippling the Croatian nation 
by expelling a large number of Croats from their homeland, thus separating the nation 
into two parts – the disunion that the HDZ movement advocated against, arguing for the 
unification of all Croats, within or outside the borders of Croatia. 
The adopted injustice frame amplified the desire for a ‘centuries–old dream of Croatian 
statehood’, denied to the Croatian nation by many actors in the past, and most recently, 
the ‘great–Serbian aggressor’.  Building a bridge between that dream and reality is how 
HDZ constructed much of the prognostic elements of their CAF, to be discussed further 
in the next chapter.  The attribution component of diagnostic framing, i.e. identifying the 
source of blame and naming culpable agents538 has been used to construct what 
Gamson539 referred to as ‘adversarial framing’, an attribution process led by the HDZ in 
an effort to delineate the boundaries between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ , between ‘Croatness’ 
                                                 
538 Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and 
assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639. 
539 Gamson, W A. (1995). Constructing social protest. In H. Johnston, B. Klandermans (Eds.). Social 
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and ‘non–Croatness’.  This particular frame achieved a high mobilisation potential by 
clearly defining the antagonists, and drawing boundaries between ‘us’ and the ‘Other’. 
Ernest Renan, the great French philosopher and writer, has defined the nation based on 
two main pillars: “to have done great things together” and “to want to do more”.540   
Indeed, Croatian history and memory in particular were instrumental in steering the 
Croatian Diaspora, now an organic part of the nation, ‘to want to do more’.  The 
diagnostic stage of the HDZ framing process heavily depended on the processes of 
commemoration and other symbolic politics that enabled Tuđman and his allies to 
assemble a new collective memory of the Croatian people.  They actively engaged in the 
process of ‘politicization of commemoration’.541  Tuđman and his supporters provided 
the materials for memory, carefully selected and meticulously packaged.  They also 
made available an appropriately stimulating discourse that nudged individuals into 
remembering certain events and disregarding others, confirming Kratochwil’s claim that 
“it is the present problem that informs the selection of what is considered worth 
remembering”.542 
Through processes of ‘politicization of commemoration’543 and other symbolic politics, 
Tuđman constructed a new collective memory that in turn helped form a new collective 
Croatian identity.  To succeed in their design, it was necessary to consolidate group 
cohesion and strengthen Diaspora unity.  Group membership, as emphasised by 
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Halbwachs,544 allows individuals to remember particular events in a coherent and 
persistent fashion.  This also explains the enthusiasm of younger generations of Diaspora 
Croats – individuals who never experienced any of those historical events in any direct 
way, yet equally identified with them.  Ivana Djuric observes that, between the early 
1980s and mid–1990s, all the elements of ethnic identity in Anthony D. Smith’s terms545 
can be found reading the Fraternalist, the official journal of the CFU.  She points out 
that references from Croatian culture, history, myths, language, and religion served as 
powerful instruments in the process of ethnic homogenisation and were instrumental in 
the early days of Diaspora mobilisation. 546  
The next chapter will look at prognostic framing, i.e. the identification of a solution to 
the ‘national problem’, including the communication and dissemination of that solution, 
as a tool in attracting Croatian Diaspora members and spurring them into action.  It will 
analyse the rationale for the articulated solution and look at how this particular 
perspective refuted the logic of opponent solutions, also known as counter–framing.  
The chapter will also shed light on how “identification of specific problems and causes 
tends to constrain the range of possible reasonable solutions and strategies”.547  The next 
chapter will also address resonance and issue salience, important motivational elements 
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of the framing process that greatly helped reinforce both diagnostic and prognostic 
elements of framing. 
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CHAPTER V: From Victim to Victory – 
Framing Solutions and Attracting 
Support 
 
The task of the leader is to get his people from where they are to where they have not 
been.548 
 
Prognostic frames look at the problem and ask, “What can be done?  They function as 
explanatory lenses that offer solutions to collective problems identified through 
diagnostic frames.  Diagnostic frames, discussed in the previous chapter, are intricately 
linked to prognostic frames, so much so that the ‘national problem’ is framed in such a 
way that it allows for only a limited number of suitable solutions.  Only certain solutions 
become logical, depending on the national problem’s diagnostic frame.  Together with 
motivational frames, they form collective action frames.  My previous chapter listed in 
detail the main components of the Croatian Diaspora collective action frames.  The 
different components of CAF are all framed as essential steps in Croatia’s journey from 
victim to victory.  Discourse analysis conducted for the purposes of this study identified 
two central courses of action as part of prognostic framing: national reconciliation and a 
unified Croatian Diaspora, as a prerequisite for achieving Croatian sovereignty, seen as 
the realisation of its thousand years of statehood – both to be achieved under the 
leadership of HDZ.  These actions were framed as sine qua non for changing the status 
quo.  They were also the ones most likely to resonate with Tuđman’s key constituency – 
the Diaspora.  This was important, as Croats abroad were a key resource for bringing the 
proposed solution to life. 
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The Prognosis 
 
As the national problem was constructed in such a way to dramatise the most atrocious 
aspects of conditions, they captured only a small share of practical experience.  For this 
reason, the actions proposed as solutions were very specific, and, most of all, politically 
fitting for mobilising Diaspora members.  These proposed solutions, as we shall see 
further below, resonated well with the Croatian Diaspora.  However, not all proposals 
were well received and some required adjustment.  Only those solutions that resonated 
with key members of the Diaspora, i.e. the ones capable of further galvanising the meso 
and macro diasporic levels, lend themselves to detailed analysis; the less popular ones 
are likely to have been silenced in the very early stage of their development.  Therefore a 
restricted number of ‘failed frames’ can be uncovered and investigated in this study.  
This is the focus of the following section where I identify proposed solutions that 
required modification in order to satisfy the needs of the critical mass.   
Frame Modification: Seeing Eye to Eye 
 
Framing theory by itself is restricted in its ability to give explanations as to why some 
prognostic frames are more successful than others.  Some research in this area has 
already begun to emerge labelled as ‘discursive opportunity structures’, which reveal 
that certain cultural elements in the broader environment facilitate and hinder successful 
social movement framing (e.g. Koopmans & Olzak549, Koopmas & Statham550).  Beata 
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Huszka’s Secessionist Movements and Ethnic Conflict551 looks at the rhetorical frames 
adopted by particular movements and the changing dynamics of secessionist framing; 
however, much remains to be done.  
The situation in Croatia prior to the free, multi–party parliamentary elections in 1990 
was complex.  The reformed communists preferred federation at the time, others 
supported centrist political views favouring confederation, while radicals would only 
support full independence.  One of Tuđman’s early challenges was reconciling the views 
of the two conflicting wings of his party, the hard–line nationalists and the moderate 
conciliators.  Many of the hardliners were stern anti–communists who escaped Tito's 
Yugoslavia, or the descendants of Ustaše families who fled Croatia after World War II.  
Many were Croats from Herzegovina or the overseas Croatian Diaspora, or both.552   
Tuđman also encountered problems when advocating Diaspora unity with its 
embellished internal Diaspora homogeneity.  Disagreements like these were inevitable 
and, as Hockenos observes, Tuđman and the Diaspora “did not always see eye to eye on 
everything”.553   To ensure frame resonance, Tuđman included a large range of themes as 
part of his collective action frames.  As we have seen earlier, the larger the range of 
issues contained in the frame, the bigger and more diverse the groups of people that can 
be drawn into the process of mobilisation.554  The flexibility of the Croatian Diaspora 
master frame and its capacity to include a wide range of related problems proved to be a 
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554Gerhards, J., & Rucht, D. (1992). Mesomobilisation: organizing and framing in two protest campaigns 
in West Germany. In full American Journal of Sociology, 98, 555–595.  
198 
 
successful tool in attracting Diaspora members across the globe.  As the analysis of 
Tuđman’s discourse and symbolism shows, he presented himself not simply as the future 
president of Croatia, but the president of all Croats.  In addressing the idea of unity, 
Tuđman proposed to ‘decapitate’ the system of retribution.  This was made personal, 
drawing on events from his own life that others identified with.  His words were 
published in June 1990 in The New York Times: 
And I know well the temptation of retribution.  Three years ago, when I 
was 65 years old and after the Communists had sent me to prison twice, I 
learned the names of the Communist soldiers who shot and killed my 
father and stepmother in cold blood.  These men live today in the 
Republic of Croatia.  For more than four decades, I believed the lie that 
my parents had been killed by Nazi collaborators.  Similar ghastly stories 
are common in Croatia.  
 
The Croatian Democratic Union and I were elected to end such tyranny.  
And, despite 45 years of brutal Communist rule, and despite the 
association of many people with these oppressors, I vow to allow no 
reprisals in a newly democratic Croatia.  I will work to build a society 
which is a vibrant marketplace of ideas and initiative, where disagreement 
and debate are signs of strength.  
 
The Communist soldiers who murdered my parents will be judged by 
God alone.  I no longer yearn for revenge; the murderous, inhumane 
system that killed my parents and tens of thousands like them has been 
judged for its crimes – in free and fair elections –  by the Croatian people.  
That system has been decapitated.555 
 
Tuđman’s message was clear: we must leave the past and our disagreements behind and 
look towards the future. There was a great deal of appetite within the Diaspora to change 
the status quo, but they disagreed on the path forward.  
In my analysis of less successful prognostic frames that deviated from the general 
framing trend and the main ‘framing recipe’, I will focus on one of Tuđman’s core ideas 
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– Croatian sovereignty.  As we know, this idea was central to Tuđman’s CAF and served 
as a magnet for attracting Diaspora support.  The core of Tuđman’s national programme 
in late 1980s was the goal of establishing the Croatian nation–state, which meant that all 
past ideological clashes should be reconciled and, as quoted above, the system of 
retribution ‘decapitated’.  What it really meant in practice was that achieving that goal 
would require a strong support from the Croatian Diaspora.  The politically ‘awake’ 
hard–line nationalists who fled Tito’s retribution after 1945, including those that left in 
the 1970s, were seen as ideal allies.  During Tito’s purges of Croatian nationalists in the 
1970s Croatian Spring, some 1,600 Croatian communists were subjected to ‘political 
measures’556 but much of that nationalism continued in the Diaspora among groups who 
left their homeland as a result of their dislike or fear of the Titoist regime.  As we shall 
see later in more detail, some of Tuđman’s early encounters with the Diaspora included 
a number of these enthusiasts.  But they did not favour federation; they were ready for 
the possibility of returning to an independent Croatia557 and harboured strong anti–
communist views.  
It is a widespread view that Tuđman's final goal was an independent Croatia, but this 
was initially an ambitions target given the realities of internal and foreign policy.  Until 
the spring of 1991, he was prepared to agree to a compromise solution of a 
confederation or alliance of sovereign states within Yugoslavia.  
There are those, however, even in America, who fear any measure of 
Croatian democracy.  This surge of national identity and authority will, 
some say, lead to the breakup of Yugoslavia, to civil war, or both.  These 
fears are misplaced.  Freedom and self–determination do not threaten 
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stability; repression and tyranny do.  To reject Croatia's transition to a 
democracy on the pretext of preserving regional stability only delays the 
inevitable – and heightens the risk of regional chaos and violence at some 
date in the future.  The democratization of Croatia will lead neither to the 
breakup of Yugoslavia nor to civil war.  These threats represent a last 
desperate ploy by the central Communist government in Belgrade to win 
Western neutrality on the issue of Croatian democratization.558  
 
But with those proposals rejected by the Serbian leadership and with armed provocations 
intensifying, the idea of a full Croatian independence replaced federalism.559  This 
resulted in a referendum on 19 May 1991.   
However, getting there followed a squiggly line.  New ideas easily cause friction and not 
all frames have resonance.  Tuđman’s success as a frame creator is evident from his 
ability to anticipate difficulties that could potentially be associated with initiating 
controversial topics.  Tuđman tested some of his ideas during his trips to Canada in 
1987, aiming to establish existing views, identify potential  'additions' and 
'modifications' to his initial concepts and obtain other useful intelligence.  As a former 
researcher, Tuđman was no doubt familiar with the concept of a focus group as a form of 
qualitative research.  He used it to examine perceptions, opinions, beliefs, and attitudes 
of émigrés towards new ideas.  These tests, not openly identified as such, can be seen as 
a form of insurance, i.e., as a means of reducing the risks of frames later not resonating 
with potential supporters.560 
Tuđman and the Diaspora initially disagreed on the issue of Croatian independence.  In 
1987, during Tuđman’s first trip to Canada, their opinions clashed.  Tuđman was not 
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convinced of an imminent dissolution of Yugoslavia.  The political anti–communist 
émigrés, on the other hand, thought it inevitable.  Tuđman’s initial proposal was to argue 
for an improved position of Croatia within a more loosely structured Yugoslavia, i.e. a 
further gradual devolution of centralised powers.  He did not advocate for a full 
independence but a confederation with growing decentralisation and democratisation.  
His plan envisaged Yugoslavia as a loose confederation of republics, with the possibility 
of independence somewhere in the more distant future.  “We kept saying we didn’t have 
time for this”, explained Marin Sopta, a former émigré, “that time was running out.  We 
wanted full independence”.561   
Bosnian Croats, those from Herzegovina in particular, including Herzegovinians living 
in the Diaspora, particularly opposed confederation.  In their view, this arrangement 
would only work if existing borders were modified as they could not imagine a proper 
border between them and the state of Croatia.  To remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
where Croats were the smallest minority, was inconceivable.  This also explains why 
many émigrés, many of whom were citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time, very 
much welcomed the gift of Croatian citizenship. 
Tuđman’s views on Bosnia and Herzegovina were controversial and continue to be 
debated.  His claims on Bosnian territories, referring to the “unnatural shape of Croatia”, 
comparing it to “an apple with a bite taken out if it”,562 appealed to Diaspora Croats from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  His views regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina are also said to 
                                                 
561 Words by Marin Sopta, as cited in Hockenos, P. (2003). Homeland calling: Exile patriotism and the 
Balkan wars (p. 44). Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 
562 Macdonald, D. B. (2001).  Balkan holocausts? Comparing Genocide myths and historical revisionism 
in Serbian and Croatian nationalist writing; 1986-1999 (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from 
http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1652/1/U162955.pdf 
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have been influenced by the model of Croatian Banovina of 1939 as a way of 
normalising Serbo–Croatian relations.  The Banovina had effectively divided Bosnia and 
Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia.  A similar division was apparently discussed 
between Tuđman and Milošević during a meeting in Karađorđevo in March 1991, 
allegedly leading Tuđman to believe that he had avoided war by satisfying Serbian 
demands and realising a Croatian state with defensible borders.563  Some of Tuđman’s 
early supports, including Marin Sopta, Gojko Šušak and Vinko Grubišić were Croats 
from Bosnia and were convinced that the Bosnian situation could not be solved 
peacefully and were prepared to fight.564 
While Tuđman initially, including during his first visit to North America, “refrained 
from explicitly demanding Croatian independence”565, he openly “made irredentist 
claims on behalf of the as yet nonexistent state”566.  He also used discourse that did not 
allow ethnically inclusive identities, which also proved to have a stronger mobilising 
effect.567  When representatives from the Diaspora “called on all sons of the Croatian 
home guard, Croatian Ustaše and Croatian partisans to fight for the interests of the 
Croatia state” at the HDZ Assembly, no objections were reported.  Tuđman also never 
                                                 
563 Sadkovich, J. J. (2011). Father of his country? Franjo Tudjman and the creation of contemporary 
Croatia. Retrieved from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/304-father-his-country-franjo-
tudjman-and-the-creation-contemporary-croatia#sthash.6g5YZbcv.wOzWeH2R.dpuf 
564 Hockenos, P. (2003). Homeland calling: Exile patriotism and the Balkan wars. Ithaca, London: Cornell 
University Press.  
565 Huszka, B. (2013). Secessionist movements and ethnic conflict: Debate-framing and rhetoric in 
independence campaigns (p. 83). New York: Routledge.  
566 Huszka, B. (2013). Secessionist movements and ethnic conflict: Debate-framing and rhetoric in 
independence campaigns (p. 85). New York: Routledge.  
567 Huszka, B. (2013). Secessionist movements and ethnic conflict: Debate-framing and rhetoric in 
independence campaigns (p. 83). New York: Routledge.  
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discouraged pro– Ustaše views coming from the Diaspora568.  Similar to this meeting, 
Tuđman’s meetings with the Diaspora in the late 1980s gave rise to many conspiracy 
theories.  According to these, the Bosnian Croats had somehow used their meetings with 
Tuđman to advance their influence inside the HDZ, and prioritize and progress their 
agenda.569  With their adamant visions and imposing plans, the North America’s radical 
émigrés “whispered” independence into Tuđman’s ear.570 
In Tuđman’s mind the program that would later be known as Croatian 
National Policy – the forging of an ethnic Greater Croatia – was still an 
amorphous hodgepodge of loose ideas and general ill–defined goals.  Its 
essential outline, though, would become discernible over the course of his 
visits to North America in the late 1980s 571 
 
Although secession was initially seen as a last resort, at least in public discourse, Huszka 
argues that the HDZ rhetoric, present throughout 1990, was an avenue that led to it.  The 
aggressive, nationalist nature of their discourse contributed to the outbreak of ethnic 
tensions and violence as they spread fears of Serbian dominance within Croatia, 
purposefully shifting public focus towards existential threats based on fears from the 
local Serb population and vice versa.572  According to Huszka, when “fear is widespread, 
alternative frames for ethnically inclusive identities and moderation, such as the 
democracy frame or the prosperity frame, are unlikely to win mass support”.573  These 
                                                 
568 Huszka, B. (2013). Secessionist movements and ethnic conflict: Debate-framing and rhetoric in 
independence campaigns (p. 86). New York: Routledge.  
569 Sadkovich, J. J. (2010).Tuđman – Prva politička biografija [First political biography] (p. 247). 
Zagreb: Večernji list. 
570 Hockenos, P. (2003). Homeland calling: Exile patriotism and the Balkan wars (p. 42). Ithaca, London: 
Cornell University Press.  
571 Hockenos, P. (2003). Homeland calling: Exile patriotism and the Balkan wars (p. 42) Ithaca, London: 
Cornell University Press.  
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fears were building on the strong and widespread belief of the late 1980s Croatia that 
Serbs were joining efforts to create a ‘Greater Serbia’, which helped solidify HDZ’s 
‘foreign domination’ frame.  In late 1990 this frame eventually took over all other 
frames, including those that focused on democracy, free elections and prosperity, and led 
itself away from federation and towards independence, which resonated the most 
strongly.  
Frame transformation, or in this case ‘adjustment’, becomes needed when existing 
frames do not resonate with core supporters (i.e. right–wing Croatian émigrés) or are 
overshadowed by other, more powerful, frames that carry more resonance with the 
general public, including the Diaspora.  Regrettably, this alignment approach has not 
received much attention in movement studies and much more research remains to be 
done. 
Resonance & Issue Salience: “We have our 
Croatia!”574 
 
The proposed solution was tremendously ambitious.  To measure the potential of 
Diaspora mobilisation one must take into account both the interest of the target 
audience, which defines whether a certain collective good is worth acquiring, and the 
role of mobilising capacity, which determines whether the group is capable of achieving 
the collective good.  Framing plays a crucial role here in that it can both camouflage the 
collective good offered and artificially generate interest in acquiring it.  In the Croatian 
case the means for this were found in accentuating common grievances that highlighted 
                                                 
574 “Imamo Hrvatsku!”, often used as a HDZ slogan, is Tuđman’s most famous statement, uttered in the 
main square of Zagreb in front of thousands of supporters, right after the international recognition of 
Croatian independence in January 1992.  
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the need to change the status quo, and emphasised that the proposed solution was a 
thousand–year–long aspiration, which, if achieved, would ease past grievances and end 
present suffering.  For this, it was emphasised, a ‘one team’ was needed; the nation 
needed to join forces with its Diaspora, a process which Tuđman referred to as “spiritual 
revival”, a “victory of the democratic spirit and unity between all Croatian citizens”.  575 
The democratic movements within the period of the implementation of 
the first free elections have led to a kind of spiritual revival of the 
Croatian national pride.  The declaration by the enormous majority of 
Croatian people of choosing the HDZ program goals had, in reality, 
marked the ending of that “civil war” which had lasted in Croatia since 
the time of World War II.  The victory of the democratic spirit and unity 
between all Croatian citizens, regardless of their past and their views, has 
created the preconditions for the removal of all fatal divisions.  Finally, 
divisions of people into first – and second – grade citizens, into 
conquerors and conquered, into suitable and unsuitable, into trustworthy 
and enemy, must disappear.  We aspire to create a society in which 
human and work abilities, citizenship and moral virtues, and not origin 
and attitudinal orientation, will determine the position and value 
judgments about an individual in society.  Besides that, we want to build 
the genuine democracy in which the rule of the majority will mean the 
protection of the minority.576 
 
The motto of the Fraternalist, “All for One…One for All”, mirrors those claims of 
unity.  Special attention in his speech was given to the Croatian Diaspora: 
Return and inclusion of emigrants.  The establishment of spiritual unity 
between domiciled and emigrated Croatia is undoubtedly one of HDZ’s 
successes, which already have significantly contributed to the carving out 
of democratic transformation.  The new Croatian Government should 
undertake purposeful steps on all levels for the enablement of the quickest 
possible return of as many Croatians as possible from the world to the 
homeland (…) Investments by Croatian émigrés in all areas of economic 
life should be motivated through special privileges.  Our distinctive 
attention must be focused on that, because they have enormous work 
                                                 
575Vukić, I. (2015, December 9). Remembering Franjo Tuđman. Retrieved from 
http://inavukic.com/2015/12/09/croatia-remembering-franjo-tudjman/ 
576Tuđman, F. (1990, May 30). Inaugural assembly of the Croatian Parliament speech, Zagreb. Also 
broadcast to the Diaspora on Voice of Croatia. Retrieved from 
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experiences, technological and financial potential at their disposal with 
which they can significantly contribute to a faster economic and 
democratic transformation of their homeland.577 
 
A great deal also depends on how perceived grievances are presented to the people in an 
effort to stimulate a particular response of ‘unity’.  For them to have such an effect, 
shared grievances need to be framed in broader economic, socio–political, and historical 
contexts.578  Adverse events, regardless of their scale and consequence, cannot on their 
own trigger social mobilisation.  When properly contextualised, perceived adversity and 
injustice can trigger and perpetuate an array of collective emotions and can provide 
motivation, encouragement and justification for action.  The CAF put together by 
Tuđman and his followers succeeded in charging the frames with symbolic power to turn 
the collective feelings of injustice into meaningful reasons to take action.  A great 
number of highly tendentious constructions were presented as undisputed truth – a result 
of meticulous selecting, filtering and then carefully packaging and articulating these in 
political speeches, public statements and interviews.  Put together from a novel 
perspective, these ideas were tied together to echo around the world.  
HDZ framing strategy was heavily dependent on making the frame culturally resonant, 
ensuring that the concepts covered by the frame resonated with the Diaspora’s cultural 
history and its ‘myths’.579  Tuđman and his helpers managed to achieve a high degree of 
narrative accuracy, or what Fisher refers to as “narrative fidelity”.580  Their framing 
                                                 
577 ibid 
578 Tarrow, S. (1992). Mentalities, political cultures, and collective action frames: Constructing meaning 
through action. In A. D. Morris & C. M. Mueller (Eds.). Frontiers in social movement theory (pp. 
174-202, see p. 177). New Haven, CT and London, UK: Yale University Press.   
579 Campbell, J. (1988). The power of myth. New York: Doubleday. 
580 Fisher, W. R. (1984). Narration as a human communication paradigm: The case of public moral 
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discourse was consistent with a pre–existing framework of popular beliefs concerning a 
Croatian ethnicity such as a collective name, common ancestry, a shared history, distinct 
culture, association with a particular territory, etc.  HDZ’s nationalist framing strategy, 
which reshaped and often oversimplified complex values and histories as well as 
political aims and objectives, appealed to a wide audience within the Diaspora.  Existing 
Croatian symbols and their meanings were reshaped and readapted581 582 by the framers to 
serve their goals.  HDZ’s framing strategy derived its mobilisation power from its 
carefully constructed nationalist discourse – the mobilisation kit it used.  Its discourse 
successfully combined factual, moral and aesthetic framing devices that pursued tasks 
fundamental for the success of political mobilisation, i.e. diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational interpretational frameworks.  
Tuđman’s nationalism aimed at resuscitating old symbols for the new Croatian state and 
insisted on using some of the most powerful, yet potentially divisive symbols – the 
Ustaše and the Partisans.  He “sought to denature and appropriate both by condemning 
the crimes of the Ustaše and stressing the Croatian nature of the Partisans: presenting 
both as epiphenomena of a particular era in European history, and inviting the 
descendants of both to build a common Croatian state.” 583  It was seen as insensitive by 
many 584 but, ultimately, the fear of Greater Serbia, built on past and present grievances, 
was a powerful unifying force.  A generalised fear was a powerful tool that kept people 
                                                 
581 Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in movement (2nd ed.) (p. 109). New York: Cambridge University Press.  
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together, albeit temporarily.  We see evidence of Theodor Herzl’s model of a ‘Diaspora 
in danger’, where external existential threats to the nation bring disparate Diaspora 
members into ‘one people’.  A nation– state that encompassed all Croats was “the only 
adequate solution to the threat of victimization and persecution, or even worse – 
genocide.”585 Interviews conducted with members of the Croatian Diaspora, both Ustaše 
and partisan sympathisers, indicate that the fear of Serbian domination temporarily 
overruled any past disagreements.  According to one member of the Diaspora,  
[We] didn’t have time to think about the past when the future of our 
nation was at stake.  The future of our country was more important than 
or past.586 
 
This is evident from the wide support base that Tuđman enjoyed.  He had supporters 
within a number of Croatian Diaspora organisations, including the Croatian Fraternal 
Union, the Croatian Catholic Union (CCU) and the newly formed Croatian American 
Association (CAA), which jointly organised rallies protesting against “imperial 
aggression”,587 demanding immediate support for Croatia, and urging the West to 
recognise Croatian independence. 
The HDZ Diaspora frame resonated among the Diaspora because of two of its 
properties: its validity and its relevance.588  The claims presented by the HDZ were 
culturally resonant to their historical environment;589 they demonstrated a high degree of 
                                                 
585Macdonald, D. B. (2003, as cited in Sachar, 1977, p. 40). 
586Member of the Croatian Diaspora in North America interviewed for the purposes of this study. 
587Prpić, J. (1997). Hrvati u Americi [Croatians in America] (p. 368). Zagreb: Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika.  
588Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and 
assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639. 
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credibility as well as precise relevance to potential followers’ lives.  The validity of the 
Diaspora frame had much to do with the credibility of its designer Franjo Tuđman.  His 
legitimacy skyrocketed in 1990 when he became the first president of the country 
following his party’s triumph in the first post–communist free multi–party elections 
where they acquired around 60 per cent of the seats in the Croatian Parliament.  His 
credibility as a ‘defender of everything Croatian’ stems from the events of the Croatian 
Spring in the 1970s and 1981 when he served two prison sentences for clashing with 
central dogmas of Yugoslav Communist elite.  His ultra–nationalist HDZ was vocal in 
advocating Croatian sovereignty – a brand of nationalism that particularly appealed to 
his right–wing supporters overseas within the Croatian Diaspora.  A Croatian 
referendum on independence conducted in 1991 was another source of Tuđman’s 
credibility.  Tuđman’s “credentialing process” 590 also relied on dozens of visits to the 
Diaspora, by Tuđman himself or other HDZ representatives, speaking in front of 
Diaspora representatives and community members, whereby they would bring to light 
HDZ principles as well as stress the credentials of their party.  
An equally important fact is that both Diaspora members and their co–ethnics at home 
were able to identify with ideas spread by the HDZ.  The disastrous consequences of the 
‘Homeland War’, used as a reoccurring theme in political speeches, public statements 
and addresses throughout the media, coupled with a direct reference to those responsible 
for it, had a great power of bringing ‘us’ against ‘them’.  The proposed solution was 
clear.  It involved, as evident from Tuđman’s speeches from the early 1990s, erecting a 
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wall between ‘we’, the victims, and ‘them’, ‘the aggressors’.  These distinctions are first 
visible on a linguistic level through discursive devices that express and publicise the 
foundations of Tuđman’s Diaspora mobilisation process with an aim to progressively 
install them at a cognitive level.  Constant references to the destruction of Croatian 
cities, Croatian lives and liberties served as a great motivator for those residing far away 
from the epicentre.  Through their dialogue with the Diaspora representatives directly or 
through speeches, the framers made sure that the effects of the war were felt far beyond 
Croatia’s borders. 
In a public address in 1991 given at the outset of the conflict, a “dramatic and defining 
moment”, Tuđman lists the names of 14 Croatian cities and assures that the names of 
their victims “will be forever carved in our Croatian hearts, with pride and with 
gratitude”.  He continues to stress that the “fight for the creation and the defence of free 
Croatia was and remains a joint fight of homeland Croats and ‘Croatia in exile’”.591  The 
‘Homeland War’, a defining moment in the lives of the majority of Croatian Diaspora 
members interviewed for the purposes of this study, remained one of the constitutive 
elements of the Diaspora CAF.  The success of the frame was highly dependent on this 
particular element as the issue was an everyday part of the private lives and personal 
experiences of the ‘targets’ themselves.  
Further related to issue salience, the HDZ discourse successfully tapped into the 
personal and collective goals of multiple generations of the Croatian Diaspora.  Goals 
were not simply identified and publicised but they were made personal.  An important 
element in the motivating process was the apparent emphasis on mutual decision–
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making.  The Diaspora, as a part of the Croatian nation, was made aware, on numerous 
occasions, in public addresses and speeches, that it had the right to be directly involved 
in the decision–making process.  The very first electoral slogan of the HDZ at the 
elections in 1990 was “Let us decide on the fate of our Croatia on our own”.  In one of 
his later speeches Tuđman affirms that “those days when Croatian destiny was decided 
in Vienna, Budapest or Belgrade are long gone”; “we have decided here on our destiny 
and this is where we will be deciding on it from now on.”592  A similar statement was 
made in his article published by The New York Times in June 1990. 
Last month the Croatian people, sick and tired of Communist oppression, 
joined the peoples of Eastern Europe in looking away from Communism 
and toward a democratic future.593 
 
Mutual ‘decision making’ was further reinforced by Tuđman’s unremitting stress on 
“Imamo Hrvatsku” (“We have Croatia”), repeated in many post–independence speeches.  
The well–known statement originally reads:  
We have our Croatia, it is ours and it will be the way we ourselves want it 
to be and we will not let anyone from the outside to dictate what kind of 
Croatia it should be. 594  
 
Being part of the decision making process promoted the sense of ownership and 
accountability, which in turn further contributed to the salience of Diaspora CAF. 
Finally, the sovereignty focused prognostic frame also drew its resonance from diaspora 
Croatians’ conditions in North America, particularly the US, where they were inspired 
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593Tuđman, F. (1990, June 30). All we Croatians want is democracy. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
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by the great American narrative of democracy and freedom.  In his letter to President 
Tuđman, CFU National President Bernard M Luketich pledged its support to Croatia’s 
new democratic government.595  Further, the CFU “never abandoned its two most deeply 
rooted principles; namely, its commitment to the democratic process and its defence of 
the concept of Croatian identity (…) even the most radical official of the CFU would 
never have tampered with the Croatian name or the process by which the officials of the 
organization were elected.”596 The democracy they enjoyed in their host country was 
something they also wished to see at home.  Tuđman’s speech published on 30 June 
1990 in The New York Times597 capitalised on this sentiment, and functioned as a 
powerful source of resonance: 
We have set the goal of a Croatian society that, like the United States, is 
based on political and economic freedom, respect for human rights, the 
protection of individual liberties, an independent judiciary and a 
government that is truly ''of the people, by the people, and for the people.'' 
 
Similarly, while addressing the Croatian nation at the start of Serbian attack on Croatia, 
on 16 October 1991,598 Tuđman refers to democracy as a ‘right’, one that has been 
enjoyed by other free nations.  
They could not, nor will they ever be able to kill our passion and our need 
to live in human dignity, in peace with ourselves and with the free nations 
of Europe.  We have carved out that right at our first democratic 
elections.  For this right and for our sacred land we are even ready to die.  
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(p 56). In M. Sopta and G. Scardatello (Eds.), Unknown journey: A history of Croatians in 
Canada (p. 2).  Downsview: University of Toronto Press Inc. Retrieved from 
http://multiculturalcanada.ca/node/280136 
597 Tuđman, F. (1990, June 30). All we Croatians want is democracy. The New York Times. Retrieved 
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His words mirrored the goals of many diaspora Croats: 
This is what all Croatians worldwide wished and hoped for – a 
democratic, sovereign Croatian nation, free of the bloody Communist 
regime599 
 
Remembering HDZ’s First General Assembly held on 24– 25 February 1990, touched 
on in my last chapter, one Diaspora Croat recalls: 
 
How our hearts swelled with pride and love for Croatia.  The joy of a new 
future bright with hope and vigour.  You could ‘touch’ the overwhelming 
feelings that we finally could be free and control our united destiny.  
What an amazing time.  Let’s recapture that spirit, that optimism, that 
selflessness and determination to overcome and prosper.  Serbs tried to 
take this away from us and nearly succeeded.  While lot of energy, 
treasure and lives were spent on defending ourselves from Serbian 
aggression, we conquered the impossible odds against us.  We can surely 
conquer anything before us again, and again, and again forever.  We need 
to start to act like the victors that we are, we need to again take the moral 
high ground and proclaim we are Croatians proud and free, we keep only 
what is ours and will defend ours to the end.  We have a righteous place 
among nations and a prosperous future ahead of us.  Za Dom Spremni!600 
 
HDZ’s strategy was aimed at attracting a wide audience – the Diaspora as a whole, both 
supporters and outsiders.  According to Walsh et al.,601 this type of framing strategy can 
be of crucial importance in determining the outcome of grass–roots movements  –  more 
important than certain fixed variables such as demographic characteristics, i.e. the size 
and geographic concentration of the Diaspora population as well as the socio–economic 
status of migrants, their degree of organisation and level of discontent.  At the outset, the 
main challenge the HDZ faced was to construct their discourse so that their movement 
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gains sufficient critical mass.602  Proposed solutions were fine–tuned and then framed in 
a way that would attract as many potential allies as possible, i.e. they were specific 
enough for the members of the movement to identify with, yet suitably flexible and 
compatible with the views of those still outside the critical mass.  
Diaspora Mobilising Structures 
 
Diasporas are webs, and webs consist not only of fibres or ropes, but also of nodes that 
link them together603  
 
As crucial as diagnostic, prognostic and motivation frames are for driving Diaspora 
political mobilisation, they do not on their own lead to association or organisation;604 
they provide the framework that enables the development of mobilising structures.  A 
comprehensive analysis of Diaspora mobilisation will therefore have to take into account 
other explanatory factors.  Additional factors vital for the scope and scale of a social 
movement, according to SMTs, are the existence of mobilising structures, which include 
resources and structures, both formal and informal, that facilitate collective action.  
Mobilising structures are also defined as tools employed to collect and transfer 
information and transform individual claims into group demands605 606.  Equally 
important is the support – political, financial or other – from powerful ‘friends and 
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allies’, including the emergence of a political opportunity.  However, as we have seen on 
previous pages, it can be argued that CAF can be instrumental in influencing the opening 
of political opportunity in many ways.  The awareness of the fact that, through collective 
efforts and joint decision–making, change of current circumstances is indeed possible is 
what Gamson refers to as the agency component.  An important element of CAF is the 
conviction that through mutual efforts it is possible to alter the status quo.  Identifying 
movement participants as potential agents in a position to influence their own future 
functions as a self–fuelling mechanism within the collective action process.  
“Perceptions are not only necessary for potential protesters to recognize opportunities, 
but in many cases perceptions can create opportunities.”607 
Therefore, CAF can “suggest not merely that something can be done but that ‘we’ can 
do something”608.  This leads us to Gamson’s identity component, which is linked to 
identifying the prospective movement participants capable of delivering that change.  As 
a group they represent the collective ‘we’609.  The members of this group often see 
themselves as different in terms of their values and interests from ‘the Others’ who are, 
often in the most unambiguous terms, marked as the villains.  As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, without a clearly defined enemy, the goals and objectives of collective 
actions are likely to remain just that – an unattainable aim.  Hence, the presence of a 
human element is vital in the process of ‘enemy–making’.  
                                                 
607 Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, eds., Rethinking Social Movements — Structure, Meaning and 
Emotion, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004, p. 28. (emphasis in the 
original). 
608 Gamson, W A. (1995). Constructing social protest. In H. Johnston, B. Klandermans (Eds.). Social 
Movements and Culture: Social Movements, Protest, and Contention (pp. 85-106, see p.90). 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
609 Gamson, William. 1988. Political Discourse and Collective Action. International Social Movement 
Research 1, 219-244. 
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This chapter will continue the analysis of mobilising structures through the lens of 
leadership, with an aim to shed light on how Tuđman spread his influence and reached 
masses.  In emphasising the concept of leadership and its effects on movement 
dynamics, I will look at the key processes in movement development, what Nepstad and 
Bob define as ‘mobilisation of aggrieved parties’ and ‘activation of third party 
supporters’.  The accent remains on leadership, as it has been defined as an understudied 
topic among collective action frames researchers.  Building on Bourdieu, Putnam, and 
the existing literature on social movement leadership, Nepstad and Bob610 argue that 
these movements’ leaders possess ‘leadership capital’ consisting of cultural, social and 
symbolic components.  I have touched on cultural and symbolic components in the 
previous chapter, linking them to framing strategies.  The focus here is on social capital, 
a key contributor to Tuđman’s success as a compelling and capable organiser.  
Weaving the Web of Support 
 
Tuđman was a politically resourceful leader who inspired and moved the masses.  One 
of his key messages, encompassed in CAF, was proposing national reconciliation in 
order to increase pan–Croatian solidarity. Tuđman emphasised that ‘we are all one 
nation’, with a goal to appeal to all Croats, at home and abroad.  He later portrayed his 
party as a national movement, rather than a regular political party.611 To bring its 
ambitions policies to life, HDZ indeed needed to become a movement.  It needed to 
inspire masses to rally behind it and push it forward.  Framing, as we have seen, 
                                                 
610 Nepstad, S. E. & Bob, C. (2006). When do leaders matter? Hypotheses on leadership dynamics in 
social movements. Mobilization, an International Journal, 11(1), 21-42. 
611 Soberg, M. (2007). Croatia since 1989. The HDZ and the politics of transition. In S. P. Ramet & D. 
Matic (Eds.), Democratic transition in Croatia (pp. 31–62). College Station, Texas: Texas A&M 
University Press. 
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provided purpose and resonance.  Framing, however, is a dynamic process, influenced 
by elements of the social–cultural context in which it is embedded612 and it requires 
framers who are well versed in the social–cultural circumstances.  Tuđman’s 
transcultural skills played an important role in this process.  His experience of the 
‘Diaspora world’ is not one of spatial proximity, but a socio–political one.  As we have 
learned from previous chapters, Tuđman was well suited to understand some of the 
struggles Croatian political émigrés faced when leaving their home country.  His 
transcultural and transborder skills enabled him to negotiate meanings and operate 
effectively in multiple settings and get his message through to large and varied audience.  
This was an important skill to master as “collective action frames are not merely 
aggregations of individual attitudes and perceptions but also the outcome of negotiating 
shared meaning”.613 
It needs to be emphasised that Diaspora mobilisation developed in phases where initially 
Tuđman played a key role as a frame maker, but in order to successfully advance his 
strategies, he had to entice a cadre of capable organisers who could further his cause by 
networking with Croatian institutions, liaising with the media, raising funds for the 
‘Croatian cause’ and gathering a varied following of people.  Tuđman began this process 
well before he came into the spotlight.  His transcultural skills were most effective when 
they worked in two directions, not only informing supporters of local grievances but also 
enlightening them about outside backers.  This had the effect of multiplying the 
                                                 
612 Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and 
assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639. 
613Gamson, W. A. (1992). Talking Politics (p. 111). New York: Cambridge University Press.  
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influence of third party support and it also reinforced the commitment of constituents 
who might otherwise had been unaware of existing supporters and allies.614 
Social Capital  
 
Activation of third party resources and support was crucial for Croatian Diaspora 
mobilisation, with Tuđman’s social capital playing a key role in this process.  Social 
capital lends itself to multiple definitions, interpretations and uses.  Social capital, as 
defined by Putnam, includes “social network (…) norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them”.615  Nan Lin's concept of social capital defined as 
access to resources through network ties is a more individualistic approach and also 
refers to “investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace.”616  In 
The Forms of Capital, Pierre Bourdieu defines social capital as “the aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of 
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” 617.  
His usage of the concept is instrumental, focusing on the deliberate construction of 
sociability and the rewards that social capital brings to individuals.”618 Contrary to 
Putnam's positive view of social capital, Bourdieu’s focus is on how social capital can 
lead to reproduction of inequality where the wealthy and powerful use their ‘old boys’ 
network’ to advance their own interests, and the interests of those closest to them.  This 
                                                 
614Nepstad, S. E. & Bob, C. (2006). When do leaders matter? Hypotheses on leadership dynamics in social 
movements. Mobilization 11(1), 21-42. 
615 Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community (p. 19). NY: 
Simon and Schuster.  
616 Lin, N. (2001). Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action (p. 19). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
617 Bourdieu, P. (1986) The forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.) Handbook of theory and research 
for the sociology of education (pp. 241–258). New York: Greenwood Press.  
618 ibid 
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definition of social capital becomes relevant in our analysis of Croatian Diaspora 
members that formed Tuđman’s inner circle and reaped many benefits in later years.  As 
we have seen in previous chapter, a great number of Diaspora members were 
incentivised by the gift of citizenship.  Later, the Diaspora was rewarded by receiving an 
increased number of seats in the Croatian Parliament, a practice benefiting not only the 
Diaspora but also the HDZ, as Diaspora only ever voted for one political party.  The 
Diaspora was given an unprecedented representation in the Croatian Parliament, with as 
many as 12 parliamentary seats out of 127, more than what was allocated to Croatia’s 
own ethnic minorities.  
This electoral framework was changed prior to the 2000 elections introducing a non–
fixed quota based on voter turnout, which fixed the number of Diaspora representatives 
in the Sabor.  The number has since gradually been reduced to three, but the voice of the 
Croatian Diaspora, albeit controversial, remains influential.619  Prominent members of 
the Croatian Diaspora became leading members of Tuđman’s government and the ones 
who had helped finance his 1990 electoral victory also benefited from the process of 
privatisation from 1993 onwards.  It has been claimed that this privatisation created new 
elites620 in the 1990s, which included affluent members of the Diaspora. 
                                                 
619 Law on the Election of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament (Article 44) (1999). (Official 
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620 Soberg, M. (2007). Croatia since 1989. The HDZ and the politics of transition. In S. P. Ramet & D. 
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Third Party Support  
 
In his analysis of leadership support, Eatwell identifies a major problem with classic 
theoretical formulations of the charisma thesis: they feature a binary approach focusing 
only on macro (societal) and micro (individual) factors in model building.621  Eatwell 
identifies the group (meso) level as crucial for understanding leadership support.  The 
growth of Tuđman’s support network, which was first present at micro and gradually 
spread to meso and macro levels, supports Eatwell’s claim.  Tuđman’s charisma first 
influenced a small émigré minority, the core, who then recruited a wider community of 
supporters.  
Mobilising third party resources played an important role in Croatian Diaspora 
mobilisation.  The literature distinguishes between ‘weak (more distant) ties’ and ‘strong 
ties’ that are based on face–to–face interactions, personal and social relations, common 
meeting places and points of reference that encourage group mobilisation.  Strong ties 
enable the leader to identify and employ sub–leaders who have strong ties to lower 
levels of constituencies.622  Tuđman’s key natural allies were institutions that had been 
marginalised under the communist rule during Yugoslavia.  His obvious options were 
the Croatian political Diaspora and the Croatian Catholic Church who not only equipped 
him with human resources that helped spread his message but also provided a source of 
legitimacy for him and his cause. Once Tuđman accessed strong supporters with ties to 
                                                 
621 Eatwell, R. (2006). Charisma and fascism in interwar Europe. The concept and theory of charismatic 
leadership [Special issue]. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 7(2), 141–156.  
622 Nepstad, S. E. & Bob, C. (2006). When do leaders matter? Hypotheses on leadership dynamics in 
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221 
 
lower, more distant levels of constituencies, he was used by them as a “lightning rod”623 
for further external assistance.  Strong ties helped create and strengthen connections with 
distant and disconnected audiences – the weak ties –  facilitating the flow of Tuđman’s 
ideas and spreading some of Tuđman’s key diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational 
frames. Weak ties represent members of the Croatian Diaspora outside of this circle of 
strong natural allies, who, as we shall see, bonded through collective action towards a 
common goal.  Through weak ties, Tuđman’s diagnostic, prognostic and motivational 
framing transformed elusively felt discontent into strong grievances, motivating 
individuals to join the collective effort. But let us first turn to discussing Tuđman’s 
strong ties. 
Diaspora Strong Ties 
 
Tuđman recognised the potential in the large Croatian émigré community, particularly in 
North America, where he travelled extensively before establishing the HDZ.  Tuđman’s 
strong ties to the North American Diaspora date back to his first post–prison trip to the 
continent on 6 June 1987, three years after his release.  On this trip he visited Ontario, 
Canada, together with his wife Ankica.  This was also his first public speaking 
engagement since the days of his imprisonment and the subsequent five–year ban on 
public appearance in Croatia.  This visit was arranged in secret by Marin Sopta, Zlatko 
Čardarević, and John Zdunić.  They visited the University of York, where Sopta was a 
former student and a friend of Professor Hector Massey.624  Sopta migrated to Canada 
                                                 
623 Nepstad, S. E. & Bob, C. (2006). When do leaders matter? Hypotheses on leadership dynamics in 
social movements. Mobilization, 11(1), 21-42.  
624Razgovor s povodom: dr. sc. Marin Sopta. (n.d.). Interview by Ž. Lešić. Retrieved from 
http://www.crowc.org/kanada/549-razgovor-s-povodom-dr-sc-marin-sopta 
    Sopta is one of the main contributors to the studies of Croatian Diaspora today.   
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with his mother, mainly for economic reasons, to join Sopta's uncle, a longstanding 
political émigré.  Sopta describes his story as a “typical example similar to that of other 
Croats from Western Herzegovina that emigrated at the end of 1960s and the first half of 
1970s”.625  In 1985, he organised a successful international conference on “Yugoslavia 
after Tito” in spite of Yugoslav protests in Canada.  He returned to Croatia in 1995 and 
led the Department for Return at the Ministry for Development, Immigration and 
Reconstruction and, more recently, served as the director of the Croatian Centre for 
Strategic Research in Zagreb.626 
Tuđman’s second lecture, also organised by Sopta, was held at the University of 
Toronto, from where he travelled to Sudbury and Ottawa where Ante Beljo and Gojko 
Šušak organised lectures at the Laurentian University in Sudbury and Carleton 
University in Ottawa.627  During this trip Tuđman also visited the Croatian community in 
Pittsburgh.  As noted in the previous chapter, during his first visit to the Diaspora 
Tuđman did not explicitly mention the possibility of a Croatian bid for independence but 
his lectures on the Croat patriot and historical figure Stjepan Radić and on “The 
Question of Nationality in the Contemporary World” were infused by the contours of the 
idea and, according to Sopta, well received.628  Tuđman’s lectures at universities across 
North America set the foundation for a new Croatian national awakening.  His speeches 
advocated his idea of an all–round Croat reconciliation and promoted the creation of 
Croatian sovereignty. 
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The speech Tuđman delivered on June 19 1987, entitled “On the History of Resolving 
the Croatian Issue and the Self–Determination of World Nations” and delivered at the 
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto, was published in 
a booklet and made available to Croats across the Diaspora.  This enabled him to start 
setting the groundwork for a new political movement.  In his speech on June 19 1987, he 
outlined his views to an eager audience of diaspora Croats: 
From the earliest knowledge of mankind’s history, nationalities or nations 
have been and remain, with all their manifestations of ethnicity and 
statehood, the highest social configuration of a human community.  The 
whole of human history has concerned itself with the formation and self– 
determination of national societies and the creation of states. . . .  The 
self– determination of nations, their freedom from external influences and 
foreign domination, their sovereignty of state, and at the same time the 
desire for equality and ascendancy in the international arena have been 
and remain the main characteristics of contemporary historical 
fluctuation.629 
 
Tuđman and his wife started their second tour of North America on 19 May 1988, 
visiting Hamilton near Toronto, Kitchener, Winnipeg, Vancouver, Nanaim, Calgary, 
Monterey in Napa Valley, San Francisco, and Hollywood.  It was during these trips to 
the Diaspora that some of Tuđman’s strong ties were created.  During his North 
American visits President Tuđman solidified his relationships with eager followers – 
Marin Sopta, Ante Beljo,630 Fr. Ljubo Krasić, Gojko Šušak,631 and Vinko Grubišić632 – 
                                                 
629 Hockenos, P. (2003). Homeland calling: Exile patriotism and the Balkan wars (p. 42). Ithaca, London: 
Cornell    University Press. 
630 Active member of HDZ; appointed general secretary of the North American HDZ, established the 
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632 In 1984 and 1986 they operated as the central committee of Croatian Schools of America and Canada 
(CSAC). With the help of many Franciscans as the founders, directors, and teachers in the Croatian 
schools throughout North America (approximately 100 schools), they also held international seminars of 
the Croatian language and folklore.  The institution was later renamed to the Croatian Schools of America, 
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émigrés from Western Herzegovina where Croatian nationalism has traditionally been 
more pronounced than elsewhere and where its protagonists took pride in being “more 
Croatian” than Croats in Croatia.633  They were an example of coterie charism; a group 
of hard–core supporters, who recognised Tuđman’s ability to embark on his mission on 
behalf of the entire Croatian nation.  He inspired great loyalty and devotion among this 
critical group of people and was confident that they would put in a special effort on 
behalf of his cause.634  On one of the occasions, Mr. Šušak was Tuđman’s host and the 
two men struck up a close friendship, with Šušak becoming one of Tuđman’s strongest 
ties in the Diaspora.635  This was where the seed for independent Croatia was created, the 
place many regard as the nucleus of the Croatian Diaspora.636 
Gojko Šušak, who later became Tuđman’s Minister of Defence, helped deliver millions 
of US dollars to Tuđman’s campaign and also served as an important sub–leader and a 
point of contact, predominantly with the right–wing Croatian Diaspora.637  Originally 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, he also played a key role in attracting the support of 
ethnic Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, a group that played a key role in the HDZ’s 
                                                                                                                                                
Australia and Canada, to include 12 Australian schools that opened in 1978. Retrieved from 
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state–building project 638  Later on, HDZ BIH, HDZ’s sister party, also had a great 
influence over Croats with dual citizenship.  
Get–togethers and the face–to–face encounters led to strong bonds of solidarity and 
trust.  These meetings also helped Tuđman solidify the feeling of a moral obligation of 
his potential followers to support the ‘Croatian cause’, referred to as ‘cognitive 
liberation’ by McAdams,639 which moved them from apathy to action.  This is strongly 
linked to ‘symbolic capital’ of a leader that we touched on earlier, i.e. capital that 
emerged from Tuđman’s biographical experiences and his unique personal 
characteristics.  Symbolic capital has the power to turn leaders into charismatic figures 
able to fire constituents with the commitment and discipline necessary to “hazard time, 
liberty, and even life against powerful, sometimes ruthless foe”.640  Tuđman’s symbolic 
capital was instrumental not only for establishing a wellspring of trusted sub–leaders, 
but also for building a constituency, as we shall see later. 
Through his support base in in the Diaspora, Tuđman and the HDZ got access to funds 
to run a professional campaign.641  Tuđman gained the backing of powerful third parties 
that not only proved crucial for accessing financial resources, but they also served as 
committed spokespeople and activated more supporters within the Croatian Diaspora.  
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According to Nepstand and Bob642, leaders are more likely to attract third party support 
if they possess symbolic capital, as described earlier.  Their success is even more likely 
if they also possess cultural capital permitting them to “read their political environment 
and adapt, where necessary, to the preferences and predilection of potential 
supporters”.643 Cultural capital was one of Tuđman’s strongest points.  He was extremely 
knowledgeable about the interests, norms and trends of the Diaspora and was able to 
adapt himself to their preferences, and more importantly, to the preferences of powerful 
supporters and potential sub–leaders.   
Tuđman’s visit to Toronto in September 1990 had a very different feel to his previous, 
more modest, visits to the area.  It concluded with an elaborate gala banquet held in his 
honour at the Metro Toronto Convention Centre with 1,500 members of the Croatian 
Diaspora attending.  There he also received greetings from young Croatian Canadians, 
with Ante Beljo and Gojko Šušak, now Croatian Minister of Defence, by his side.644  His 
speech at the Croatian Social and Cultural Centre in Norval, Ontario described as “one 
of the most important events in the long history of the Croatian community in Canada”, 
attracted 20,000 people.  The Queen of Peace, the Franciscan Center in Norval, 
describes Tuđman’s visit in 1990 as “the most attended event in the history of the 
Croatian Centre”.645 
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Croatian Diaspora Organisations 
 
The idea of Croatian independence was openly voiced in May 1988 by the Croatian 
National Congress646, formed in 1974 in Toronto as an umbrella association of all 
Croatian emigrants dedicated to the independence of Croatia.  The Congress declared a 
demand for independence of both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, spurring leaders 
of political groups in the Diaspora into action.647  In June 1990, the New York Times, 
previously pro–Yugoslavian, published Tuđman’s article “All We Croatians Want Is 
Democracy”648, quoted earlier.  Similarly, the Financial Times in London reported on the 
inevitable fall of Yugoslavia, with other Western newspapers agreeing.649  On 25 May 
1991 Croatia declared independence, followed by Diaspora organised rallies advocating 
and urging recognition of Croatia.  Among the organisers were the Croatian Fraternal 
Union, the Croatian Catholic Union and the newly formed Croatian American 
Association.  Rallies were  followed by Diaspora–homeland conventions both at home 
and abroad, marking the fall of a division–wall between Croatia and its Diaspora.650  
Given the nationalist roots of the politically active core of the Croatian Diaspora, it was 
the best potential ally for right of centre, anti–Communist parties.  Many of its 
contributions to Croatia during the 1990s and its political activity aimed at influencing 
the host country were noted in my previous chapter.  With its political, financial and 
humanitarian support, the Croatian Diaspora was critical to the unfolding of events in 
Croatia during the early 1990s and played a crucial role in influencing the international 
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community and its policy toward Croatia, and the region.  The Croatian Diaspora 
organisations in North America firmly supported the newly created political parties, 
especially those that emphasised unrestricted travel to Croatia for Croatian émigrés, 
freedom for political prisoners, and the right to secret and multi– party elections for 
Sabor.651 
Alongside gatherings in Ontario, a strong example of Diaspora loyalty was the 1991 
political rally held in Washington with 35,000652 Croatian Diaspora members advocating 
and urging recognition of Croatia.  For the first time in the history of the Croatian 
Diaspora in the US, they firmly and openly disagreed with US policy toward the events 
taking place in Yugoslavia and criticised the attitude of President Bush and the US 
Government’s lack of support for Croatia.  The Croatian Government sent official 
appeals to the Croatian Diaspora regarding the issue of recognition as well as urging the 
Croatian Diaspora to inform their local, state and federal authorities about the situation 
in Croatia.  Here is an example of an appeal: 
We ask that you serve as witnesses and interpreters in your respective 
countries.  If you can, in any way, please influence the White House and 
official representatives of the US Government because the People of 
Europe are waiting to see what the Big Brother has to say.653 
 
In response to pleas from the Croatian Government, a great amount of effort was also 
invested in lobbying the US Government and in raising the awareness of the US media 
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and their understanding of Croatia.  The activities ranged from individual letters, 
petitions and telephone calls to the White House and the US Foreign Affairs Committee 
– all communicating discontent and disappointment with the level of US support for the 
newly established Croatian state.  “The Croatian Diaspora in 1990 to 1991 knew exactly 
what we wanted”654, said Dr. Ante Čuvalo, a Chicago–area college professor.  Diaspora 
activities – such as the “Croatian Days on the Hill” organised in 1991 by the Croatian 
American Association655, media activities such as the “Appeal by 104 Nobel Laureates 
for Peace in Croatia” sponsored by the American Initiative for Croatia (AIC),656 letters 
sent to President Bush and petitions encouraged by the CFU657 – all demonstrated the 
extent to which “the promotional and advocacy functions of Diaspora organisations on 
the extra–communal levels” can make a significant difference in bringing about positive 
attitudes toward their homelands.658    Fraternalist of the CFU continuously published 
addresses and phone numbers of US Congressmen and encouraged its membership to 
send letters, petitions and make telephone calls659.  According to CFU records, thousands 
of letters were sent by members of the Croatian Diaspora, as well as Croats from 
Croatia, resulting in the US recognition of Croatia’s independence in April 1992. It is 
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doubtful whether an independent state would have been achieved, and internationally 
recognised, without the support of the Diaspora. 
During the war, we Croats have been searching for other Croats, to 
support each other and to help the cause.  The most difficult part was to 
educate the American public and the American Government.  This 
remains to be a problem even today.660 
 
Prompted by the advent of Croatian independence and by the events taking place at 
home, the Croatian Diaspora representatives in the US stressed the importance of 
creating a ‘united Croatian front’.  The united front was formed in 1993 through the 
founding of the National Federation of Croatian Americans (NFCA), an umbrella 
organisation linking 10 major Croatian–American organisations, including the Croatian 
Fraternal Union, which was the focus of earlier chapters, as well as several hundred 
individual members.  It defines its aim as strengthening the many cultural, educational, 
humanitarian, public relations, social and political activities important to the Croatian 
community in the US.  The NFCA was instrumental in ensuring US support for 
Croatia’s eventual membership of NATO through lobbying for the enactment of the so–
called ‘Croatian Amendment’ – the ‘Amendment to the 1997 Foreign Appropriations 
Bill’.  The organisation defines itself as a non–governmental, non–profit entity, and 
engages in political and lobbying activities.661  The international Croatian World 
Congress was formed in 1993 as a non–profit, non–governmental and non–party 
international organisation, and according to its mission statement aims to unite and 
                                                 
660A quote by a member of the Croatian Diaspora interviewed for the purpose of this study.  
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network Croatian associations and institutions throughout the world so as to assist in 
their successful functioning and to promote Croatian heritage worldwide.662 
Croatian Catholic Church 
  
The Church had a rather marginalised presence during communist Yugoslavia. Although 
it maintained a presence not just in Croatia, but also Slovenia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Catholic Church was often subject to censure.  In January 1952, the 
communist regime officially banned all religious education in public schools.663  That 
year the regime also expelled the Catholic Faculty of Theology from the University of 
Zagreb, to which it was not restored until democratic changes took place in 1991.664  The 
Church was also exposed to frequently being portrayed as a supporter of the Ustaše 
regime with allusions to fascist collaboration during World War II.  This discourse 
became more common and increasingly confrontational in the late 1980s prior to the 
1990 elections.  As part of the nationalist discourse in Serbia, the Church was accused of 
“clerical nationalism” and for being part of a “conspiracy of the Comintern and the 
Vatican against Yugoslavia”665.  The Church saw these accusations as severe slander and 
initiated a series of articles in Glas Koncila, its ecclesiastical weekly, to address these 
concerns.  Glas Koncila was (and remains) the main publication promoting the opinions 
of the Church, an activity prohibited during Yugoslavia.  
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These events lead to the Croatian Church playing a more prominent role in the Croatian 
society and becoming more vocal in welcoming the breakup of Yugoslavia.  The events 
of the Croatian Spring at the start of 1970s further spread the idea that Croatian culture 
and identity were imperilled by the Yugoslav regime.  These views grew stronger as the 
political tensions continued but the public arena was dominated by an imposed silence, 
contributing to a very strong legacy of the Croatian Spring.666  The silencing of the 
Croatian Spring also contributed to the failure of the pan–Slavic version of Croatian 
nationalism.667 Throughout these years, the Catholic Church became the main stronghold 
of dissident resistance against the communist establishment, “the guardian of the 
Croatian Spring”.668  The Church endorsed the idea of a traditionalist, ethnic version of 
Croatian identity669 and given there was no other forum left for national expression, 
Croatian national identity became even more intertwined with religion.670  
The Church participated in the debate regarding the road ahead for Croatia, openly 
supporting democracy but officially refusing to get involved in partisan politics.  This 
announcement was published in a statement issued by the Croatian Catholic bishops in 
the run up to the 1990 elections but the statement became subject to multiple 
interpretations, with many equating it with de facto support for the HDZ.  Tuđman in 
particular used the statement to claim that HDZ had full support of the Catholic Church.  
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Glas Koncila, in particular, had a reputation of being, in effect, a HDZ publication, 
subtly supporting HDZ which defended the Church promising to reinstate its rights 
denied during Yugoslavia.  It has been reported that Glas Koncila preferred the HDZ to 
other parties in the election and that the parish clergy openly campaigned for the HDZ 
during their services as well as advised parishioners on how to vote.  HDZ reciprocated 
the favour by allowing the Church to organise religious instruction in schools as it came 
into power in 1990.671 
The Croatian Catholic Church functioned as an important supporting organisation in the 
Diaspora mobilisation process.  Tuđman’s strongest supporters within the Catholic 
Church helped disseminate his message to some of the weaker ties within the Diaspora.  
Articles about Tuđman were widely distributed through Catholic publications such as 
Glas Koncila.  Catholic institutions proved instrumental for Tuđman, as these weak ties 
helped broadcast his views to an extended audience.  Croatian Catholic parishes and 
missions in the Diaspora assisted Tuđman in disseminating his message to the Diaspora 
but they were also a great ally in his fundraising campaigns abroad and raised millions in 
hard currency for Tuđman’s electoral campaign.  Among them were Croatian Catholic 
priests who knew Tuđman personally, such as the Ljubo Krasić from Canada, now 
heading the Croatian Ethnic Institute in Chicago, and Tomislav Duka from Germany 
who once referred to Tuđman as a “prophet sent by Jesus Christ to finish off 
communism and bring eternal happiness to humankind”.672  Father Krasić, a 
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Herzegovinian Franciscan, with his fellow Herzegovinians mentioned earlier – Vinko 
Grubišić, Gojko Šušak and Ante Beljo from Ottawa, and other supporters from the so–
called Norwal group – collaborated with Tuđman during his American tours between 
1987 and 1990 and supplied him with dollars as well as very reliable cadre.673 
Although the Catholic Church was divided in its support for the HDZ, it can be claimed 
that in some respects they joined forces in the early days.  The church organised 
missions abroad and organised rallies and speeches at HDZ meetings.  Priest and clerics 
rallied support and raised funds for the HDZ from their missions in the Diaspora, with 
some remaining politically active long after the 1990s.  Tuđman, on the other hand, 
portrayed himself as a close ally of the Church, which significantly increased the 
legitimacy of his party.  References to God and religion, which resonated highly with 
Croats both at home and abroad, can be found in Tuđman’s speeches throughout the 
1990s.  An example of connecting Tuđman’s nationalist cause with the Catholic religion 
is the apparition of Virgin Mary to six Croats on 24 June 1981 in Međugorje, a small 
town located in Western Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the Herzegovina region and close 
to the border of Croatia.  Since then Međugorje has become a sacred place of 
pilgrimage, with over 40 million people having visited the site.674  According to Škrbis, 
such apparitions were appropriated by the Croatian nationalist discourse675.  Another 
example is a speech Tuđman gave in Knin in 1995:  
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With God’s help, we will succeed in this, in what no one believed in (…) 
we knew that the Croatian people can survive this and find strength inside 
them.676 
 
Another example, the HDZ’s anthem “God Save Croatia”, (Croatian: “Boze Čuvaj 
Hrvatsku”) has strong religious connotations, and was written in August 1991 in 
response to the concern that Croatia’s military capabilities were non–existent compared 
to the “overwhelming military might of the occupier.”677 The song appeared on national 
Croatian Radio Television at the beginning of September 1991 and was one of the most 
frequently played songs on both Croatian TV and radio in the early 1990s, including the 
Voice of Croatia, broadcast in the Diaspora.  Below is an excerpt: 
If needed, my lord, this is my vow to you, 
Take my life and give it to her,  
For better or for worse, stay with us, stay with her, 
God protect Croatia, my dear home. 
 
Religion, twinned with music, doubled the mobilising effect of these lyrics.  Pettan’s 
study on music, politics and war678 suggests that one of the key functions of music in 
wartime, apart from encouragement to fighters and civilians, and humiliation of the 
enemy, is to “call for the involvement of those not directly endangered – including 
fellow citizens, the diaspora and the political and military decision makers abroad”.  
Content analysis of major Diaspora publications at the time, including Croatian Fraternal 
Union’s Fraternalist, confirms a strong emphasis on religion.  With their articles on 
Croatia’s history, glorifying their nation’s heroes and paying tribute to their religious 
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leaders, alongside Croatia’s artists and sportsmen, in an effort to revive common 
memories, these publications reflected a heightened sense of ethnic identity and national 
unity. 
Diaspora Weak Ties 
 
Weak ties679 represent more distant connections to broader networks.680  One of the 
earliest writers to describe the nature of the ties between people was German scientist 
and philosopher, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.681  Similar to Goethe’s analogy using 
particles of quicksilver, which find unity through the process of chemical affinity, 
distant members of the Croatian Diaspora, aggregate or bond through collective action 
towards a common goal.  We should not underestimate the strength of weak ties.  
These networks are of utmost importance as they can create and further reinforce links 
with geographically distant, disengaged, and/or inaccessible audiences.  Tuđman’s weak 
ties facilitated information dissemination and appeal for Diaspora support and also 
helped spread some of key Tuđman’s frames that, decades later, are still being used by 
some Croatian Diaspora organisations.  Contrary to what McVeigh, Myers, and 
Sikkink682 claim, knowledge of local conditions does not diminish with distance and 
greater recruiting success does not depend on potential recruits being spatially proximate 
to the leader’s strongholds.  In the context of Diaspora, the ‘weak link’ category can be 
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expanded to include what we can refer to as ‘latent links’.  These are host country 
citizens or residents of Croatian origin who do not maintain their diasporic identity and 
thus cannot be referred to as members of the Croatian Diaspora.  Sheffer would refer to 
this group as the ‘dormant Diaspora’, i.e. entities with successfully implemented 
assimilationist and integrationist strategies that can under certain circumstances be 
reawakened.683  These individuals did not nurture “relationships with their host societies 
and governments, homelands, global and regional actors, and other groups from the 
same nation residing in other countries”.684  They were thus harder to access by Tuđman 
as they were not members of diasporic organisations and institutions and did not 
participate in political, social, cultural and/or religious activities.  However, through 
weak ties, the combination of Tuđman’s diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing 
translated vaguely felt dissatisfaction into well–defined grievances and compelled 
individuals to join the collective effort.685  
I am so grateful to my Croatian friends who brought me closer to my 
nation.  I was proud to be able to contribute.  I can honestly say that ‘I 
once was lost but now am found’.686 
 
The political victory of HDZ resulted in unleashed nationalist currents pouring in from 
all sides of the Diaspora.  Expressing nationalist feeling was no longer off–limits as the 
HDZ assertively affirmed its Croatian nationalism.  This particularly appealed to 
political émigrés who were forced to leave Croatia because of their political beliefs that 
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were now encouraged.  The masses followed.  Transnational engagement of the Croatian 
Diasporic communities in the US lead to $4 million being collected for Tuđman’s 
electoral campaign.  The voters, both at home and abroad, opted for the unapologetic 
nationalism of the HDZ, giving it a majority in the Croatian Parliament.  Tuđman’s party 
acquired almost two thirds of the seats and a clean mandate to dictate a legislative and 
constitutional agenda of its choice.  A number of Croatian emigrants, many of them 
former political émigrés, assumed key political roles in the new Croatian Government.  
Their influence was most evident in the early days of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, one fifth of which was composed of Diaspora representatives.  Dozens of 
ambassadors, ministers and their advisors, including the Ministry of Information, the 
Ministry for Return and Immigration, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry for 
Maritime Affairs, Transportation and Communications, and the Ministry of 
Environment, MPs, political secretaries, directors of Croatian Homeland Foundation and 
political party leaders, were also former members of the Croatian Diaspora. 
The conflict further generated an unparalleled boost in financial support and 
humanitarian activity, with the Diaspora making significant donations in an effort to 
help the situation in their homeland.  Croatian cultural, educational as well as political 
organisations jointly participated in the humanitarian campaign, sending millions of 
dollars to Croatia as direct monetary contributions.  The Croatian National Bank records 
show that, through the Croatian Investment Fund alone, the Croatian Diaspora invested 
approximately $151 million.  An additional amount between $300 and $600 million was 
invested through individual investments and investments into Croatian banks in the 
1990s.  As noted in the previous chapter, Croatian organisations also engaged in sending 
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hundreds of tons of food, medicine, uniforms for the Croatian soldiers, and help for 
children who had lost their fathers in the war.  
At an Oakville, Ontario church dinner in 1993, one speaker described a conversation 
with a Croatian ambassador–at–large who told him contributions from Canada had 
“saved us.” 
That's nothing.  During the war, in 1991, we used to raise $100,000 for 
the government with each dinner; people were coming in with their 
pension checks and taking new mortgages.687 
 
These were the words of John Sola, a member of the Ontario Parliament, originally from 
Croatia.  Anton Kikas, on the other hand, a wealthy Toronto businessman, arranged for a 
chartered Boeing 707 to fly $1 million worth of machine guns and ammunition from 
South Africa to Croatia in August of 1991.  When Croatia declared independence in 
June 1991 and war broke out between Croatian forces and Serb rebels supported by the 
Serb–controlled Yugoslav army, Kikas decided to take action.  He describes his action 
guardedly in 1993; the contents of the plane, he says, were “certain military equipment” 
obtained from British and Austrian intermediaries for about $1 million.  In his words:  
What motivated me to get involved and work on the Croatian cause are 
the lies that were spread by the [Serb–controlled Yugoslav government] 
about my nation and my people; I wanted to tell the real truth.688 
 
However, Kikas’ plane was forced down by Yugoslav fighter jets, and he was taken into 
custody where he was tortured for two days, then imprisoned.  Three months later, he 
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was released in exchange for a Yugoslav army general.  Kikas returned to Toronto a 
hero.689 
Young men and women, who had previously never been to Croatia, left their homes in 
the US, Canada, Australia, South America and Europe to defend their homeland.  In 
1990 approximately 100 New York Croatians arrived in Croatia and joined the Croatian 
Army as volunteers.690  Former Croatian members of the French Foreign Legion, 
including Ante Gotovina, a Croatian Army general who served in the ‘Homeland War’ 
and later stood trial at The Hague Tribunal, discussed further in my next chapter, 
contributed to the advancement of the Croatian military and police forces.  
The realisation of the ‘thousand–year–old dream of statehood’ ended Croatian 
Diaspora’s stateless existence as they rejoiced in the birth of the new Croatian state.  As 
pointed out by a member of the Diaspora, 
Homeland was no longer a symbolic reference point, but a source of new 
focus and rejuvenating force, a place that we can help grow, build 
connections with and be proud of.  
 
Diaspora members who took part in the research report an increase in their levels of 
participation in Croatian cultural events following independence – picnics, dances, 
festivals and shows – organised by both their local communities and Croatian Diaspora 
organisations such as the CFU or the CCU.  The events in Croatia had a powerful impact 
on Diaspora Croats in demonstrating “that they [members of the Diaspora] are an 
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organic part of their nation, directly connected with its destiny, although far away from 
Croatia.”691 
Conclusion 
 
Prognostic frames are critical elements of the framing process as they provide the 
targeted audience with a sense of direction and a shared goal.  Specifically, the prospect 
of the ‘centuries–long dream of Croatian statehood’ coming true was a compelling 
prognosis, one that resonated across multiple generations of the Croatian Diaspora.  The 
proposed solutions were framed as the only way of successfully changing the status quo 
and putting an end to existing difficulties.  They also clearly identified the leading 
figures, namely the HDZ, capable of putting that plan into action.  These, as we have 
seen, also included religious representatives and leaders from both Croatia and its 
Diaspora, acting as self–legitimated spokesmen of the collective Diaspora identity.  
Benford692 identifies four generic vocabularies of motive: vocabularies of severity, 
urgency, efficacy, and propriety, which we briefly touch upon in Chapter II.  These 
vocabularies proved vital for sustaining the participation of Diaspora members in 
homeland affairs.  The analyses of Diaspora movement activists, elites, politicians and 
significant others’ speeches, interviews, slogans and statements provide evidence that 
points to the existence of all four previously identified vocabularies.  However, 
Benford’s list lacks an important component, which is of particular salience for the 
Croatian Diaspora mobilisation; one I referred to as the ‘perceived justness of the cause’ 
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in the previous chapter.  This vocabulary refers to the feeling of duty and a sense of 
obligation among the Diaspora to do what is perceived as right –  to stand up for the 
cause that they believe is worth investing in and fighting for, one that promises 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of their homeland.  These promises mirrored 
Tuđman’s speeches in North America where he emphasised national self–determination 
as the unstoppable dynamic of “history’s forward march”.693   
For a frame to resonate with its audience, it needs to be credible and relevant, ensuring 
narrative fidelity and cultural resonance.694 For a frame to be culturally resonant to its 
historical background,695 it has to have a high degree of credibility as well as logical and 
precise relevance to potential followers’ lives.  Successful prognostic frames, and frames 
in general, also heavily rely on the power of emotion.  Also, the larger the range of 
problems covered by the frame, the larger the potential ‘catch’ within the Diaspora.  The 
master frame, broad in scope with magnet–like characteristics, proved to be a successful 
tool in attracting Diaspora members across the globe.  However, this chapter also shed 
light on factors leading to frame transformation.  Examples from the Croatian Diaspora 
suggest that frame transformation becomes needed when proposed solutions do not 
resonate or are in conflict with views of core supporters.  Unfortunately, this alignment 
approach has not received much attention and much more research remains to be done.   
Alongside framing, Croatian diaspora mobilisation is also the product of a complex 
historical, political and social dynamics, where leaders play a crucial role in shaping the 
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mobilising process through motivating and coordinating people.  The success of 
Tuđman’s leadership is a product of both contextual and individual forces and, as 
Nepstad and Bob point out, it is difficult to separate leadership from the larger aspects of 
the movement.  Nonetheless, it is possible to highlight the different roles that leaders 
play.696  Tuđman played a central part in Croatian Diaspora mobilisation, which makes it 
a good case study for analysing leadership roles.  It would be difficult to conceive of the 
mobilising process of the Croatian Diaspora without Tuđman, its leader, who was able to 
take advantage of external conditions and actualise the potential for change.  Leaders do 
not do it all by themselves, they are encouraged by political opportunities and 
organisational structures.  However, existing theories, with their structural orientation, 
tend to minimise the role leaders play in processes of mobilisation.  Shifting the focus on 
the leader, both on how he develops individually as a leader and how he leads through 
his supporters is something that can greatly expand our knowledge of Diaspora 
mobilisation dynamics. 
The following chapter will take a look at the post–Tuđman Croatian Diaspora to 
examine to what extent it continues to voice ideas framed by Tuđman in the 1990s.  The 
chapter will also examine examples of post–Tuđman Diaspora engagement, which is 
still very much guided by the events of the 90s.  In doing so, the chapter will also touch 
on the current status of the Diaspora and their disenchantment with the current political 
settlement.  The chapter will also explore some of Diaspora’s present–day existential 
questions, including the lack of unity and inspiring leaders, and the question of return. 
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CHAPTER VI: Diaspora after Tuđman 
 
There is a significant gap between the Diaspora and the Homeland.  The Diaspora 
expected Croatia to open up its doors after the war, but doors have been shut; they were 
slammed! 697 
 
One of Tuđman’s main objectives, and the focus of his diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivation frames, was to achieve national unity.  Ideas framed by Tuđman in the 1990s 
served as ‘glue’ that united disparate networks and disjointed Diaspora identities 
together.  Acting as diasporic entrepreneurs, Tuđman and his party were greatly 
responsible for the powerful mobilisation of the Croatian Diaspora and transformed it 
into a coherent identity network, with an aim of securing Diaspora support for HDZ.   
Achieving unity also included reconciling the two wings of Tuđman’s party, the hard–
line nationalists and the moderate conciliators.  He was obsessed with healing the 
“national split personality”,698 so much so that he attempted to metaphorically reconcile 
the two groups through an infamous endeavour, often described as insensitive, when he 
proposed to “dig up the past in a mass healing ritual”.699  He suggested excavating the 
remains of the Ustaše families buried at Bleiburg and laying them to rest at Jasenovac, 
the notorious concentration camp where Ustaše murdered tens of thousands of Serbs, 
Jews and Gypsies.  He died in December 1999 without fully accomplishing his healing 
mission.  The danger that presented itself after his death was that the persistent historical 
divisions would re–emerge and the unity created during the early years of his power 
would slowly dissipate.  
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This chapter will touch on the changes that took place in the Croatian Diaspora post–
Tuđman, specifically addressing the question of unity.  The chapter will also analyse the 
modern–day Croatian Diaspora with an aim to examine how and why active Diaspora 
organisations continue to internalise and reproduce the ideas framed by Tuđman in the 
1990s.  In doing so, the chapter will focus on the current status of the Diaspora and their 
disenchantment with the present-day political settlement.  More specifically, the chapter 
will examine the controversies that accompany Croatian Diaspora electoral participation; 
namely, the unique voting rights that Croatian Diaspora enjoyed in the 1990s, the 
reasons behind that unparalleled position of privilege, and the ‘disenfranchisement’ that 
followed.  The chapter will highlight the main concerns coming from the Diaspora as 
well as those voiced by the Croatian Government.  I will analyse how the modern–day 
Diaspora political activity in Croatia – as well as direct and indirect influence, through 
voting, campaigning, financing and lobbying, is still very much guided by the events of 
the 90s.  The discussion will be framed around justice and accountability in the context 
of Croatia’s path towards the EU, as some of the most notable activities organised by the 
Diaspora were around those themes.  The final section will continue to focus on the 
recent history of the North American Croatian Diaspora and discuss views of Croatian 
Diasporic communities after independence, exploring major existential questions, 
including the question of return. 
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Heroes vs. Villains  
 
Recent literature on Diaspora Politics challenges the reactionary nature of diaspora 
communities.  Zunzer observes that, “there is no evidence that diaspora communities 
structurally develop a more conservative perspective on politics in general or on the state 
of affairs in their home country”.700  Further, it is claimed that, ‘by preserving livelihoods 
and maintaining vital services in countries emerging from or still experiencing conflicts 
(e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, 
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, West Bank and Gaza, Haiti and others), remittances can be seen 
as a sine qua non for peace and rebuilding’.701  However, the Croatian case demonstrates 
that deep–rooted suspicion and the widespread negative perceptions about diasporas 
continue to be very well represented in societies.702  These views include arguments 
highlighting a more radical side of diaspora communities, emphasising those that engage 
in, ‘long distance nationalism’.703  These views also support Werbner’s claims that 
diasporas freely, “endorse and actively, support ethnicist, nationalistic, and exclusionary 
movements”.704  Works by Stacy Sullivan and Paul Hockenos recognise the impact of 
‘long–distance nationalism’ as a crucial part of Balkans’ dynamics.  They expose the 
degree to which transnational actors such as diaspora communities can boost radical 
nationalist feelings by supporting and spreading political ideologies, providing financial 
                                                 
700 Zunzer, W. (2004). Diaspora Communities and Civil Transformation (p. 8). (Occasional Paper 26). 
Berghof: Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.  
701 Fagen, P. W. &  Bump, M. N. (2006) Remittances in conflict and crises: How remittances sustain 
livelihoods in war, crises and transitions to peace (p. i). New York: International Peace 
Academy.  
702 Cohen, R. (1997). Global Diasporas: An Introduction. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.  
703 Anderson, B. (1998) The spectre of comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the world. London 
& New York: Verso.  
704 Werbner, P. (2002) The place which is diaspora: Citizenship, religion and gender in the making of 
chaordic transnationalism. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28 (1), 119–133. (See p. 
120).  
247 
 
assistance, and often the supplies of weapons to bolster the conflict at home.705 
Kostovicova and Bojičić-Dželilović argue that political, economic and social 
transformation of the Balkans, dubbed Europeanisation, will not be determined purely 
by domestic forces, but by transnational ones, too. They argue that globalisation is 
internal to the post-communist and post-conflict transition in the countries of ex-
Yugoslavia; it “is not just a context that moulds the unfolding transitions, but also a 
force that shapes them from within”.706  
Indeed, the modern–day Croatian Diaspora remains politically active; a force that 
continues to shape Croatia from within.  Some of the most compelling examples of their 
recent engagement are around Croatia’s EU accession process.  In its bid to join the EU, 
Croatia, like any other aspiring EU member country, had to satisfy the Copenhagen 
criteria which require that a state has stable institutions guaranteeing democratic 
governance and human rights, a functioning market economy, and that it accepts the 
obligations and intent of the EU.707  In view of the legacy of the 1990s, ensuring respect 
for fundamental human rights has proven to be the most complex element of the EU 
accession process throughout the Balkans region. The human rights chapter was also the 
one that triggered a great deal of disapproval within the Diaspora and a vocal debate 
among the international community.  There is concern among a number of international 
                                                 
705Sullivan, S. (2004). Be not afraid for you have sons in America: How a Brooklyn roofer helped lure the 
US into the Kosovo War. New York: St. Martin's Press.; and 
     Hockenos, P. (2003). Homeland calling: Exile patriotism and the Balkan wars. Ithaca, London: Cornell 
University Press. 
706Kostovicova, D. & Bojičić-Dželilović V. (2008). Europeanizing the Balkans: Rethinking the Post-
communist and Post-conflict Transition. In D. Kostovicova & V. Bojičić-Dželilović (Eds.). 
Transnationalism in the Balkans. (pp. 7-26, see p. 8). London and New York: Association for the 
Study of Nationalities Routledge. 
707Europa (1993) Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council. Retrieved from 
www.europarl.europa.eu 
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and local NGOs, which was strongly articulated during Croatia’s accession process, by 
Amnesty International in particular, that the lack of political will in Croatia to deal with 
the legacy of the war creates an atmosphere in which prosecution of war crimes cases is 
unpopular.  A number of Croatian Diaspora NGOs were seen as supporting and 
advocating the status quo.  Croatia has had to extradite several of its citizens to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), an issue that was 
often contentious in domestic politics and one that has raised heated debates with the 
Diaspora.  The human rights debate in the Diaspora has mostly been centred around 
Ante Gotovina, former Lieutenant General of the Croatian Army who served in the 199–
1995 war in Croatia, indicted on war crimes and crimes against humanity charges by the 
ICTY and found not guilty.  His release caused widespread euphoria among Croats, and 
for many umbrella organisations in the Diaspora, and much of Croatia, Gotovina 
remains a hero. 
The foreign policy of the Croatian Government, especially the issue of cooperation with 
the ICTY, has deeply divided Diaspora Croats.  On one side are organisations such as 
the Croatian American Association (CAA), the Croatian Worldwide Association (CWA) 
and the Croatian Catholic Union (CCU) of the USA, who openly expressed 
dissatisfaction, while on the other side are the Croatian Fraternal Union and the NFCA 
who worked well with the Government and its diplomatic representatives in the US.   
The CWA describes itself as a non–party, non–profit organisation that strives to promote 
democratic values and principles in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, working for 
truth, justice and peace.  CWA defines its mission as profoundly democratic and 
patriotic.  Its task is defined as protecting Croatia's national sovereignty and the 
249 
 
legitimacy of the ‘Croatian War of Independence’, as well as sponsoring domestic 
reform in order to create a viable, strong and prosperous democratic republic.708  CWA’s 
goal at the time was “to display support for Croatian Generals, to show the world we 
have not forgotten these brave heroes who so graciously defended Croatia from 
aggression and occupation of the Yugoslav/Serbian army.”  This included expressing 
solidarity and support for the release of Croatian General Ante Gotovina and all other 
Croatian generals indicted at The Hague at the time.  Its 2005 public statement reads:  
We cannot and must not wait a minute longer for others to rewrite our 
proud history.  It has been well over four years since the General's 
indictment and we must join together and defeat the bogus policies 
implemented by the U.S. State Department, the European Union and the 
United Nations.709  
 
The language used by the CWA in its public statements very closely mirrors the 
language used by Tuđman in the early 1990s.  The refusal to let others ‘rewrite our 
proud history’ is a common theme used by Tuđman in his speeches.  ‘Joining forces’ 
and acting as ‘one team’ to ‘defeat the enemy’ are another common themes that served 
as a great mobilising force.  One year after the arrest and extradition of General 
Gotovina the CWA held a rally in support of him at The Hague.  More than 12,000 
Croats around the world signed the Free Ante Gotovina internet petition.710  
The Croatian World Congress, which presents itself as ‘the authentic voice of the 
Croatian Diaspora’, is defined as a non–profit, non–governmental and non–party 
international organisation that enjoys advisory status as a member of the United Nations.  
                                                 
708 CWA Croatian Worldwide Association Website. Retrieved from www.croradio.net 
709Lijepa Naša Domovina Hrvatska (2005). Home Page. Retrieved from 
www.lijepanasadomovinahrvatska.com 
710 CroRadio.net (2010a). Free Ante Gotovina Petition. Retrieved from www.croradio.net 
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According to the CWC mission statement, the Congress “works in the interests of both 
the Croatian Homeland and its Diaspora”.711  The CWC was also particularly outspoken 
in the Gotovina case in its unfailing support of the Croatian General.  In 2002, in a letter 
to Carla Del Ponte, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY at the time, it expressed its “deep 
dismay” at his indictment, further stating that the CWC, “firmly believes that General 
Gotovina is innocent of the charges [that] have [been] levelled against him (…) but 
believes that if the ICTY Prosecutor insists on Gotovina’s prosecution, the US officials 
should be prosecuted as well”.712  The letter urges Del Ponte to open a criminal 
investigation into President Clinton and other top officials of his administration for 
“aiding and abetting” the indicted Croatian General.713  
Another vocal political debate within the Diaspora involves another key Croatian figure, 
General Branimir Glavaš, also a Member of the Croatian Parliament from 1995 to 2010.  
Branimir Glavaš was one of the founding fathers of Tuđman’s Party, the party that the 
Croatian Diaspora has been loyal to for nearly two and a half decades.  In 2009 the 
Zagreb District Court found him guilty of torture and murder of Serbian civilians and 
sentenced him to 10 years in prison.  When the criminal case against him was initiated in 
2006, Glavaš lost his political immunity and was detained due to the possible risk of 
tampering with witnesses.  The CWA, jointly with Croatian Radio Melbourne in 
                                                 
711CSO Net (2010). Civil Society Network. Retrieved from esango.un.org 
712Balkan Tribunal Turns to Clinton. (2002, July 8). The Washington Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/jul/8/20020708-033445-6349r/ 
713ibid; also CWA Website. Retrieved from www.croradio.net 
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Australia, immediately started an online petition for his release.714  The Free Branimir 
Glavaš Petition, the preamble of which describes him as a hero, stated that:  
We the undersigned Citizens of the republic of Croatia and Croatians 
Worldwide plead to prevent the death of one more of our Croatian war 
veterans.  However the outcome of the courts, General Branimir Glavaš 
should be freed to prepare his defence. 
 
After his release, the Petition website stated, “As a result of all our voices around the 
world General Glavaš has been freed715 from jail and is in hospital.  It goes to show that 
if we yell loud enough from every corner we will be heard”.716  
Diaspora Disagreements  
 
Ante Čuvalo points out that, “there are no significant efforts on the part of the diaspora to put 
pressure on the ruling elite in the homeland to steer the national ship in a different direction”.  
The Diaspora voices that do get heard are not “visible witnesses to the higher ideals of 
democracy and civil society”.717  
 
Often perceived by their co–ethnics in Croatia as right–wing fanatics and foolish 
idealists dwelling on romanticised ideas of their ancestral homeland, the modern–day 
Diaspora Croats report encountering resentment, ambivalence and hostility at home.718  
Croats in the Diaspora point out the unfriendly attitude of the Croatian Government 
                                                 
714 CroRadio.net (2010b) Petition for General Branimir Glavas. Retrieved from www.croradio.net 
Accessed June 2010. 
715 On May 2009, the day the verdict was announced, the accused fled to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
citizenship he acquired in the meantime.  In 2010, when the sentence for Glavaš was confirmed by a court 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, upholding a Croatian court’s earlier verdict, he was ejected from the Croatian 
Parliament, stripped of his wartime medals and rank, and subsequently jailed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
His sentence was reduced to 8 years in prison.  He was released in January 2015, after Croatia's 
Constitutional Court cited procedural reasons for striking down his conviction.  
716CWA (2010b) Croatian World Association. Petition for General Glavaš. Retrieved from 
www.gopetition.com accessed 15 January 2010. 
717Čuvalo, A. (1999). Triangular relations: Croatian diaspora, the U.S.A., and the homeland. Conference 
Paper presented at The Association for Croatian Studies symposium at Xavier University, 
Croatian Diaspora in the U.S.A. on the Eve of the Third Millennium. Chicago  
718Winland, D. N. (2007). We are now a nation: Croats between ‘home’ and ‘homeland’. Toronto, 
Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press. 
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towards potential returnees as well as the current Croatian electoral law, which prevents 
the Croatian Diaspora from participating in Croatian elections and politics “in any 
meaningful way”.719  In an interview for the Croatian Radio show “Bridges, Homeland 
and Diaspora”, Niko Šoljak, the President of the CWC, warns that the prevailing feeling 
today among the Diaspora is that they are largely alienated, even more so today than 
before the 1990s.  Members of the Diaspora find it hard to accept that they are 
“discarded by the country that they helped so much, the country that would perhaps 
never be here today had there not been for the Diaspora”.720  At home, Diaspora Croats 
are often portrayed in an unfavourable light and referred to by some Croatian media as 
hard–core nationalists, ‘political and economic opportunists’ or ‘high–minded idealists’ 
out of touch with modern Croatia.721  It is often stressed in the homeland, particularly by 
those critical of the HDZ, that despite the political fragmentations within the Croatian 
Diaspora, Diaspora Croats have historically been loyal to only one political party and 
have consistently voted for the HDZ both during and after Tuđman. 
The following pages will focus on the modern–day political activities and discourse of 
Croatian Diaspora organisations that continue to reflect some of the key themes that 
formed Tuđman’s 1990s Diaspora CAF.  The next section will touch on the ongoing 
controversy in relation voting rights, a topic that has been particularly controversial in 
the modern–day Diaspora.  
                                                 
719 NFCA (2005a) National Federation of Croatian Americans. Retrieved from www.nfcaonline.com 
720Šoljak, N. (2009, March 11). Croatian Radio Interview: Bridges, Homeland and Diaspora. Retrieved 
from  http://www.hssd.hr/interview/intervju.html 
721 Winland, D. N. (2007). We are now a nation: Croats between ‘home’ and ‘homeland’. Toronto, 
Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press. 
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Diaspora’s Right to Vote  
 
Belgrade does not tell Bosnian Serbs what to do whereas Bosnian Croats vote for the 
Croatian Parliament and President.722 
 
Croats, no matter where they live in the word, have the right to vote in Croatian 
elections.  The post–Tuđman era, however, has witnessed a significant reduction in their 
political representation, and according to Diaspora representatives, a degradation of their 
voice and their freedom of political action. After the establishment of the independent 
Croatian state, the newly adopted Constitution and Citizenship Law entitled a great 
number of Croats to Croatian citizenship.  A special ‘Diaspora Constituency’ was 
created allowing Croatian citizens residing outside Croatia to vote in the elections.723  
Political activity of the Croatian Diaspora has been a contested topic since the beginning 
of the 1990s, spurring heated political debates among both Croatian politicians and 
Diaspora representatives, particularly with regards to Diaspora voting preferences.  It is 
a well–known public secret that most of the Diaspora vote for the HDZ.  Consequently, 
Tuđman’s party has won every parliamentary seat from the Diaspora Constituency in 
every election since Croatia’s independence.  The Organisation for Co–operation and 
Security in Europe (OSCE) observes that, “in October 1995 elections for the lower 
house of Parliament, 90.02 per cent of participating Diaspora voters supported the ruling 
[HDZ]”.724  It is often stressed that, for their efforts in the homeland conflict and their 
financial, humanitarian and military contributions, the new HDZ law allocated as many 
                                                 
722 Said by the Vice President of the Serbian government, Božidar Jelić, at a conference about the future of 
the western Balkans during an argument with the Croatian President, Stjepan Mesić, concerning Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Bosnian Croats should seek happiness in their homeland. Večernji list, 4 
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723Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Article 45) (2001). Official Gazette. (XLI). 
724OSCE (1997). Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, Observation Delegation to the Croatian Presidential Elections 
1997. Retrieved from www.osce.org 
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as twelve seats (9.5 per cent of all seats)725 in the Parliament to the Croatian Diaspora, 
outnumbering the seats given to Croatia’s national minorities. 
Given Tuđman and his party had the greatest Diaspora support dating back to the late 
1980s, predictions by HDZ revealed that they would continue to receive the strongest 
support from the Diaspora.  These predictions proved correct as hundreds of people 
lined up in Croatian diplomatic and consular offices, churches, Croatian cultural centres 
and schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, North America, Australia and elsewhere to 
vote.  Over 200,000 ballots were sent abroad for the 1992 elections.  No information on 
the election officials was available, but the opposition was particularly concerned that 
the approved Croatian diplomatic officials abroad were all loyal HDZ devotees.  Tuđman 
was accused by the opposition of manipulating the election campaign to ensure that both 
he and his party were returned to office.726  The Diaspora’s participation in Croatian 
elections has been the source of contentious debate in Croatian politics ever since.  
A large part of the controversy surrounding the Diaspora vote lies in the fact that the 
citizenship of many current Diaspora voters is based on their ethnicity, rather than their 
current or former residence.  In its Special 2007 Report on Croatia, the National 
Endowment for Democracy observes that  
The Diaspora Constituency has become politically controversial.  The 
challenge ahead lies in balancing several competing factors: As citizens 
of Croatia, Diaspora voters have a legitimate claim to a vote in Croatian 
elections.  As a community, they made substantial sacrifices in the wars 
leading to Croatian independence.  As such, they maintain a strong and 
                                                 
725Today there are only three seats allocated to the Diaspora 
726International Republican Institute (1992). Elections in the Republic of Croatia. (Report of The 
International Republican Institute). 1992. Retrieved from 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/fields/field_files_attached/resource/croatias_1992_presidenti
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recent link to Croatia.  On the other hand, their citizenship is based 
entirely on their ethnicity, not on their current or former residence, as 
many have never lived in what is Croatia today.727  
 
The majority of the people granted Croatian citizenship are based in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, many of whom are also citizens of BiH who have never resided in Croatia 
proper.  Political parties in Croatia differ in their views regarding the question of the 
Diaspora right to vote, with HDZ supporting current provisions for Croatian citizens 
living abroad to vote in the elections and have one separate list of MPs.  The Social 
Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP)728, on the other hand, maintains its position that the 
system needs to be changed in order to terminate non–resident Croatian citizens’ right to 
vote.  In 2007, to demonstrate its disapproval of the current regulations concerning 
Diaspora voting rights and to stress its perception of bias present among the Diaspora,729 
for the first time in Croatia’s elections, the SDP together with a number of other 
parliamentary parties did not provide candidate lists in the Diaspora Constituency.730  
The HDZ on the other hand protected the existing electoral regulations, emphasising the 
equality of all Croatian citizens before the law.  In return, this solidified HDZ’s political 
capital and maintained its electoral advantage.  For instance, it was often emphasised by 
the opposition that the 400,000–strong Croatian Diaspora eventually decided the very 
                                                 
727National Endowment for Democracy (2007). New borders and anomalies in the Balkans: Croatia’s 
diaspora constituency. Retrieved from www.ned.org  
728The Social Democratic Party of Croatia (Croatian: Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske) is the main 
centre-left, social democratic political party in Croatia.  
729The bias refers to the fact that the Diaspora favoured HDZ in previous elections. 
730Croatia held parliamentary elections on November 25 2007, the fifth in independent Croatia, in a 
democratic and transparent environment with no significant procedural transgressions, as declared by 
domestic NGO monitors.  However, the extremely tight race between incumbent HDZ and opposition 
SDP further highlighted the issue of Diaspora vote and its role in deciding the new government.  Diaspora 
vote turned into a hot political issue when SDP refused to be on the Diaspora list and stressed its opinion 
that electoral regulations regarding the Diaspora needed to be altered.    
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tight race in the 2007 elections in favour of the HDZ and Ivo Sanader, who served as the 
Prime Minister of Croatia from 2003 to 2009.  
A gathering organised by the Buenos Aires branch of the HDZ in 2008 and attended by 
some hundred persons honouring the ninth anniversary of Tuđman’s passing, further 
illustrate HDZ’s stance on the matter.  Following are the words of Joza Vrljičak, who 
served as the President of HDZ Argentina:  
We at HDZ Argentina are convinced that Croatian Emigration has the 
right, and even the duty to involve itself actively in the political events in 
the Diaspora, and wherever we, Croatians, live, and of course in Croatia 
itself.731 
 
The following pages report findings from primary sources, mainly records of Croatian 
Diaspora organisations, interviews with Diaspora leaders, public statements and press 
releases related to Croatian Diaspora’s frequently expressed concerns regarding their 
inability to partake in Croatia's elections more effectively. 
Disenfranchisement of the Diaspora 
 
Croatia has not paid its debt to its Diaspora.  She is behaving like a stepmother to her 
own children.732 
 
Much of the current political debate in Croatia revolves around the category of voters 
who reside abroad, often permanently, and so do not have a home constituency in 
Croatia.  Instead, they have a separate 11th constituency in Sabor, called the ‘Diaspora 
Constituency’.  The year 1999 saw a reduction of Diaspora political representation when 
a so–called ‘non–fixed’ quota law was introduced requiring Diaspora parliamentary 
                                                 
731 Vrljičak, J. (2008, December 9). In remembrance of Dr. Franjo Tuđman. Studia Croatica. Retrieved 
from http://studiacroatica.blogspot.co.nz/2008/12/in-remembrance-of-dr-franjo-tudjman.html 
732 Šoljak, N. (2001, March 15). Otvoreno pismo zastupnicima Hrvatskog sabora. Retrieved from 
http://dns1.vjesnik.hr/Html/2001/03/15/Clanak.asp?r=pis&c=4  
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seats to be proportional to the number of Diaspora votes.  This electoral regulation was 
brought in to avoid instances in which, in times of lower Diaspora turnout, the number 
of votes required for a Diaspora parliamentary seat is lower than the number of votes 
required for the remaining 10 Croatian constituencies – a scenario that occurred in the 
1995 election.733  
Main Diaspora concerns are caused by the fact that the current electoral law consolidates 
the votes of the Diaspora, effectively giving preference to Croats living in BiH, who are 
the most numerous.  While Diaspora members eligible to vote reside in 43 different 
countries, more than 70 per cent of them are based in BiH, so the seats allocated to 
Diaspora in reality belong to Croats in Bosnia.  Consequently, Croats living outside 
Croatia and BiH are left without representation in the Sabor.  In his letter to Neven 
Jurica, Croatia’s Ambassador to the US at the time, Ed Andrus, the President of NFCA 
in 2005, states:  
Rather than engendering interest in Croatian politics, the current system 
results in the effective disenfranchisement of Croatian citizens in the US 
and around the world.  Without an amendment to the electoral laws 
providing for absentee voting, the political under–representation of the 
worldwide Croatian Diaspora will remain chronic.734 
 
Croatian Diaspora organisations continue to urge the Croatian Government to consider 
reforms to the present allocation of Diaspora representatives in the Parliament.  They 
suggest a different allocation of seats to ensure that the worldwide Croatian Diaspora has 
its own representation in the Parliament.  In 2005 the NFCA stressed that 
                                                 
733 Law on the Election of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament, Article 44 (1999). Official gazette 
(No. 116). (in Croatian). 
734 NFCA Archives. Retrieved from www.nfcaonline.com/ABSENTEE%20BALLOT%20LETTER.htm 
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The current system of consolidating the votes of Croatian citizens living 
in Western Europe, North America, Australia, and elsewhere with those 
living in Bosnia and Herzegovina effectively leaves those Croatian 
citizens living outside of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with no 
representation in the Sabor.  The large number of Croats in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina far outweighs the potential numbers of voters in other 
countries.  We fully support the rights of Croatian citizens in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to continue to vote for their own representatives to the 
Sabor; but if Croatia seeks to draw to itself the political, intellectual, 
economic, and social potential of its Diaspora living abroad, it must make 
provisions for representation of their interests and concerns in the Sabor 
as well.735 
 
The latter issue is closely linked to an earlier concern voiced in 2002 by the First 
Legislative Council Meeting of the Croatian Diaspora held in Poreč, Croatia, which 
refers to the number of seats allocated to the Diaspora.  The open letter to the Croatian 
authorities reads:  
No one in Croatia has the right to take away our right to vote and our 
right to be represented in the Croatian Parliament.  Croatia has forgotten 
how much the Diaspora contributed to Croatia and keeps contributing by 
way of remittances and investments.736  
 
Agreeing with the views of many other Diaspora representatives, the letter expresses 
dissatisfaction with the current regulation system that deprives the Diaspora of the 
previously allocated 12 Diaspora seats in the Parliament.  It urges Croatian MPs to 
                                                 
735NFCA supports absentee balloting in Croatia and calls for reforms for Diaspora representation in the 
Sabor. (2005, Summer). The Croatian American Advocate, p. 1. Retrieved from 
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736Šoljak, N. (2001, March 15). Otvoreno pismo zastupnicima Hrvatskog sabora. Retrieved from 
http://dns1.vjesnik.hr/Html/2001/03/15/Clanak.asp?r=pis&c=4 1; also see 
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Council Meeting of the Croatian Diaspora, held in Poreč 21-23 June, 2002. 
    According to the letter, Croatia receives some 500 million Diaspora dollars annually. 
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respect the constitutional right of the Diaspora by making at least 10 per cent of 
parliamentary seats available to them.737  
The letter further lists a number of additional proposals and requests from the Diaspora: 
1. A law on the Diaspora similar to that of Ireland and Israel.738  
2. A Ministry for the Diaspora.739  
3. Three Diaspora representatives in Hrvatska Radio Televizija (HRT), Croatian 
Radiotelevision.740   
Further discontent was expressed regarding poor access to information in the Diaspora.  
At the Council Meeting it was concluded that the “Diaspora finds itself within its own 
type of information blockade because they do not get the information; they often get 
more misinformation then real information.”741  It was further stressed that Diaspora has 
to have its own magazine/newspaper and its own portal.  An additional necessity 
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738The Israeli law, established in 1950, began as an open-door immigration policy for Jews and provided 
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‘home’ and ‘homeland’. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press.) 
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Constitution are devoted to returnees.  Article 16 of the Law on Citizenship guarantees automatic 
citizenship to any Croat who “issues a written statement that he or she considers himself or herself to be a 
Croatian citizen”. Initially, Tuđman set up separate government units devoted to returnees and established 
the Ministry for Return and Immigration that was, to reflect changing priorities of the Croatian 
Government, later renamed to Ministry for Development, Emigration, and Reconstruction.  While actively 
supported by the first Croatian Government, the return of emigrants was not encouraged by the coalition 
government of 2000–2003.  Eventually the Ministry formed by Tuđman was absorbed into the Foreign 
Ministry to become the Office for Croatian Minorities, Emigration and Immigration. 
740Šoljak, N. (2001, March 15). Otvoreno pismo zastupnicima Hrvatskog sabora. Retrieved from 
http://dns1.vjesnik.hr/Html/2001/03/15/Clanak.asp?r=pis&c=4  
741ibid 
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identified was a radio and television programme in Croatian and English for the 
Diaspora that can reach Croatians all over the world.  
In 2005 the NFCA and its network vocally expressed its support for absentee balloting 
to allow Croatian citizens living abroad to participate in Croatian elections more 
productively.  The members of the organisation strongly supported Croatian Prime 
Minister Ivo Sanader’s proposal to introduce absentee balloting and stressed that this 
issue must be given serious consideration.  The main difficulty causing low turnout by 
the voters in Diaspora that many Croats frequently refer to is principally linked to 
inaccessible and very scarcely available polling stations.  In order to reach one of the 
polling stations, located only at the Croatian Embassy in Washington and Croatian 
consulates in only eight other US states, Diaspora Croats residing in one of the 42 states 
without a polling station must travel for hours in order to cast their votes.  “Only several 
thousand votes are tallied across the US, a major under–representation of the Croatia 
Diaspora.”742  For example, less than 2,000 of them voted in the 2003 elections.   
The Diaspora leaders feel that an essential first step in addressing the question of 
absentee balloting is to bring the issue into the public debate and raise awareness of the 
concern within the Croatian Government and the media.  The NFCA and its network 
also feel that their attempt to voice their concerns regarding the voting system currently 
in place has run into a wall of silence in some circles in Croatia because of an apparent 
lack of appreciation for Diaspora voting rights.  Andrus admitted that:  
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Sabor. (2005, Summer). The Croatian American Advocate, p. 1. Retrieved from 
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I and my colleagues in the NFCA have often heard critics of Diaspora 
voting note that Croatians living abroad should not have the right to vote 
since they do not pay taxes in Croatia.  I would note that in the United 
States it was long ago recognised when poll taxes in some of our southern 
states were declared illegal that voting is a fundamental right of 
citizenship and has nothing to do with paying taxes.743 
 
The debate surrounding Diaspora voting rights becomes again exceedingly relevant in 
2009 when the Croatian World Congress met in Poreč, Croatia on 17 and 18 January of 
the same year.  One of the discussion points was the upcoming 2010 Presidential 
elections in Croatia.  Niko Šoljak, the President of the organisation, stressed the need for 
the worldwide Croatian Diaspora to take part in electing a President that would protect 
the interests of Croatia at home and abroad.  “After all”, he pointed out mirroring 
Tuđman’s words from the previous decade, “Croats at home and Croats abroad are one 
nation, one unit, one spirit with one and the same desire”.744  However, the prevailing 
feeling today among the Diaspora is that they are largely alienated, even more so today 
than before Tuđman.  Professor Šoljak also listed bureaucracy as another factor that 
continues to alienate diasporants with hopes to return or with intentions to contribute to 
Croatia.  “They weren’t given a chance.  This relationship needs to be changed.”745  
Ivo Jolić, the president of CWC Canada, who emigrated from Croatia approximately 40 
years ago, identified the 2010 elections a possible step toward strengthening the bond 
between Croatia and its Diaspora by way of electing a President who will make this goal 
one of his priorities.  Jolić also touched on the question of citizenship, which, according 
to many Croats living abroad, should be offered to the members of the Croatian 
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744 Šoljak, N. (2009, March 11). Croatian Radio Interview: Bridges, Homeland and Diaspora. Retrieved 
from  http://www.hssd.hr/interview/intervju.html 
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Diaspora who have not yet acquired it.  The Diaspora sees the new elections as a 
possibility to influence Croatian politics in a positive way, not permitting it to go in 
unwanted directions.  In case of a new crisis in Croatia, the Diaspora, with its votes, 
Jolić comments, would ensure that Croatia does not go astray again.  He stressed that the 
Diaspora “has had enough of wrong directions, wrong ideologies and wrong 
decisions”.746 
The Croatian World Assembly proposes a solution that would include introducing nine 
Constituencies, instead of just the one that is currently provided for by the electoral law, 
which would account for 10 per cent of all the representatives in the Croatian 
Parliament.  This arrangement, they stress, would have the effect of further heightening 
the responsibility of the Croatian Diaspora toward its people in the homeland.  It justifies 
its proposal by stating that the number of Croats living outside Croatia, including first, 
second, third and now fourth generations of Croatian immigrants, reaches close to 15 
million.747  This proposal has been sent to the Croatian Parliament on a number of times 
– an effort that produced no result on each occasion. 
From Contribution to Entitlement  
 
The sentiments expressed by Croatian Diaspora organisations are an example of the 
increasingly vocal role transnational actors play through their continuous cross border 
influence on the political life in their homeland.  Findings suggest that the reasons 
behind Diaspora’s feeling of entitlement to a more powerful political voice are closely 
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747 Legislative Council of the Croatian Diaspora. (2002, June 21–23). Decisions, summary, requests and 
recommendations from first Legislative Council Meeting of the Croatian Diaspora.  Retrieved 
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connected to its view of the Croatian Diaspora as an organic part of the Croatian nation 
and, most importantly, as an instrumental agent in the fight for Croatian independence.  
These views accurately echo Tuđman’s unifying statements of the 1990s.  The general 
sentiment is that, for these reasons alone, strong ties between two groups of Croatians 
should be maintained by the Croatian Government.  This includes the restoration of 
Diaspora representation in the Parliament, one that is appropriate and gives justice to the 
size of the Croatian Diaspora.  Diaspora leaders further emphasise that, with their efforts 
in establishing independent Croatia, the Diaspora, many of them having fled their 
homeland due to political and economic reasons, want to help Croats in Croatia avoid a 
similar fate.  With this in view, Diaspora argues that the government does not have the 
right to silence its political voice and deride its right to vote in the homeland.  Diaspora 
Croats, having wielded considerable political and economic influence in Croatia, see the 
Diaspora as a co–founder of independent Croatia and no less a constituent part of the 
Croatian nation than their co–ethnics at home.  For these reasons they feel entitled to full 
voting rights, a representation in the Croatian Parliament that mirrors that of the 1990s 
and a strong voice in the political life of Croatia.  
Voting rights continue to be one of the greatest concerns among the Diaspora in the new 
millennium.  The Croatian Diaspora has recently used the ‘cannot see the forest for the 
trees’ metaphor in its claims that participating in Croatian political life from afar enables 
them to do it from an unbiased, fair and balanced perspective  –  a privilege unavailable 
to Croats in Croatia or those in BiH.  As we have seen, a number of post–Tuđman 
Croatian opposition parties continue to disagree, and even question the eligibility of their 
vote.  
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The Decline of Unity and Common Purpose: Who 
are We, Where do We Come From, Where are We 
Headed? 
 
There is a lack of leadership and a lack of organization among the members of the 
Croatian Diaspora in the US.  The level of our unity and passion is far from that of the 
early 1990s.748 
 
Through immigrant money, knowledge and experience, Diaspora Croats made a strong 
impact on Croatia as a whole.  Tuđman’s and his party’s efforts generated the highest 
level of ethnic homogenisation and cohesion among the Diaspora since the first 
emigration wave in the first decades of the 19th century, and connected all possible 
means of influence, whether financial or political.749  As we have seen in previous 
chapters, the years between 1991 and 1995 marked the most intensive period of 
Diaspora contribution to Croatia.  
In their role as bridges between two homelands, Diaspora Croats continue to contribute 
to both countries to this day.  One example is the Croatian Academy of America, which 
continues to educate the US public concerning Croatian literature, culture and history by 
organising and sponsoring lectures on these subjects and by publishing articles in the 
organisation's Journal of Croatian Studies.750  The Croatian Scholarship Fund’s goal is to 
educate leaders for Croatia's future by providing financial assistance to highly qualified 
students of Croatian origin.751  The Croatian World Congress, with national branches 
established in countries throughout the world, promotes humanitarian activities, the 
                                                 
748 A quote by a member of the Croatian Diaspora, surveyed for the purpose of this study. 
749 Djuric, I. (2001). The Croatian Diaspora in North America: Identity, Ethnic Solidarity and the 
Formation of a 'Transnational National Community. Spaces of Identity, 3, 89—105. 
750 The Croatian Academy of America. Retrieved from http://www.croatianacademy.org/ 
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promotion of culture, and Diaspora investment in business enterprises in Croatia, 
pressing forward Croatian and US business and trade links.  The Croatian Ethnic 
Institute produces and promotes materials valuable for the study of the Croatian 
language and heritage.  With its collection of books, periodicals and magazines, 
manuscripts and artefacts, the Institute encourages research on the sociological, 
demographic, religious, and political aspects of the Croatian Diaspora.752  Through their 
fraternal publications, Fraternalist and Naša Nada, the CFU and the CCU continue to 
contribute to the religious, political and cultural experience of the Croatian Diaspora.  
Internet networks and forums such as the Croatian World Network (CROWN) aim to 
bring Croatians and non–Croatians together through articles and news.  These 
organisations merely represent a fraction of Diaspora organisations that continue their 
cross–border activities, linking Croatia and the US.  
The advent of the Internet further revolutionised the lives of the immigrant communities 
by creating a new medium through which people express their views and maintain 
strong ties to their homeland.  This has added to the rise in ethnic group identification.  
However, with the completion of the fight for independence, the vigour, force and power 
of the early 1990s has dissipated.  Tuđman’s efforts in the 1990s had a dramatic 
influence on the Croatian Diaspora but the results they produced were not as resilient as 
the enthusiasm and energy of the 1990s might have promised.  The unity produced by 
the events in the early 1990s became exhausted and began to wane.  
The absence of a common enemy, a common goal and a mission that can be achieved 
only if everyone pulls together, has resulted in a decline in Diaspora unity, a gradual 
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alienation from the homeland and a decrease in ethno–national identification.  This is 
also partly due to differences in opinion regarding the political developments in Croatia, 
as well as a deteriorating relationship with the homeland.  A symposium titled “Croatian 
Diaspora in the USA on the Eve of the Third Millennium,” held in Chicago, served as an 
opportunity for Croatian–Americans to examine the situation of the Croatian Diaspora in 
the US and think of its future.  About 80 representatives of major Croatian Diaspora 
organisations, together with a number of diplomats from Croatia's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, students, young professionals, immigrants and professors, were present at the 
conference to express their concerns and promote discussions and planning about how to 
safeguard and promote the Croatian culture so that Croatian schools, churches political 
organisations, clubs, and other institutions continue to serve as bridges between the two 
homelands.753   
Findings of empirical research conducted for the purpose of this study also reveal 
important issues relating to concerns faced by the Croatian Diaspora.  On the heels of 
the new millennium, they were faced with the following questions: “What is the future 
of the Croatian Diaspora in the US?”, “Are Croatian–American political organisations 
losing their significance?”, “How can Croatian–Americans ensure the future of their 
ethnicity?”, “Are the young generations of Diaspora Croats interested in preserving their 
Croatian heritage?” The majority of the respondents continue to question the direction of 
the Croatian Diaspora and emphasise the need for a new approach to channel their 
energy.  The two homelands need to find new ways of connecting themselves.   
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They report that language and customs have lost their value as the main identity markers 
in many homes.  There is a need for more Croatian schools in the Diaspora and Croatian 
institutions, both at home and abroad, that can serve as important sources of knowledge 
and skills for the young Croatian Diaspora.  In similar terms, local community events 
can function as catalysts for bringing Diaspora communities together and at the same 
time provide an arena for the affirmation of common values and Croatian identity.  
Events like the San Pedro Croatian Festival,754 which includes food, music and dancing 
by dozens of young Croatian–Americans in national costumes, are both spectacular and 
entertaining, yet at the same time solemn and highly ceremonial practices that express 
Croatian cultural heritage in a complex way, drawing from all aspects of culture.  Folk 
dances, theatre shows, gastronomy events and music festivals that draw on the rich 
cultural, poetic and musical heritage can serve as major symbolic manifestations of 
Croatian identity.  As pointed out by a member of the Croatian–American Diaspora, “we 
need more drive from community members to change the status quo”.755 
Šoljak observes that before a meaningful Diaspora mobilisation around voting rights can 
be orchestrated, Croatians around the world need to recognise the common denominator 
they all share and join forces.  Šoljak further states that the Croats living in Croatia and 
those living abroad are two parts of one whole, equally responsible for maintaining and 
safeguarding Croatia’s interests.  He stressed fragmentation and disintegration of the 
Croatian Diaspora as one of its most threatening challenges.  It is for this reason the 
Croatian diasporants need to look beyond their differences, get organised and stand up 
                                                 
754 Adleman, A. (2008, May 30). Shoulder to shoulder at Croatian Festival. San Pedro News. Retrieved 
from http://sanpedronewsonline.blogspot.com/2008/05/shoulder-to-shoulder-at-croatian.html 
755 A quote by a member of the Croatian Diaspora, surveyed for the purpose of this study.  
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for their views.756 But most importantly, Diaspora members observe, what is necessary is 
a new, vibrant leadership and a considerable number of new Diaspora organisations, 
clubs and associations in order to continue maintaining a Croatian identity in North 
America.  
In February 2015 Kolinda Grabar–Kitarović, a politically conservative member of HDZ, 
became the first female president of Croatia, winning by the narrowest of margins.  
Since President Tuđman’s death, HDZ has alternated in power with the Social 
Democrats but has not regained the presidential post until 2015.  The 37,203 registered 
Croatian voters living in the Diaspora played a key role in deciding the elections.  
Grabar–Kitarović won in almost all countries with a significant Croat community, 
including the US, Canada, Australia, Austria, Germany and Switzerland.757  In her 
acceptance speech, Grabar–Kitarović makes special mention of Croats living abroad, 
acknowledging their contribution to the creation of the Croatian state and its 
independence – and potentially marking the beginning of a new era for Croatia and its 
Diaspora.  In her speech, she sends this message to Croats abroad: 
On this occasion I wish to send a special message to our émigrés 
throughout the world.  You too are Croatia and I shall never permit 
anyone to neglect your role and your contribution to the creation of the 
Croatian state.  
 
Referring to President Tuđman’s efforts of the 1990s, she also stresses the need to put an 
end to ideological divisions: 
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It is only though togetherness of the whole nation that we can build a 
better Croatia.  Let’s compete with ideas, solutions and innovation, and 
not with the roles our parents or grandparents played.  We will not realise 
a better life through ideological divisions nor will be become better 
people on account of them… Just as president Tuđman had created the 
preconditions for the creation of the Croatian state through the 
reconciliation of the divided national being, so too must we open a new 
page of our better future through a new Croatian togetherness.  We seek a 
better life in the future, not in the past!758 
 
 
The Question of Return 
 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the short–term nature of Croatian migration abroad 
was always emphasised at home as one of the peculiarities of Croatian emigration.  
Although the majority of the early migrants left Croatia with an animus revertendi, 
estimates show that only one third of them have since returned to their homeland. 759  In 
addition to economic reasons that discouraged migrants from returning, Čizmić 
identifies important reasons of political nature, in particular, the oppression of the 
Croatian people that occurred in the former Yugoslavia between the two world wars.760 
With socialist Yugoslavia collapsing, the Croatian Diaspora, and political emigrants in 
particular, welcomed HDZ’s invitation to return home.  However, the number of 
returnees is still fairly small – approximately 5000 families returned to Croatia between 
1990 and 1998 from all over the world761 (1200 of which are Croatian–Americans762).  
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With the establishment of Croatia as a sovereign and a democratic nation, it is expected 
that Croatian emigration to North America will continue to decline.763  
Although not many of them returned home, my findings suggest that Diaspora Croats 
define the achievement of Croatian independence as a turning point in their lives, giving 
them personal pride and increasing their self–esteem. 
Taking pride in Croatian independence, one research participant captures 
the prevailing sentiment in stating, “Independence day is dear to our 
hearts and is an expression of our pride in the historic achievement of the 
Croatian nation.  It is our responsibility to build on this achievement, to 
continue our dedication to our homeland, and to enhance it, 
comprehensively.   
 
Another respondent describes her connection to Croatia:   
Our pride in our homeland is real and unrelenting.  Croatia is where I 
belong.  It is where we all belong, whether we live there, visit or simply 
feel a spiritual bond to the place.  Our homeland is the embodiment of 
many long years of aspiration, through foreign rule and persecution.  It 
brings us together. 
 
At times, there is ‘more will than way’ to return home.  Different factors, including the 
new social and political circumstances in Croatia, the bureaucracy associated with the 
return and grim economic prospects, are all factors that slow down the return process.  A 
member of the modern–day Croatian Diaspora voiced an additional vital concern, shared 
by many young people: 
I am finishing my PhD studies in the US and am very much 
considering going home.  I want to go home because I will always be a 
foreigner in this country and I miss my people, my home, and my city.  
Realistically, in my field there are no jobs for me.  Further, the kind of 
salary and career advancement that Croatia can offer me at the moment is 
inadequate. 
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When Croatia declared independence in 1991, many Diaspora members defined it as 
‘mission complete’.  Long–term aspirations of their forbearers, both at home and abroad, 
were finally achieved and long–lasting struggle for independence successfully 
concluded.  Contrary to what was expected and predicted both in Croatia and abroad, 
this did not result in their return home en masse.  Preliminary research suggests that 
when the hope of return materialises and the means to go home finally emerge, the 
satisfaction and fulfilment does not always result in a return to one’s homeland.  For 
many, the mere option of return proved to be enough.  For others, a cluster of causes 
generated by the reality of everyday life proved to be responsible for diasporants re–
evaluating their lifelong hopes of return.  The majority of the participants in this research 
have found a balance between having a strong American or Canadian identity and being 
involved in the life of Croatian–American or Canadian communities.  By maintaining a 
balanced dual identity, they have found a way to preserve both the bond with Croatia as 
well as their devotion to their new homeland. 
In her acceptance speech, the newly elected Croatian President Kolinda Grabar–
Kitarović reminds the Diaspora of its importance to the Croatian nation. 
You are an important link between the homeland and the world but, also, 
our important component that will continue contributing to our national 
development.  Croatia’s door is wide–open to you.  Your knowledge and 
experience are precious to our homeland.764 
 
                                                 
764 Vukić, I. (2005, January 11). Welcome Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović – The New President Of Croatia. 
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Voices from the Diaspora welcomed her victory, observing, “the Croatian people have 
made it clear that they crave a new direction in the Office of the President of Croatia”.765  
The new President’s discourse and tone has also reminded many of Croatia’s first 
President, Franjo Tuđman. 
Conclusion 
 
Croatian Diaspora organisations have remained politically active both locally and 
globally.  Previous research suggests that, by nature, diasporas are “neither innocent nor 
subversive political actors,” almost always directing their energy at “positive 
enterprises” and serve as “bridges between cultures, societies, and states”.766  A number 
of Croatian Diaspora NGOs pride themselves in working to promote democratic values 
and principles in the homeland, with a goal of serving the best interests of both 
Croatians at home and their co–ethnics abroad.  
However, the controversy that overshadows some of the more recent Diaspora political 
actions has caused concern at home and within the international community, reflecting 
Adorno’s observation that, “distance is not a safety zone, but a field of tension”.767  The 
legacy of the past, and of the 1990s in particular, including a strong emphasis on ethnic 
belonging, is still seen as a major influence in some Croatian Diaspora organisations’ 
political decisions including voting preferences, lobbying, advocacy, advising and media 
work in their attempts at influencing politics at home as well as putting pressure on other 
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external actors.  Certain Croatian Diaspora groups are identified as still harbouring the 
strong passions of the 1990s, which continue to shape the aims and objectives of their 
organisations.  
As we have seen, Diaspora has been vocal in their disappointment with the ICTY, and 
some of the most recent public debates were framed around justice and accountability in 
the context of Croatia’s EU accession process.  The Diaspora saw the efforts of the 
ICTY, and Croatian Government’s support of those, as diminishing the significance of 
the Croatian ‘Homeland War’ and the collective sacrifices made by Croats at home and 
abroad.  Some of their most vocal press releases and public statements heavily borrow 
from Tuđman’s repertoire of diagnostic and prognostic frames. 
A number of Diaspora organisations frequently draw attention to Diaspora’s right to 
vote stating that the Croatian Diaspora has in effect been disenfranchised.  Šoljak,768 
echoing voices of other Croats in the Diaspora, clarifies by stating that the Croatian 
Diaspora in the US, Canada, Australia and Europe have been ‘tricked’ by the current 
electoral law as they do not have a single representative in the Parliament769.  And while 
Diaspora mobilises to pressure the Croatian Government to enable them to fully exercise 
their right to vote, the political debate over Diaspora’s eligibility to participate in 
Croatia’s elections and their apparent bias toward the HDZ remains a highly 
controversial political issue.  
In modern–day Diaspora communications, Croatian Diaspora continues to be identified 
as an organic part of the Croatian nation.  A sense of entitlement to participate in the 
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political life of their homeland is also central to recent Diaspora debates.  These were 
key elements of Tuđman’s discourse and continue to echo in the new millennium.  The 
Diaspora is also vocal in its observation that participating in Croatian political life from 
afar enables them to do it from an impartial and balanced perspective; Croats in Croatia 
or those in Bosnia and Herzegovina often cannot see situations as they really are and 
easily lose perspective.  Croatia’s policy toward neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina 
remains contested.  There are disagreements among major Diaspora organisations, 
including the Croatian American Association, the Croatian World Congress, National 
Federation of Croatian Americans and the Croatian Fraternal Union, on whether Croats 
from BiH are a part of the Diaspora or whether they are autochthonous, being a 
constituent nation in that country.  A similar debate exists in Croatia between the HDZ 
and the opposition parties. 
And while recent events around Croatia accession to the EU, including ICTY matters, as 
well as Diaspora voting rights have somewhat provided the Diaspora with a common 
purpose, the energy of the 1990s has dissipated and the Diaspora is now left looking for 
ways to replenish it.  This includes finding new charismatic leaders within the Diaspora, 
but also leaders in Croatia willing to work towards strengthening the bond between 
Croatia and its Diaspora and making that goal one of Croatia’s priorities.  Findings 
suggest that Diaspora Croats, having made considerable contributions to Croatia, 
politically, financially and humanitarily, see the Diaspora as a co–founder of 
independent Croatia and no less a constituent part of the Croatian nation than their co–
ethnics at home.  For these reasons they feel entitled to a representation in the Croatian 
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Parliament that they enjoyed throughout the 1990s.  As an organic part of the nation, 
they feel that they deserve to have a say in the political life of their home country. 
The new Croatian President Kolinda Grabar–Kitarović took office on 19 February 2015.  
Her job is largely ceremonial, but her win may signal a comeback for the opposition 
HDZ and a new era for the Croatian Diaspora.  Her victory has been described as 
emotional among HDZ supporters at home, and particularly among those in the 
Diaspora.  Openly acknowledging their contribution to the creation of the independent 
state of Croatia, Grabar–Kitarović vows to do her utmost to make Croatia a wealthy 
nation for both Croatians at home and in the Diaspora. 
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CHAPTER VII: Conclusions 
 
There is something about words. In expert hands, manipulated deftly, they take you 
prisoner. Wind themselves around your limbs like spider silk, and when you are so 
enthralled you cannot move, they pierce your skin, enter your blood, numb your 
thoughts. Inside you they work their magic.770 
 
I began this thesis by quoting an article published in a Croatian paper at the turn of the 
19th century, which alarmingly described Croatian emigration as the ‘suicide of the 
nation’.  Indeed, the outlook looked dire at the time and the events that followed a 
century later nearly brought that prediction to life.  The reality of the 1990s turned 
Croatia into a battlefield as the country fought for its survival.  This time the papers were 
equally alarmed by the predicament that Croatia found itself in and their choice of words 
was no milder.  The words they used weren’t accidental either.  The discourse that 
spread itself around Croatia and the Diaspora, obediently mirroring that of President 
Tuđman and his party, clearly pointed to the enemy responsible for the country’s 
grievances and created a strong division between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  The discourse also 
identified a way out, a solution to the nation’s problem.  This was articulated as 
Croatia’s ‘thousand–year–old dream of statehood’, its right to sovereignty.  This was a 
bold idea and an ambitious target which meant that ‘we’ had to unite against ‘them’ and 
act as a unified whole, a strong ‘one team’.  It also meant the country needed a much 
stronger, and a more resourceful, ‘we’.  President Tuđman was not the only one to 
recognise the great potential within the Croatian Diaspora, but he was the only one to 
take full advantage of it.  With the help of the Croatian Diaspora, Croatia was led 
towards independence, bringing the ‘thousand–year–old dream’ to reality.  Getting there, 
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as we have seen, was a long, arduous journey, one that was carefully planned and 
skilfully organised.  
The overarching question that this study sought to answer was “What shapes diaspora 
mobilisation?”  Are conflict–based arguments on their own adequate to explain diaspora 
mobilisation or are there additional, less apparent, yet more powerful, driving factors 
behind it?  What is the role of human agency? And, finally, when diasporas do get 
involved in homeland affairs, what determines the success of their efforts?  To what 
extent do politics at home strengthen networks abroad?  Empirical material used in the 
study of these questions was drawn from the Croatian Diaspora in North America.  The 
study sought to answer the following case study–specific question: 
What were the drivers behind Croatian Diaspora mobilisation in early 1990s and during 
the Croatian ‘Homeland War’?  
Closely related to the main question were the following questions:  
What roles were played by political leaders? Why/how did Tuđman and his party, the 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ,) succeed in strengthening the mobilisation and 
political influence of the Croatian Diaspora in their homeland?  
In exploring the process of Croatian Diaspora mobilisation the study identified the 
nature of the drivers of Diaspora mobilisation, the reasons and motivations behind it, the 
type and the extent of the resources required for mobilisation and the role and impact of 
the leader in the process.  Acknowledging the plethora of studies that have identified 
homeland conflict as a key contributor to diaspora mobilisation, this study argues that, 
while homeland conflict provides important opportunities to mobilise, agents play an 
important role in framing these opportunities to advance their political goals. Collective 
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action frames (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational), designed and disseminated by 
home country leaders, play a vital role in the successful mobilisation of the Croatian 
Diaspora. 
The following pages will provide a synthesis of the main arguments of the thesis.  The 
chapter will also identify the theoretical and policy implications of the study with respect 
to Diaspora Studies as well as consider implications in a broader context, beyond the 
points already made.  Finally, the last part of the conclusion will provide direction and 
areas for future research.   
Diaspora Mobilisation: Framing through the 
Lens of Leadership 
 
Over many generations large numbers of Croatians left their home country, either 
voluntarily or by force, and made their homes and lives elsewhere.  In the spirit of 
animus revertendi, some returned.  However, it was animus morandi that prevailed and 
many others remained abroad.  But the bond that they felt towards their homeland 
remained strong and enduring.  As in the case of many other diasporas, like the Irish, 
Armenian or the New Zealand diaspora, this is a bond that is not bound nor defined by 
geography or time.  However, not all Croatian emigrants and their descendants consider 
themselves to be Diaspora Croats.  The strength of their connection has varied over time 
and, as we have seen in the Croatian case, depended to a large extent on the 
circumstances in both their home and host countries.  
The previous chapters examined closely the mobilisation of the Croatian Diaspora 
during the period of early 1990s and analysed the drivers at home that defined the 
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strength and the scale of Diaspora bonds.  It has previously been stressed that a crisis at 
home has the power to bridge dispersed diaspora entities and prompt these groups to 
mobilise around their homeland.  ‘Dormant diasporas’, in particular, face severe 
dilemmas during periods of hardship at home.771  While recognising the role that 
‘homeland crisis’, and conflict in particular, can play in ‘awakening’ the identities of 
politically inactive diasporas, this study argues that there are additional factors that lead 
to a sustained diaspora involvement in homeland affairs, the type of involvement that we 
have seen in the Croatian case.  Diaspora involvement characterised by both strength 
and scale that we witnessed in Croatia was indeed buttressed by the ‘Homeland War’, 
but the process of Diaspora mobilisation began years before the first gunshot was fired.  
Indeed, it was words, not bullets, that proved to be the main motivators. 
This study argues that Croatian Diaspora mobilisation was greatly aided by the 
successful framing strategy designed by homeland leaders, namely President Tuđman 
and his supporters both at home and in the Diaspora.  Their discourse acted as a 
centripetal force that pulled the Diaspora towards the homeland, its centre, and 
mobilised it around a common cause.  This is where the notion of the triangular 
diaspora–host–home country relationship, as discussed by both Safran 772 and Sheffer,773 
is challenged.  At a time when diasporas are heavily engaged in their home country 
affairs, this relationship becomes more circular with the homeland at the very centre, 
with diaspora groups orbiting around it.  The centre–seeking force that kept the Croatian 
Diaspora groups focused on the homeland was the discourse of political leaders that 
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compellingly framed issues at the time to make them resonate with Diaspora groups 
abroad.  This force, it can be argued, altered the direction of their focus and brought 
them closer to home – physically, but also intellectually and psychologically. 
The role of leadership was given much–needed attention in this study to address a gap in 
the literature by focusing on human agency in the process of Diaspora mobilisation.  The 
study was interested in how leaders generate social change, how they take advantage of 
existing opportunities, and, more importantly, how they create new ones.  This study 
paid special attention to how leaders obtain authority and legitimacy, to what extent they 
employ ‘injustice frames’ referring to past and present grievances, and how they use 
references to a collective national identity focusing on shared meaning and cultural 
narratives to attract Diaspora support.  In examining the drivers behind Croatian 
Diaspora mobilisation, the study revealed how Croatian leaders diagnosed the national 
problem and proposed a solution in the form of Croatian statehood, freedom and 
prosperity.   
The main protagonist of the framing process, President Franjo Tuđman, the man behind 
the frame, is often credited with setting the foundations for an independent Croatia and 
liberating the country from communism.  And while his legacy remains controversial, 
Tuđman’s leadership qualities, admired by his devotees and his critics alike, are 
undeniable.  Without doubt, a favourable political environment was a crucial factor that 
contributed to Tuđman’s political success.  The political system of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s Croatia was weak and susceptible to change.  This weakness was primarily 
influenced by the growth of political pluralism, elite cleavages and rising political 
divisions.  But no matter how advantageous and conducive the conditions presented by 
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the opportunity structure, they provide potential actors with nothing more than that – 
opportunity.  At the end of the day, it is up to the individual to harness the opportunities 
offered and maximise on their benefits.  As a resourceful political leader, Tuđman did 
nothing short of that.  In fact, his efforts resulted in a Diaspora undertaking unparalleled 
by any other period in Croatia’s history.  But even with political opportunity on the rise 
in Croatia in the late 1980s and the 1990s, it would have been difficult for any leader to 
fully take advantage of the political opportunities offered without the help of powerful 
and resourceful allies and talented aides.  Tuđman’s charisma, his resourcefulness and 
his talent in taking advantage of political opportunity only formed the foundation 
necessary for the efforts that followed.  They were only a part of the puzzle that allowed 
Tuđman to assume power and lead Croatia towards independence.  Of equal importance 
was his social and political capital, which enabled him to choose the right collaborators 
and the framework needed to get him there.  To achieve the success he did, Tuđman 
relied heavily on his core supporters in the Croatian Diaspora.  His ability to travel 
abroad, giving him access to the Diaspora, provided him with an important head start 
over other political parties and helped him build much–needed momentum abroad.   
Tuđman and his allies chose a nationalist political framework, one that proved to be the 
most suitable one at the time, promising change to Croats at home and those around the 
world.  Within this framework they successfully identified a question of national 
urgency, and through their discourse clearly articulated the causes of Croatia’s ‘national 
distress’.  Interestingly, the opportunity to create change, publicised by the leaders to 
attract support, revealed a self–fulfilling aspect of political opportunity structures; 
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namely, Diaspora involvement, with its financial contributions, created further 
opportunity. 
As a charismatic and capable leader, Tuđman moved the masses.  Through his discourse, 
he manipulated old ideas and shaped new ones.  He adeptly finessed conceptions of 
Croatian identity, interpreting and articulating them in a way that legitimised his 
political program.  This was achieved by carefully fabricating what the literature calls 
meta–frames or master frames, which will be summarised further below.  A man of 
many inconsistencies, evident from shifts in his political and religious views, Tuđman 
managed these well, ensuring he remained relevant and attuned to the needs and wants 
of his audience.  His personal journey from political persecutions, to arrests and 
imprisonments, helped him create an image of a man that was able to identify with 
historical grievances suffered by Croatians, many of whom settled in the Diaspora.  
Historical grievances later became key themes of his collective action frames.  
Framing the Road towards Statehood 
 
Tuđman’s master frames can be defined as larger schemata of meaning that generated 
larger narratives connected to collective Croatian perspectives.  Their role was to contest 
existing political realities and support alternative ones.  The main components of the 
Croatian Diaspora collective action frames, identified through discourse analysis and 
elaborated on in Chapter IV, were all framed as essential steps in Croatia’s journey from 
victim to victory.  The discourse framed by Tuđman and his collaborators had two main 
tasks.  The first was to diagnose the ‘national problem’, an issue requiring urgent 
attention by the Croatian people, while the second was to offer a solution. 
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The role of diagnostic framing was not only to identify and appropriately frame the 
national problem but also to attribute blame.  The diagnostic frames served as a 
justification for challenging the status quo and were a key driver of collective action.  
Discourse analysis conducted for this study identified three fundamental elements of the 
diagnostic framing process: the first one being problem diagnosis itself, framed as the 
abolition of ‘national slavery’, accompanied by the creation of ‘injustice frames’ that 
highlighted traumatic events from Croatian history, many of which had forced large 
numbers of Croats to emigrate.  This was followed by the closely related ‘adversarial’ or 
‘boundary’ frames aimed at identifying a collective enemy, ‘the greater Serbian 
aggressor’, responsible for the nation’s distress.  This created very clear boundaries 
between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and strong divisions between the Croats and the Serbs.  It was 
stressed that Croatia was a European nation, both traditionally and culturally, and a part 
of the Western European tradition, while Serbs were closer to the East.   
These first stages of the diagnostic process, which focused on the ‘victim’ aspect of the 
Croatian nation, highlighting a number of traumatic periods from the nation’s history, 
were important for achieving resonance.  Most frequent references in the discourse both 
at home and abroad included the 1945 Bleiburg massacre and the events surrounding the 
1970s Croatian Spring.  Tuđman and his allies actively engaged in the process of 
‘politicisation of commemoration’,774 providing a list of events to be remembered – 
handpicked and methodically packaged.  At the same time, their discourse was 
appropriately emotionally resonant, nudging individuals into action, broadening the 
framers’ support base and gathering resources.  This process in turn helped form a new 
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collective Croatian identity, which strengthened Diaspora cohesion and unity.  Group 
membership allowed individuals to remember particular events coherently and 
consistently.775  It also generated nationalistic fervour among individuals who never 
personally experienced any of those historical events, enabling them to identify with 
their fellow countrymen who had a more direct involvement with the events.  References 
found in the Fraternalist, the official journal of the Croatian Fraternal Union, linked to 
Croatian culture, history, myths, language, and religion served as powerful tools in the 
process of ethnic homogenisation and were instrumental in the early days of Diaspora 
mobilisation. 776  The Diaspora was explicitly woven into the discourse as Tuđman 
blamed historical injustices for splitting the Croatian nation in two, as many were forced 
to leave the country during those times.  The HDZ was very vocal, particularly when 
addressing the Diaspora, against the political disagreements that existed within the 
Croatian nation, particularly the different political views among the Diaspora.  Tuđman 
openly called for the unification of all Croats, both within and outside the borders of 
Croatia. 
The injustice frame employed by the framers further intensified the longing for the 
‘thousand–year–old dream of Croatian statehood’ among Croats.  This was seen as a 
right denied to the Croatian nation for centuries and, most recently, as emphasized by 
Tuđman, by the ‘great Serbian aggressor’.  The promise to turn that dream into reality 
was what constituted much of the prognostic elements of Tuđman’s collective action 
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frames.  These prognostic frames, intricately linked to their diagnostic counterparts, 
functioned as explanatory lenses offering solutions to collective problems identified in 
the process of diagnosis.  Achieving Croatia’s ‘thousand–year–old dream of statehood’ 
was framed as the solution to the ‘national problem’, providing the targeted audience 
with a sense of direction and a common goal.  Identifying and framing a specific 
problem helped limit the range of possible solutions.  It made the goal obvious, very 
clear, and almost palpable.  Discourse analysis identified two preconditions for 
achieving that dream: national reconciliation and pan–Croatian unity, including a unified 
Croatian Diaspora, which was defined as an organic part of the Croatian nation.  These 
were framed as sine qua non for changing the status quo and realising the ‘thousand–
year–old dream of Croatian statehood’.  A first step to achieving unity was to enable the 
return of Diaspora Croats, also a key component of Tuđman’s Diaspora CAF.  These 
achieved a high level of resonance with Tuđman’s key constituency – the Diaspora, a 
key resource for bringing the proposed solution into reality.  The prospect of the 
‘thousand–year–old dream of Croatian statehood’ coming true was gripping and 
inspirational.  “It possessed such magnetism about it”.777  It resonated across multiple 
generations of the Croatian Diaspora as the only way of effectively changing the status 
quo. The discourse also plainly identified the HDZ as the only party capable of turning 
this vision into reality. In executing his plan Tuđman heavily relied on both weak and 
strong ties in the Diaspora, which included religious representatives and early friends 
and allies in the Diaspora acting as spokesmen for the collective Diaspora identity. An 
important part of Tuđman’s CAF was the Catholic Church, portrayed as the preserver of 
Croatian identity.  The church, an important motivational force and a strong source of 
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resonance, became an important ally of HDZ, emphasising the role of Catholic values in 
Croatian society in its fight against the enemy. 
It is important to stress that motivational frames are difficult to separate from diagnostic 
and prognostic frames, as all frames require a high degree of resonance.  Successful 
frames are primarily so because of their motivational power.  Regardless of how 
accurate the national diagnosis or how rational the solution, without resonance 
diagnostic and prognostic frames will not result in action.  For a frame to resonate with 
its audience, it needs to ensure narrative fidelity and cultural resonance.778  Cultural 
resonance is achieved through having a high degree of credibility and significance in 
potential followers’ lives, where the power of emotion plays an important role. The 
breadth of Tuđman’s diagnostic master frame, with a large range of problems in its 
scope, also proved instrumental in achieving resonance.  The prognostic frame promised 
the much needed protection and relief from foreign oppression.  Diaspora support for the 
homeland was framed as a contribution toward the struggle to obtain these values, 
carrying a high degree of resonance.  The collective identity discourse, which focused on 
shared meanings and cultural narratives, used heavily by the framers, echoed within the 
divided groups of the Croatian Diaspora, invigorating them into social, political and 
economic action.   
Analyses of Tuđman’s discourse and its reception in the Diaspora points to the presence 
of all four generic vocabularies of motive as identified by Benford.779  These include 
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vocabularies of severity, urgency, efficacy and propriety, which proved vital for 
achieving resonance and contributed substantially to a sustained Diaspora involvement 
in homeland affairs.  However, one additional component proved to be of particular 
salience for Croatian Diaspora mobilisation: one we can refer to as the ‘perceived 
justness of the cause’.  This vocabulary introduced the notion of duty and a feeling of 
responsibility and obligation among Diaspora Croats to ‘do the right thing’.  Tuđman’s 
discourse encouraged them to stand up for the ‘Croatian cause’ referring to it as a cause 
worth fighting for, one that promised the realisation of Croatia’s ‘thousand–year–old 
dream of statehood’.  These vocabularies are evident in Tuđman’s speeches in North 
America where he talked about national self–determination as the “unstoppable dynamic 
of ‘history’s forward march”.780 
There was great deal of intent and rationale behind first selecting, filtering, and then 
meticulously packaging and carefully articulating the words that appeared in Tuđman’s 
political speeches, public statements and interviews.  They were packaged to go around 
the world like a boomerang.  What gave the new discourse novelty is “not so much the 
originality or the newness of its ideational elements, but the manner in which they 
[were] spliced together and articulated”,781 accessing ideas from a novel perspective and 
articulating them accordingly. 
His ideas resonated globally, across the Diaspora, and resulted in an unprecedented 
Diaspora undertaking, bringing the ‘thousand– year– old dream of statehood’ to reality.  
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All members of the Croatian Diaspora interviewed for the purpose of this study spoke of 
a heightened sense of identity, connection, and pride they experienced at the time.  To 
borrow Gamsons words, Diaspora participation in homeland affairs  amplified the 
diasporants’ personal identity and offered “fulfilment and realisation of the self”.782   
Tuđman’s Lingering Legacy in the New 
Millennium 
 
Croatian Diaspora organisations have remained politically active both locally and 
globally; however, their activity has been overshadowed by the controversy associated 
with some of the more recent Diaspora engagements.  A number of Croatian Diaspora 
groups are seen as still living in a 1990s state of mind, which continues to shape the 
mission of their organisations.  Tuđman’s legacy is evident from their political decisions 
including voting preferences, lobbying and advocacy, and other attempts at influencing 
politics at home as well as putting pressure on their host countries and the wider 
international community.  The post–Tuđman Croatian Diaspora continues to strongly 
voice ideas framed by Tuđman in the 1990s.  This is particularly evident in some of the 
more recent public debates framed around justice and accountability in the context of 
Croatia’s journey towards the EU.  More specifically, the Diaspora’s disappointment 
with the effort of the ICTY supported by the Croatian Government was seen as 
downplaying the importance of the Croatian ‘Homeland War’.  A large number of 
Diaspora groups saw these efforts as disrespectful of the joint sacrifices made by Croats 
both at home and in the Diaspora.  
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Modern–day Diaspora communications heavily borrow from Tuđman’s inventory of 
diagnostic and prognostic frames.  In some of the most vocal Diaspora publications, the 
Croatian Diaspora continues to be identified as an organic part of the Croatian nation.  In 
line with this claim, a central theme found in recent Diaspora debates, which was also a 
key element of Tuđman’s discourse, is a sense of entitlement to participate in the 
political life of their homeland.  Having contributed politically, financially and 
humanitarily to the future of Croatia in the 1990s, the Diaspora see themselves as co–
founders of independent Croatia and equal members of the Croatian nation.  As such, 
they feel entitled to participate in the political life of their home country.  Referring to its 
right to vote, the Croatian Diaspora sees itself as having been disenfranchised by the 
current electoral law,783 as currently all existing Diaspora representatives in the Croatian 
Parliament are from Bosnia and Herzegovina, effectively leaving the overseas Croatian 
Diaspora without any representation.  And while Diaspora’s passionate pleas for its right 
to vote continues, its eligibility to participate in Croatia’s elections as well its bias 
toward the HDZ remains highly controversial and politicised at home.  There continue to 
be disagreements between the HDZ and other political parties in Croatia on whether 
Croats from BiH fall under the category of Diaspora or whether they are autochthonous 
to BiH.  A parallel debate exists between major Diaspora organisations, including the 
National Federation of Croatian Americans, the Croatian Fraternal Union, the Croatian 
American Association, and the Croatian World Congress.  An important part of that 
debate is the view that partaking in Croatian political life from a distance enables the 
overseas Diaspora to remain unbiased and rational, unlike those in BiH. 
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Unquestionably, recent political developments around Croatia’s accession to the EU, 
including ICTY matters, as well as Diaspora’s voting rights have to a certain degree 
provided the Diaspora with a shared goal and a common purpose.  However, there is no 
doubt that the energy of the 1990s is long gone.  Findings suggest that without a 
charismatic leader, one that is willing to invest in strengthening the bond between 
Croatia and its Diaspora, it is unlikely that the situation is going to change.  With that 
said, early 2015 brought some optimism to many in the Diaspora, with the new Croatian 
President Kolinda Grabar–Kitarović taking office in February of the same year.  
Pointing to the importance of human agency, HDZ supporters at home and abroad 
described her victory as emotional, and her Presidency as the beginning of a new era for 
the Croatian Diaspora.  In her speeches, echoing ideas expressed by Tuđman, she openly 
acknowledged the Diaspora’s contribution to Croatian independence, promising to bring 
prosperity to Croats at home and abroad.  
The echoes of Tuđman’s frames in the new millennium, whether voiced in the Diaspora 
or repeated by the new Croatian President, point to a high degree of resonance achieved 
by Tuđman’s frames in the 1990s.  The resonant power of Tuđman’s discourse 
contributed to these frames becoming institutionalised in the Diaspora, continuing to 
generate a modern–day discourse emulating the one that dominated the 1990s.  In the 
1990s political elites made words their primary tools in stimulating a strong involvement 
of receptive audiences at home and abroad.  They achieved unprecedented success in 
implementing their ideas through the creation of Diaspora collective action frames and a 
discourse that endorsed and encouraged a collective Diaspora identity.  This study has 
demonstrated the importance of human agency in the process of Diaspora mobilisation 
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and revealed the centrality of the role leaders play in the processes of framing.  Going 
back to Ernest Renan’s claim784 that to be nation is “to have done great things together” 
and “to want to do more” we can indeed say that Tuđman steered the Diaspora towards 
wanting to do more, but this desire, which was most evident in the 1990s, was carried 
over well into the 21st century, with the Diaspora working towards new goals, but inside 
very similar, Tuđmanesque, frameworks.  The Diaspora not only had “common glories 
in the past” but a “common will in the present”.785 
Contributions to Research and Suggestions for 
Future Study 
 
What shapes the political agendas of Diasporas?  What drives their mobilisation?  This 
study contributes to existing literature by expanding our understanding of the contexts in 
which diaspora mobilisation operates. The study broadens our understanding of the 
strategies behind political mobilisation of diasporas and the causes and motivations 
behind their participation in the political life of their homelands.  A plethora of studies 
focus on homeland conflict as the sole explanatory variable for diaspora mobilisation, 
arguing that some of the most highly mobilised diaspora groups are conflict–generated.  
In linking the literature on collective action frames with Diaspora studies, this study 
offers a complementary explanation, analysing in depth how framing processes (which 
instrumentlise homeland conflict) work in the presence of charismatic leadership and 
their framing strategies. 
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By focusing on the drivers of Diaspora mobilisation, this study has also significantly 
contributed to Croatian Diaspora Studies, where much of the focus to date has been on 
the outcomes of Diaspora engagement, including political activity as such, or the push 
and pull factors of Croatian emigration.  Also, by looking at mobilisation through the 
lens of leadership, this study has addressed the gap in the literature around the role of 
human agency in the process of mobilisation.  However, further research remains to be 
done.  Indeed, leaders do not accomplish everything on their own; they are assisted by 
political opportunities and organisational structures.  Existing theories, however, with 
their structural orientation, tend to minimise the role leaders play in processes of 
mobilisation.  Shifting the focus to the leader, both on how they develop individually as 
a leader and how they lead through their supporters, is something that can greatly 
expand our knowledge of the dynamics of diaspora mobilisation.  
Further, the findings of this thesis can also apply to a larger universe of cases of 
conflict–generated diasporas linked to sovereignty conflicts in the original homeland. 
Lyons and Mandaville observe that diasporas are not the only actors to “think locally 
and act globally”786, but homeland-based secessionist elites do so as well.787 A vibrant 
debate is taking place at the moment, with scholars delving deeper into the factors and 
processes leading to different types of diaspora mobilisations, and how such 
mobilisations influence political and social processes in their original homelands. For 
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example, Koinova observes that different types of diaspora mobilisation could occur 
depending on the strength of the linkages between the main secessionist elites and the 
diaspora. A framing perspective, particularly the leadership aspect of it, can further 
elucidate our understanding of the strength of diaspora–homeland linkages, allowing us 
to explain why certain diaspora–homeland collations endure and others dissipate. It can 
contribute to existing literatures by adding more in–depth understanding of the contexts 
in which transnational diaspora mobilisation operates. It can also further our 
understanding of how the position of diaspora entrepreneurs in a particular state 
becomes important for the sovereignty struggle. For example, Kosovo's secessionist 
elites, in order to internationalise the conflict, needed to create links to alternative 
nonstate actors, including diaspora entrepreneurs, opening offices in Turkey,  
Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Norway, and other European countries as well as 
overseas, in the United States, Canada, and Australia.788 Koinova argues that the level of 
interactions in the transnational space between the main secessionist elites and diaspora 
entrepreneurs depend on how important the main secessionist elites consider the position 
of a particular diaspora to be for the sovereignty goal, with linkages being “strong” when 
a diaspora is considered more able to contribute to the achievement of sovereignty in the 
homeland.789 A framing perspective with a focus on the role of human agency can, for 
instance, help explain why radical and moderate Kosovar diaspora attitudes were strong 
in the United States and weak in the United Kingdom. This  study can expand our view 
of how diaspora–homeland linkages contributed to the strong radicalisation of US 
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diaspora politics.790 It can open up new avenues of understanding to how leaders 
establish durable links with a particular diaspora and how they frame their narrative to 
unite, organise and mobilise diaspora entrepreneurs around their agenda. In the Kosovo 
case, it can shed light on how leaders maintained strong relationships with the US–based 
diaspora, how they capitalised on the internal warfare in Kosovo in 1998–1999, and how 
they framed and disseminated their mobilisation messages that contributed to the strong 
radicalisation of US diaspora politics. 
This thesis also contributes to the scarce literature on diasporas and democratisation. 
Shain argues that diasporas are not just insensitive nationalists but can contribute to their 
home country’s quest for democracy. In his analysis of Mexican, Greek, Haitian, and 
Cuban cases in the US, he observes that the diaspora fight against authoritarian regimes 
is often led by political emigrés who were active in the political sphere prior to leaving 
their home countries.791 In her analysis of the Ukrainian, Serbian, Albanian, and 
Armenian diasporas, Koinova observes that there is a high degree of variation in the 
behaviour of diasporas in terms of the role that they play in the democratisation of their 
home countries. She argues that a number of different challenges to the sovereignty of 
their homelands explain whether diasporas involve with procedural or liberal aspects of 
democratisation. She argues that unless diasporas are linked to home countries that enjoy 
both international legal and domestic sovereignty, they will involve only with procedural 
                                                 
790 ibid 
791 Shain, Y., 1994e1995. Ethnic diasporas and US foreign policy. Political Science Quarterly, 109 (5), 
811e-841. 
      Shain, Y., 1999. Marketing the American Creed Abroad. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK. 
      Shain, Y., 2002. The role of diasporas in conflict perpetuation and resolution. SAIS Review XXII 
              (SummereFall), 120e123. 
      Shain, Y., 2007. Kinship and Diasporas in International Affairs. University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor. 
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aspects of democratisation. Diasporas filter international pressure to democratise post–
communist societies by utilising democratic procedures to advance nationalist goals. The 
Ukranian diaspora for example, linked to a homeland that enjoyed both international 
legal and domestic sovereignty, demonstrated some involvement with liberal aspects of 
democratisation after 1989, unlike other diasporas, the Kosovo or Karabakh diaspora for 
instance, linked to homelands experiencing challenges either to their international legal 
sovereignty or domestic sovereignty, engaged with procedural aspects of democracy 
only. 792 
Democracy was also a frame used by elites to mobilise Croats abroad. In Chapter V we 
have seen examples of how the sovereignty focused prognostic frame also drew its 
resonance from diaspora Croatians’ conditions in North America where they were 
motivated by the great American narrative of democracy and freedom.  In line with this 
narrative, one of Tuđman’s key claims was that there were two main battles to be fought 
collectively by the Croatian nation. These were defined as the battle for democracy and 
the battle for Croatia. The analysis of Tuđman speeches, among other themes, identified 
democracy as a frame used to attract Diaspora support. To achieve it, it was emphasised, 
a ‘one team’ was needed; the nation needed to join forces with its Diaspora, a process 
which Tuđman referred to as “spiritual revival”, a “victory of the democratic spirit and 
unity between all Croatian citizens”.793 As we have seen in Chapter V, although the 
democracy frame achieved some degree of resonance among the Diaspora, it was 
                                                 
792 Koinova, M. Diasporas and democratization in the post-communist world. Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, 42 (2009), 41-64. Retrieved from http://ac.els-
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heavily overshadowed by a much stronger frame, one that focused on fear of foreign 
(Serbian) domination. According to Huszka, in the presence of widespread fear, 
alternative frames for ethnically inclusive identities and moderation, such as the 
democracy frame, fail to win mass backing.794  In Croatia and in the Diaspora, these 
fears were built on the strong and widespread belief of the late 1980s Croatia that Serbs 
were joining efforts to create a ‘Greater Serbia’. This helped solidify HDZ’s ‘foreign 
domination’ frame, which became a much stronger motivating force.  In late 1990 we 
witness this frame eventually taking over all alternative frames, including those that 
focused on democracy, free elections and prosperity.  
This study also shed some light on factors leading to frame transformation, with 
examples from the Croatian Diaspora suggesting that frame transformation becomes 
needed when proposed solutions do not resonate or are in conflict with views of core 
supporters.  Unfortunately, this alignment approach has not received adequate attention 
and further research remains to be done.  Future research would benefit from examining 
the factors that enable frame resonance and lead to their successful dispersal in the 
public sphere where they are accepted and internalised, while other, less effective 
frames, fail. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the role of leaders (and their discourse) in mobilising 
diasporas with homelands that have no existential threats would be valuable from the 
perspective of governments wanting to leverage the skills, experience and networks of 
expatriates for economic purposes.  These diasporas do not belong to a universe of cases 
of conflict–generated diasporas for which the emerging literature has identified some 
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distinctive characteristics: involuntary emigration, traumatic identities linked to painful 
experiences, intention or myth of return, and emotional links to original homelands 
experiencing limited sovereignty. For example, the great New Zealand diaspora, one of 
the world’s largest per capita, has passed the million mark, meaning one million Kiwis 
now live overseas. There is a rising sentiment that New Zealand has reached a tipping 
point, that an ongoing exodus of the best and brightest is a cost the New Zealand 
economy can’t easily bear, particularly given many expatriates have gone for good.  The 
government is searching for better ways to draw upon the knowledge, skills and 
connections of New Zealanders abroad.  How successful are framing strategies when the 
home country is a prosperous and peaceful nation?  What roles do leaders play? 
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